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ABSTRACT 
This thesis describes a program of research designed to investigate the sensitivity of 
perceivers to the ontological distinctions between simulated expressions of happiness 
unrelated to positive emotional experience, or, posed smiles, and spontaneous, 
veridical expressions of positive affect, or, genuine smiles. Importantly, this research 
was conducted from within the theoretical framework of Gibsonian ecological 
psychology, an alternative approach to the information processing theories that 
dominate contemporary psychological theorising. 
Four experiments were conducted that employed an original set of ecologically valid 
facial displays generated specifically for the present research. In Experiments I a and 
1 b, it was demonstrated that when jUdging from either photographs or video, 
participants could determine whether a smile reflected a positive emotional 
experience or not. Furthermore, for both of these studies, participants exhibited a bias 
toward misidentifying posed smiles that expose the teeth as genuine smiles. 
Experiment 2 also revealed findings consistent with the notion that perceivers are 
sensitive to the meaningful differences between posed and genuine smiles. In this 
study, participants were required to judge the valence of a series of target words, each 
of which was preceded by a briefly presented facial expression (i.e. a prime). The 
results of this study indicated that the identification of positive words was facilitated 
when preceded by a genuine smile, but not a posed smile. Experiment 3 was 
conducted to further investigate how such sensitivity may be manifest in regard to 
guiding effective social interaction. PartiCipants were required to play several rounds 
of the Prisoners' Dilemma game with partners (actually video recordings) exhibiting 
Xll 
either posed or genuine smiles. The results of this experiment indicated that genuine 
smiles facilitated cooperative interaction, but posed smiles did not. 
The results of all four experiments are discussed in terms of the functionality provided 
by accurate social perception with regard to the acquisition of information specifying 
the emotional state, and more broadly, the dispositional properties of conspecifics. 
Finally, these results will be considered in terms of the ecological conceptualisation of 
psychological activity, with an emphasis on the social affordances specified by posed 
and genuine smiles respectively. 
CHAPTER 1 
Emotion, Smiling and Social Interaction 
Detection of the dispositional properties belonging to the people, places, and things of 
the environment is a fundamental capacity of human cognition. Basic survival needs 
are often met simply by knowing what may harm us, what may help us or what we 
need to know more about. Such knowledge equips us to avoid the dangerous, 
approach the beneficial or explore the unknown. Moreover, the environment contains 
a wealth of information specifying just such properties. We can tell whether fruits are 
ripe from their hue, the likelihood of rain from cloud formations, the sex of a stranger 
from their gait, and so on. By attending to the relevant properties of the environment 
we are able to shape our activity toward realising goals and avoiding harm. In this 
sense, perception guides action in an adaptive, functional manner. The information we 
acquire regarding the people, places, and things of the environment helps steer us 
toward biologically adaptive behaviour. 
The functional nature of perception takes on an especially significant role when 
engaging with others. Successful social interaction requires the accurate acquisition of 
information relevant to the dispositional properties of others. Along with more stable 
characteristics such as age, sex, and identity, an awareness of the emotional state of 
interaction partners proffers considerable advantage for the social perceiver. By 
attending to indicators of another's emotional state the perceiver can acquire 
knowledge helpful for guiding interaction with that person. Knowing that someone is 
angly will tend to lead to quite different types of interaction in comparison to 
knowing they are happy. It is advisable to be more wary of an angry than a happy 
individuap.iPone wishes to avoid hann. Again, in interactive situations perception 
guides behaviour in a functional manner; the infonnation we acquire regarding other 
people's emotional states helps guide us toward socially adaptive encounters. 
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Thus, it follows that the social perceiver will enjoy adaptive advantage by being 
sensitive to information specifying the dispositional properties of others. Knowledge 
of the socially relevant qualities of others allows the perceiver to tailor their own 
behaviour toward achieving desirable and successful interactions and avoiding 
potentially hannful transactions. However, the utility of such perception-action cycles 
may be compromised if the interests of the interaction partners do not correspond. 
What is adaptive for one person in a dyadic interaction may not be adaptive for the 
other. For instance, if one is angered sufficiently to want to hann another, signalling 
this intention by providing infonnation about emotional state may actually thwart the 
achievement of this goal. Upon recognising expressed anger, the perceiver is granted 
an opportunity to anticipate potential harm and behave accordingly (perhaps by 
fleeing, pre-emptively attacking, or attempting some form of non-violent conflict 
resolution). Consequently, in the context of social exchange, there may often be 
incentives to employ some form of disingenuous signalling (e.g. pretending to be 
happy when actually angry). In this situation, the social perceiver needs to be 
sensitive to the difference between infonnation that actually specifies a disposition 
and attempts to simulate dispositional infonnation or else risk being deceived and 
losing the adaptive function accurate social perception brings. 
The present research utilises the notion of the functional nature of social perception to 
investigate the sensitivity of perceivers to infonnation specifying positive emotional 
3 
state. In particular, the focus of the cunent research relates to the function of detecting 
information specifying a positive emotional state by means of facial expressions, 
specifically posed and genuine smiles. While the latter are spontaneous, genuine 
expressions of emotional state, posed smiles are intentional communicative 
mechanisms usually intended to simulate an emotional state. In this sense it is 
important for the social perceiver to be sensitive to any meaningful differences 
between posed and genuine smiles or risk misperceiving the relevant opportunities for 
adaptive interaction with an individual exhibiting a smile. 
This chapter outlines an argument regarding the adaptive function that the accurate 
detection of the emotional state of others provides the social perceiver. Initially, 
relevant approaches to the study of emotion will be reviewed with a focus on 
functional accounts of emotion as well as the link between emotional experience and 
facial expression. Subsequently, evidence will be presented that suggests systematic 
physiological and psychological distinctions exist between posed and genuine smiles 
that are manifest physiognomically and are therefore available to be perceived. 
Finally, consideration will be given to a recent theoretical account of the evolution of 
smiling in humans that posits that genuine smiles were selected for as an effective 
mechanism of fostering cooperation by means of eliciting positive emotion in others. 
Emotions and Emotion Theory 
_ . ..-" 
Intellectual interest in human emotion can be found in the writing of many of the 
great philosophers from history. Plato and Aristotle both wrote of the place of 
emotion in their respective considerations of the human condition, as did Descartes 
and Darwin to name only a very few significant contributors. Modem psychology has 
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strong roots in emotion theory and research, which is evident by the seminal works 
produced by James (1884; 1890), Lange (Lange, 1885), Cannon (1929) and Freud 
(Breuer & Freud, 1895/1960). More recently, the rise of cognitivism within 
psychology has seen a proliferation of theorising and research concerning emotion 
(e.g. Elanan, 1994; Frijda, 1953; Izard & Bartlett, 1972; Lazarus, 1991; Plutchik, 
1962; Schachter & Singer, 1962; Tomkins, 1962). As may be expected the views 
within this body of literature represent different theoretical and empirical approaches 
to the study of emotion potentially as diverse as those exhibited in the study of 
psychology itself. Contemporary accounts of emotion range from those that establish 
the foundations of emotion in biology (e.g. Buck, 1999) and evolution (e.g. Cosmides 
& Tooby, 2000) to strictly social constructionist approaches whereby emotions are 
conceptualised principally as learnt responses (e.g. Harre, 1986). Clearly then, a 
comprehensive review of the literature pertaining to emotion is well beyond the scope 
of this thesis. However, the present approach relies on concepts relating to emotion 
and emotional experience as part of a functional description of aspects of social 
perception (also see Chapter 2) hence a brief review of relevant aspects from this 
literature is necessary. To this end, the following sections outline the dominant 
contemporary functional approaches to emotion. These theories establish a broad 
conceptual framework for arguing that emotions have an important role in 
coordinating social interaction. 
Functional Accounts of Emotion 
Although definitions of emotion are potentially as numerous as the theories to which 
they pertain, many researchers suggest that emotions function to help the individual 
cope adaptively with the contingencies of their environment (e.g. Elanan, 2003; 
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Frijda, Kuipers, & Schure, 1989; Izard, 1994; Plutchik & Conte, 1997). Often 
described as coming from a psycho evolutionary approach to emotion these theorists 
expand on Darwin's (1872/1998) early writing on emotional expression to suggest 
that emotions are multi-component, biologically based patterns of action and 
interaction that have been shaped by natural selection to serve specific ecological 
functions. Lazarus (1991) for instance, in one of the more thorough analyses of 
emotion, suggests that emotions occur in response to a meaningful appraisal of the 
person-environment relationship. Appraisal involves some form of appreciation of the 
potential for both harm and benefit in the relationship between the individual and their 
environment, which triggers a relevant emotional response specific to the appraised 
situation or, as Lazarus termed it, adaptational encounter. The emotional response is 
generally conceived as involving several inter-related components typically including 
phenomenal experience (Jones, 1995), physiological effects including changes to the 
endocrine system (Baum, Grunberg, & Singer, 1992), the autonomic nervous system 
(Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983), the central nervous system (Davidson, Ekman, 
Saron, Senulis, & Friesen, 1990) and the musculoskeletal system (Lynch, Bakal, 
Whitelaw, & Fung, 1991), and an expressive or communicative component (Fridlund, 
2002; Pittam & Scherer, 1993), all operating in a coordinated and largely automatic 
manner (Ekman, 2003). It is in this sense that Fridja (1986) refers to the collective 
emotional response as changes in action readiness, that is, modes of relating to, or 
interacting with, the environment. Together, the various components of an emotional 
state regulate the interaction between an individual and their environment by 
promoting adaptive modes of behaviour that modify, establish, or terminate, aspects 
of this relationship. 
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Conceptualising emotions as multi-componential modes of relating to the 
environment suggests there may be as many emotions as there are potential types of 
person-environment interactions. However, if this were the case, the concept of 
emotion becomes nebulous and meaningless. It would logically follow that the 
number of emotions, in parallel with the number of potential person-environment 
interactions, is virtually infinite, which in turn provides the construct of emotion with 
little, if any, descriptive or explanatory power. Instead, most theorists of emotion 
attribute a specific structure or organisation to emotion based on the fundamental 
adaptive utility a particular emotional response may provide. It is common for 
theorists describing functional accounts of emotion to prescribe adaptive benefit to a 
small set of discrete basic or primaJY emotions (Plutchik, 2003). For example, Ekman 
and Friesen (1975) suggest there are seven primary emotions I based around universal 
themes or events that are common "to the welfare and survival of all human beings" 
(Ekman, 2003, p.23), a concept Lazarus (1991) referred to as a core relational theme. 
Alternatively, Izard and Bartlett2 (1972) and Tomkins3 (1962; 1963) both propose a 
greater number of basic emotions than has Ekman, while Panksepp4 (1982) suggests 
fewer. Plutchik (2003; Plutchik and Conte, 1997) describes a multi-dimensional 
model of the structure of emotion whereby emotions are represented along the 
dimensions of intensity, similarity and bipolarity, while Lazarus (1991) describes the 
primary emotions in terms of six components of the appraisal process (goal relevance, 
goal congruence, ego-involvement, blame, coping and expectation), which in 
combination distinguishes each emotion from others. Clearly, with regard to the 
1 Ekman and Friesen's (1975) list of primary emotions includes: sadness, anger, fear, surprise, disgust, 
contempt, and happiness. . 
2 Izard and Bartlett (1972) suggest fear, anger, enjoyment, interest, disgust, surprise, shame/shyness, 
contempt, distress, and guilt are the primary emotions. 
3 Tomkins (1962; 1963) suggests fear, anger, enjoyment, interest, disgust, surprise, shame, contempt, 
and distress are the primary emotions. 
4 Panksepp (1982) suggests fear, rage, panic, and expectancy are the primary emotions. 
theoretical appraisals of the function of emotion there is an observed taxonomic 
stmcture that, although varying in specific detail between theorists, describes a 
relationship between an individual .and the contingencies of their environment. 
Although the functional theorists of emotion clearly differ in regard to the exact 
stmcture of the taxonomy of emotion, two common themes emerge from their 
discussions. First, it is generally accepted that while emotions can be classified into 
discrete categories, emotions rarely occur singularly (Ekman, 2003; Lazams, 1991). 
Often emotional responses are made up of combinations of more than one primary 
emotion. To illustrate, Plutchik (2003) compares, by analogy, his stmctural model of 
emotions with the colour solid first conceived by Sir Isaac Newton. Primary colours 
(red, yellow and blue) can be combined to produce secondary colours (green, orange 
and purple) all of which in tum can be mixed at varying intensities to produce a great 
number of colours. Furthermore, complementary colours (analogous to bipolar 
emotions), when mixed tend to cancel each other out, producing differing shades of 
grey. Plutchik goes on to suggest that "neither colours nor emotions are clear-cut 
categories with sharp boundaries" (p.l 03). While this may well be the case, it does 
not undermine the utility of classifying emotions (or colours for that matter) into 
discrete primary categories. The frequency with which any particular emotion, or 
combination of emotions may occur does not determine the underlying reality of the 
emotion, but merely suggests that the nature of a given emotion as it pertains to a 
given person-environment transaction is likely to be the result of a complex set of 
interacting factors. 
7 
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Second, the proposition that emotions have a functional, biologically based evolved 
component implies a degree of universality among emotions (McNaughton, 1989). 
Most theorists are quick to acknowledge that a claim of panculturalism of emotion 
need not suggest that emotions are mechanistic, programmed responses to specific 
environmental contingencies, but that emotions share a functional similarity across 
individuals and situations (Griffiths, 1997). The precise nature of the context for a 
given emotion may vary between individuals, but the function of that emotion is very 
similar for all. For example, not everybody experiences fear toward the same events. 
Ekman and Friesen (1972) contrasted self-reports of fearful events from members of a 
preliterate culture in Papua New Guinea with those of citizens of an urban American 
city. While the former reported being frightened by being attacked by wild pigs, the 
latter reported being frightened by being attacked by muggers. Although the context 
for each event is very different, both events represent the potential for harm to the 
individual and therefore are seen to be accompanied by the same fearful response. As 
Griffiths suggests, examples such as this one demonstrate "that people in all cultures 
respond in a similar way to things that frighten them. They do not show that people in 
all cultures are frightened of the same things" (p.55). It is the functional specificity of 
emotion that is implied when claims are made regarding the apparent universality of 
emotion, rather than an invariance of the precise antecedent events that give rise to a 
particular emotional response. Further consideration will be given to the empirical 
evidence for the pancultural nature of emotion in subsequent sections. 
Social Functions of Emotion 
Beyond the intrapersonal function of informing and preparing the individual to cope 
adaptively with the demands and opportunities of their environment, emotions have 
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been prescribed important interpersonal functions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999,2001; 
Lazarus, 1991). Not surprisingly, research that considers the social functions of 
emotion has typically been focussed on the communicative aspects of emotion 
including vocal and postural cues to emotion, and in particular facial expressions of 
emotion. The fact that emotions have expressive, observable components provides a 
means for perceivers to know about the emotional state of others, which in turn helps 
faCilitate the coordination of social interactions. Consistent with Fridja's (1986; Fridja 
& Mesquita, 1994; Fridja & Tcherkassof, 1997) notion of action readiness, knowing 
the emotional state of an interaction partner provides information pertinent to their 
likely intentions (Fridlund, 2002) and future behaviour (Keltner & Gross, 1999) to 
which the perceiver can then respond accordingly. Furthermore, if emotion is thought 
of as some means of regulating the person-environment interaction, it may be the case 
that the detection of the emotional state of another person also communicates 
information about meaningful events in the environment. Children often use 
information about the emotional state of caregivers to inform their own behaviour. 
For instance, Sorce, Emde, Campos and Klenert (1985) demonstrated that infants 
were more likely to cross a visual cliff when their mother was looking happy (e.g. 
smiling) compared to when she was looking fearful (e.g. displaying a facial 
expression of fear). 
In a related sense, Keltner and Haidt (1999) also suggest that expressions of emotion 
can elicit complementary and reciprocal emotions in others. As another case in point, 
Dimberg and Ohman (1996) reported that upon the detection of a facial display of 
anger, participants responded fearfully even though the presentation time of the angly 
face was insufficient to enable participants to report what they had seen. Interestingly, 
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this effect was only found when the apparent attention of the angry facial display was 
directed toward the participant (Dimberg & Ohman, 1983). If it appeared as though 
the gaze of the facial display was not focussed on the participant (i.e. the target was 
attending to something or someone else), no such fearful response was observed. This 
finding exemplifies the highly social nature of facial expressions of emotion in that 
only when the participant was the focus of attention (i.e. eye contact was made with 
the target) was their emotional response conditional on the target's facial display. 
Similarly, other researchers have reported a contagion effect for expressions of 
emotion whereby there is a tendency to experience emotions similar to those 
expressed by companions in order to help synchronise social interactions through 
shared experience (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992). 
These examples demonstrate a functional role for the expression and detection of 
emotional states in social contexts. Knowing about the emotional state of others can 
help organise and coordinate social interaction. However, as aforementioned, such a 
function relies heavily on a coupling between the information specifying an emotional 
state and the actual emotional state of an individual. There is little utility in detecting 
information specifying an emotion in others if, for instance, the person who looks 
angry, is not angry. Believing erroneously that someone is angry may be quite 
dysfunctional, if, for example, interactions with a supposedly angry person are 
avoided unnecessarily. It is therefore important to consider the ontological basis for 
expressions of emotion. The next section provides a brief overview of research that 
has considered one means by which the perceiver can potentially gain knowledge of 
the emotional state of others: the facial expression. 
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Facial Expressions of Emotion 
It is widely acknowledged that modem research on facial expressions of emotion has 
grown in large part from Darwin's (1872/1998) seminal work in the area of emotional 
expression. Darwin was among the first to claim that facial expressions of emotion 
were innate expressions of emotional states. Specifically as a challenge to the 
dominant view of the time that God gave humans facial muscles for the purpose of 
expressing emotion (Russell & Fernandez-Dols, 1997), Darwin, drawing from his 
earlier theory of natural selection (Darwin, 1859), proposed that expressions of 
emotion were vestiges of responses in ancestral species. Based on an anatomical 
description of the musculature of the human face provided by French anatomist 
Duchenne de Bologne (1862/1990), together with careful comparative observation, 
Darwin drew many parallels between human expressions and those of other species 
suggesting that homologies between human and non-human emotion indicated a 
common progenitor: 
With mankind some expressions, such as bristling of hair under the influence 
of extreme terror, or the uncovering of the teeth under that of furious rage, can 
hardly be understood, except on the belief that man once existed in a much 
lower and animal-like condition. (p.19) 
Darwin did not believe that expressions of emotion evolved in order to fulfil some 
form of communicatory function, but that such function had been acquired and 
retained in the form of a secondary adaptation after the original adaptive purpose of 
these expressions had declined (Griffiths, 1997). For example, in the ancestral 
environment (and paralleled in modem non-human primates) the baring of teeth 
during anger may plausibly have been related to a preparation to attack, an action that 
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therefore may have conferred some survival value. Although contemporary human 
expressions of anger frequently involve exposure of the teeth (Ekman, 2003), social 
and cultural influences mean that it is now far less likely to be in preparation for 
fighting or biting. However, such behaviour may still have a use. While the original 
function of exposing the teeth may have been lost, a secondary, function has been 
acquired, namely the communication of aggression or anger to conspecifics. As 
Griffiths has noted: "a behaviour originally associated with an emotion because it 
fulfils some function will not cease to be associated with the emotion simply because 
it has ceased to serve that function" (p. 65). Due to the past association between an 
emotion and expressive behaviour, the signal value of the expression may be 
sufficient for that expression to remain part of the species' behavioural repertoire in 
the absence of the original function. In this sense, the reliable association between an 
overt behaviour and a dispositional quality provides the basis for the development of a 
system of communication. Thus, in Darwin's view, facial expressions of emotion 
were biologically linked to an underlying emotional state, but had acquired 
contemporary function as a means of nonverbal communication. 
Darwin's work on facial expressions of emotion was largely ignored by psychologists 
until the mid to late 1960s. During this time the prevailing view regarding facial 
expressions of emotion was that they were learnt, culturally specific displays that 
potentially showed little overlap between various populations (e.g. Birdwhistell, 
1963). However, when empirical evidence was sought to confirm this position the 
results revealed a consistency in the interpretation of the meaning of various facial 
expressions across a range of distinct cultural groups. In a number of early studies 
(e.g. Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969; Izard, 1969) 
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recognition rates of six facial expressions of primary emotions (i.e. sadness, anger, 
fear, disgust, surprise and happiness) were shown to be greater than chance r~gardless 
of the cultural group to which the judge belonged. Importantly these studies utilised a 
wide range of cultures including preliterate groups from Borneo and New Guinea 
(Ekman et aI., 1969), and a media-isolated group of Fore also from New Guinea 
(Elanan & Friesen, 1971). The latter group, the Fore, had never seen movies, 
television or magazines, did not speak or understand English or pidgin English and 
had not lived or worked in any settlement or town with Westerners. Ekman and 
Friesen also reversed the standard recognition test with this group by telling them a 
story (e.g. about the death of a child) designed to involve only one emotion and 
asking them, via interpreters, to show how their face would appear if they were the 
person in the story. Videotapes of these expressions were then shown to American 
college students who were able to accurately recognise the intended emotion. 
Considering this early research as a whole, although some variation in recognition 
rates was observed both between expressions and between cultures, these researchers 
were able to conclude that for a certain range of facial expressions there was a 
universal understanding of what a given expression meant that was independent of 
any form of cross-cu1tura11eaming. A recent meta-analysis of 97 studies of cross-
cultural facial expression recognition conducted by E1fenbein and Ambady (2002) 
confirmed these findings, concluding that "evidence for the cross-cultural recognition 
of emotions ... suggests that certain core components of emotions are universal" 
(p.228). 
However, further research has suggested that the expression and recognition of 
emotion may not be as linear and straightforward as initially conceived. Elanan 
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(1971) reported an experiment comparing the spontaneous facial expressions 
exhibited by Japanese and American college students. Participants were required to 
watch a film previously shown to elicit similar amounts of self-reported stress in both 
groups while alone in a room. Although each participant was aware that various 
physiological recordings were being taken during the film, they were not aware that 
their facial expressions were being recorded by video. Correlations between the facial 
expressions displayed by each group of participants revealed a high degree of 
consistency in facial movements between the groups when viewing the film, 
indicating that the Japanese and American participants exhibited similar expressions. 
However, when the procedure was repeated with an experimenter from the same 
culture as the participant present, differences between the groups emerged. 
Specifically, the Japanese participants appeared to show relatively more positive, and 
fewer negative emotional expressions than did the American participants, whose 
facial expressions remained similar to when they were watching the film alone. When 
the videotapes ofthe Japanese participants were examined in slow motion, brief, 
momentary traces5 of negative facial expressions that were rapidly replaced with a 
smile were observed. The Japanese participants appeared to have masked facial 
evidence of their negative emotions with a smile. Ekman described this phenomenon 
in terms of the use of display rules, culturally defined norms and conventions 
regarding when and to whom it is appropriate to exhibit emotion6. For the Japanese 
participants in this study, custom deemed that it was not appropriate to display 
negative emotion in a social setting (McNeill, 1998). Although the evidence 
5 Often termed microexpressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1969) 
6 Display rules are thought to be very common among groups of all varieties. Ekman (1971) suggests 
display rules may operate according to individual characteristics (e.g. age, sex, identity etc.), setting 
characteristics (e.g. funeral, party etc), social roles (e.g. dominant, authority etc.) and interaction 
characteristics (e.g. playing, talking, listening etc.). Management of expression may entail increasing or 
decreasing the intensity of the expression, looking neutral (expressionless) or masking the felt 
expression with a simulated expression of another emotion. 
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suggested that for all participants the same negative emotions were experienced when 
viewing the film alone and when accompanied by an experimenter, the Japanese 
participants attempted to hide signs of such experience from others. 
While the results reported above do not undermine the view that affective facial 
expressions have a biological basis, they do suggest that factors in addition to 
experienced emotion influence expression. The presence of an audience led to the 
management of emotional expression according to socially constructed convention. 
Indeed, social context has been shown to playa significant role in the expression of 
emotion in naturalistic settings. Kraut and Johnston (1979, study 2) report an 
ethological study concerning the influence of social context on the frequency and 
incidence of smiling amongst people ten-pin bowling. Although bowlers smiled 
relatively rarely, the incidence of smiling was approximately nine times greater when 
the bowler was facing toward friends compared to when facing toward the pins. 
Furthermore, smiling was not associated with the quality of the bowl delivered. In this 
study it appeared as though smiling was induced to a greater extent by social factors 
(i.e. smiling at friends) than emotional factors (i.e. smiling following a good 
performance). Similar studies have also been carried out experimentally. For example, 
Hess, Banse and Kappas (1995) systematically varied the social context, the intensity 
of emotional experience, and the relationship between the participant and their 
audience in order to uncover which of these factors predicted the display of facial 
expressions. The authors reported that no one factor alone could be used to predict the 
intensity of facial expressions observed. Instead, a complex interplay of all three 
factors needed to be considered. Comparable findings have also been reported by 
Jakobs, Manstead and Fischer (1999) and Bonanno and Keltner (2004), whereby both 
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the experience of emotion and the social context for such experience have bearing on 
facial expression.7 
In relation to the present research, the notion that facial expressions are not always 
literal read-outs of emotional experience underscores the importance of accurate 
detection on the part of the social perceiver. Given that expressions are often managed 
in accordance with context and convention, perceivers cannot always rely on a given 
expression necessarily being linked to any specific underlying emotional state. Any 
particular example of facial efference may be an expression of emotion, an intentional 
display, or a mixture of both. While an expression of emotion may convey 
information to the perceiver that is relevant to coordinating smooth social transaction, 
an intentional expression may do quite the opposite in that advantage may be gained 
by voluntarily signalling a false intention. Smiling when angry for instance, may fool 
an interaction partner into a potentially dangerous engagement. Thus, the adaptive 
social perceiver needs to be sensitive not only to emotional state as specified by facial 
expression, but also to simulations of emotional state in the sense that these 
expressions are not veridical expressions of any reliable social infOlmation, but 
instead represent managed forms of nonverbal communication. In the next section, 
research will be reviewed that suggests there are meaningful psychological 
distinctions between spontaneous genuine smiles as expressions of positive emotion 
and intentional simulations of this expression or posed smiles which are manifest 
physiognomically and are therefore available for perception. 
7 Some researchers have interpreted these and other findings to suggest that facial expressions should 
not be thought of as being grounded in emotional experience, but instead only as mechanisms of 
communication of social intention (e.g. Chovil, 1997; Fridlund, 1994; Fridlund, 1999; 2002; Provine, 
1997). Among the proponents of this view, Fridlund has been the most vociferous and thorough, 
proposing the Behavioral Ecology View as an alternative theory of facial expression. Frid1und's 
approach as it relates to smiling is considered in more detail below. 
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Posed and Genuine Smiles 
The French neurologist and anatomist Duchenne de Bologne (1862/1990) was the 
first to report systematic differences between smiles that were spontaneous 
expressions of positive emotion and those that were intentional or posed expressions. 
He suggested that: 
The emotion of frank joy is expressed on the face by the combined contraction 
of the zygomaticus major muscle and orbicularis oculi. The first obeys the 
will but the second is only put into play by the sweet emotions of the soul; 
fake joy ... cannot provoke contraction of this muscle .... The muscle around the 
eye does not obey the will; it is only brought into play by a true feeling, by an 
agreeable emotion. (p.126) 
Duchenne had been examining the physiognomic effects of electrical stimulation of 
individual facial muscles. Originally using human heads collected from the guillotine, 
Duchenne would touch electrodes to individual facial muscles and photograph the 
resulting contractions. However, this method was rather unsatisfactory as the facial 
nerves would only reliably conduct electricity for a few hours after beheading, 
providing Duchenne with only a short time frame in which to conduct his research 
(McNeill, 1998). To overcome this limitation, Duchenne hired an elderly man who 
was suffering from a form of facial anaesthesia which left him unable to feel pain in 
his face and who was therefore agreeable to the otherwise painful process of 
galvanisation. When Duchenne stimulated the zygomatic major muscle, which runs 
diagonally from the top of the cheek bone to the upper lip and pulls the outer corners 
of the mouth outward and upward in a characteristic smile shape, he noted that the 
resulting change in appearance did not give an impression of happiness. To provide a 
basis for comparison, he told his subject a joke and photographed the reaction. The 
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facial expression occurring in response to the joke showed evidence of contraction of 
the muscle that surrounds the eyes, orbicularis oculi (which pulls the skin 
surrounding the eyes toward the eye-ball) in addition to zygomatic major contraction. 
This observation led Duchenne to draw the conclusion that contraction of the 
orbicularis oculi was a reliable marker to distinguish genuine smiles of enjoyment 
from intentional or posed smiles. 
In the following century, Duchenne's (1862/1990) observations were largely ignored 
by scientists of facial expression. However, during this time, much was learnt in 
regard to the functional neuroanatomy of the face, findings which provided support 
for the conceptual basis for Duchenne's conclusions regarding the distinction between 
posed and genuine smiles. Of particular relevance to Duchenne's notion that some of 
the muscles of the face are not under voluntary control is the suggestion that relatively 
distinct neural pathways separately innervate voluntary and involuntmy facial 
movements (Rinn, 1984). In a neurological sense, voluntary facial movements 
originate from areas in the motor cortex, predominantly in the left hemisphere, and 
are innervated via the pyradimal tract (Gazzaniga & Smylie, 1990). By comparison, 
spontaneous facial movements employ phylogenetic ally older neural pathways 
originating in the sub-cortical areas within the brain (according to Damasio (1994), 
specifically the anterior cingulate region, limbic cortices and basal ganglia), which 
innervate the facial muscles via the extra-pyradimal motor system (Gazzaniga, Ivry, 
& Mangun, 2002). Clinical evidence for the distinction of these neural pathways can 
be observed in stroke patients. Patients who have experienced damage to the motor 
cortex show asymmetrical voluntary facial movements, but symmetrical involuntary 
expressions. In contrast, stroke patients with damage to the anterior cingulate region 
exhibit an asymmetry contralateral to the damaged hemisphere during spontaneous 
facial expressions', but no such asymmetry when wilfully contracting their facial 
muscles (Damasio, 1994). Such is the reliability of the neurological distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary facial movements that prior to the use of soft-
tissue imaging, facial movements were used as diagnostic criteria for brain injury 
(Dejong, 1979). 
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The nature of the neurological distinction between volitional and spontaneous facial 
expressions supports Duchenne's original observations regarding posed and genuine 
smiles. Damasio (1994) suggests that while the zygomatic major can be contracted 
either wilfully or involuntarily (i.e. is innervated by both the pyradimal and extra-
pyradimal motor systems), orbicularis oculi is not under volitional controL In support 
of this claim, Ekman, Roper and Hager (1980) demonstrated that while most people 
can deliberately contract the medial aspect of orbicularis oculi, only around 20% of 
the population are able to voluntarily contract the lateral aspect of this muscle. 
Importantly, as noted by Duchenne and later confirmed by Ekman, Friesen and 
O'Sullivan (1988), it is only the lateral parts of orbicularis oculi that are recruited 
when spontaneously expressing positive affect. Thus, it appears there is sound 
neurological support for the distinction made by Duchenne between posed and 
genuine smiles, in terms of both the conceptual difference between facial muscles that 
can and cannot be wilfully contracted, as well as evidence that the specific muscles 
Duchenne claimed to distinguish posed from genuine smiles (i.e. zygomatic major and 
orbicularis oculi) conform to this distinction. 
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Physiognomy of Posed and Genuine Smiles 
Over 100 years after Duchenne (186211990) published his views on the disti~ction 
between posed and genuine smiles, Ekman and Friesen (1982) revisited his original 
observations. Drawing on the relevant literature since Duchenne, Ekman and Friesen 
proposed that there were potentially five markers that distinguished posed from 
genuine smiles, namely the Duchenne marker (orbicularis oculi contraction), the 
symmetry of zygomatic major contraction, the smoothness of contraction, the duration 
of expression, and the degree of synchrony of action. Each marker will be considered 
below in terms of the evidence suggesting its utility for differentiating posed from 
genuine smiles. The ontological status of each respective marker with regard to 
emotional state is noted. For reference, photographic examples of posed and genuine 
smiles are displayed in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Photographs of a posed smile (left) and a genuine smile (right). 
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Duchenne marker. 
By far the most thoroughly researched indicator of a genuine expression of a positive 
emotional state is that originally proposed by Duchenne8 (1862/1990). Specifically, 
the Duchenne marker consists of contraction of the orbicularis oculi pars lateralis 
(hereafter referred to as orbicularis oculi) muscle in concert with contraction of the 
zygomatic major muscle. While all smiles involve contraction of the latter muscles to 
pull the comers of the mouth obliquely upward in an expression characteristic of the 
prototypical smile, only spontaneous genuine smiles of enjoyment also involve 
contraction of the former muscles. Importantly, contraction of orbicularis oculi (also 
more commonly known as the eye-sphincter muscle) pulls the skin surrounding the 
eye toward the centre of the eyeball resulting in a number of observable changes in 
the appearance of this region of the face. Most notably, contraction of orbicularis 
oculi causes wrinkles or crow's feet at the outer comers of the eye socket which 
extend radially away from the eyes as well as a raising of the cheeks, bagging or 
bulging of skin below the eye and a pulling of the lower eyelid up toward the eye. 
More subtle changes involve a pulling of the skin above the eye slightly down and 
inwards, a narrowing of the eye aperture and a slight lowering of the eyebrows 
(Frank, 2002). In short, contraction of orbicularis oculi results in visible changes 
around the eye region.9 
Evidence that the Duchenne marker can be used to reliably determine whether or not a 
given smile is accompanied by a positive emotional state has been reported across a 
variety of domains. Ekman, Friesen and O'Sullivan (1988) provided one of the first 
8 Hence the term: Duchenne marker (Frank, 2002) 
9 Although, as Frank (2002) points out, intense contraction of zygomatic major may result in the 
bunching of skin below the eyes which may be mistaken for orbicularis oculi contraction. In this 
situation, only the pulling of the skin above the eye toward the eyeball and the lowering of the brow 
will provide unambiguous evidence of orbicularis oculi contraction. 
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systematic demonstrations of such an effect by employing a deception scenario in 
which participants were required to lie about any negative feelings they were 
experiencing. Specifically, while being surreptitiously video-taped, nursing students 
were asked to watch two films, one of a nature scene designed to be relatively 
pleasant and elicit positive emotions, and one showing amputation and bum scenes 
designed to be unpleasant and elicit strong negative emotions. Their task was to 
convince the interviewer they were watching the pleasant film regardless of which 
film they were actually watching. This involved concealing any negative feelings they 
may have experienced. To introduce a practical element the experimenters told the 
student nurses that the material they would be seeing was similar to that which may 
be encountered in an emergency room, where they may be required to conceal any 
fear, distress or disgust from the patient and their family. Furthermore, the 
participants were also informed that previous testing had indicated that their skill at 
the experimental task, as indexed by whether the interviewer could guess that they 
were lying, predicted their job performance. Ekman, Friesen and O'Sullivan reported 
that although the frequency of all types of smiles did not differ between the honest 
(pleasant film) and deceptive (unpleasant film) conditions, the frequency of smiles 
accompanied by the Duchenne marker was in fact different between conditions. 
Specifically, when participants were watching the film intended to elicit positive 
feelings they were more likely to exhibit smiles that included orbicularis oculi 
contraction compared to when they were watching the unpleasant film and attempting 
to conceal any negative responses. Smiles with the Duchenne marker present occurred 
more often when the participants were having a positive experience compared to 
when they were feigning such an experience. 
23 
Further evidence for the association between smiles that feature the Duchenne marker 
and positive emotional experience has been reported by Ekman, Davidson and Friesen 
(1990). In this study, participants were seated alone in a room while they watched 
both pleasant and unpleasant films. Facial expressions, subjective ratings of 
experienced emotion, and brain activity (measured using electroencephalogram, 
henceforth EEG) were recorded while the participant watched each film. Analysis of 
these recordings revealed a coherent pattem of results that linked smiles with the 
Duchenne marker to positive emotional experience across all measures. Participants 
exhibited more smiles with the Duchenne marker present when watching the pleasant 
films compared with the unpleasant films, but no such difference was observed for 
smiles that did not feature the Duchenne marker. Furthermore, the prevalence of 
smiles with the Duchenne marker was positively related to self-reports of positive 
emotional experience, and negatively related to self-reports of negative emotional 
experience. Finally, the EEG measures revealed a pattem of distinct brain activity 
when smiles with the Duchenne marker were expressed. These smiles were 
accompanied by relatively more left hemisphere central nervous system (eNS) 
activity than smiles that did not feature the Duchenne marker. Importantly, consistent 
pattems of eNS activity accompanying smiles with the Duchenne marker have been 
reported by Fox and Davidson (1988) who demonstrated that 10-month-old infants 
were more likely to exhibit smiles with the Duchenne marker when approached by 
their mother than when approached by a stranger. This finding is particularly 
significant in that it links both a context where positive emotion may be anticipated 
(i.e. an infant seeing his or her mother approaching), and a psychophysiological index 
of positive emotional state (i.e. eNS activity) with the spontaneous display of a 
genuine smile. A similar finding was also reported by Davidson et al. (1990) for 
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participants watching emotionally laden films.lo Thus, as the above laboratory studies 
demonstrate, there appears to be a reasonable degree of coherence between positive 
emotional experience and the exhibition of smiles that feature the Duchenne marker. 
Smiles that feature the Duchenne marker appear to occur in response to positive 
environmental events (e.g. watching a pleasant film) and are accompanied by a 
distinct pattern of neurophysiological activity along with self-report of a positive 
emotional experience. Alternatively, smiles without the Duchenne marker tend to 
show little relationship with context, no particular pattern of CNS activity, and are not 
related to reported positive emotional experience. 
On the basis of the laboratory demonstrations of a reliable coupling between positive 
emotional state and the expression of smiles featuring the Duchenne marker it follows 
that similar observations should be apparent in more ecological settings. That is, we 
should expect to observe smiles with the Duchenne marker in contexts where 
individuals are known to be experiencing positive emotions and an absence of these 
smiles when there is no such affective state. To this end, pre-school children have 
been shown to display more smiles that feature the Duchenne marker after succeeding 
at a game, but more smiles without the Duchenne marker when they failed 
(Schneider, 1987). Happily married couples were reported to express more Duchenne 
marked smiles than those unhappily married, but no difference in other types of 
smiles existed between these groups (Levenson, 1989). In addition, Scherer and 
Ceschi (2000) reported that of those airline passengers whose baggage had been lost, 
10 Davidson et al. (1990) suggest that the pattern of left hemisphere activity found during smiles that 
feature the Duchenne marker is characteristic of an approach-related emotional response, while a 
similar pattern of right hemisphere activity is characteristic of a withdrawal-related emotional response 
(e.g. fear, disgust). 
those who displayed smiles with the Duchenne marker were in better humour, as 
indexed by both self-report and the reports of airline staff, than those who did not. 
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Further support for the Duchenne marker as an indicator of positive affect has been 
reported in clinical settings. Clinically depressed individuals, as would be expected in 
line with their lack of positive affective experience, exhibit fewer smiles with the 
Duchenne marker than individuals who are not depressed (Berenbaum & Oltmanns, 
1992; Katsikitis & Pilowsky, 1991), but show an increase in the frequency of 
expression of these smiles consistent with reductions in depressive symptoms 
(Steiner, 1986). Depressed patients admitted to hospital also displayed more smiles 
with the Duchenne marker at the time of their discharge compared with the time of 
their admission (Matsumoto, 1987). Consistent with the typical anhedonic 
symptomatology associated with schizophrenia, individuals experiencing this 
condition also tend to display fewer smiles with the Duchenne marker than do 
individuals without this condition (Berenbaum & Oltmanns, 1992; Keltner & Kring, 
1998). Furthermore, Bonanno and Keltner (1997) reported that amongst adults who 
had experienced the death of a romantic partner, the incidence of smiles with the 
Duchenne marker during an interview 6-months post-loss was negatively associated 
with grief as measured 19 months later. Finally, Bonanno, Keltner, Noll, Putnam, 
Trickett, Lejeune and Anderson (2002) compared the facial expressions of children 
who had experienced some form of childhood sexual abuse, with the expressions of 
non-abused participants during interviews concerning distressing life events. The 
authors reported that smiles featuring the Duchenne marker were most prevalent 
among the children who did not have a history of abuse, and in fact the frequency of 
smiles of this type was negatively related to the total amount of lifetime trauma 
reported by each child. 
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Thus, from a cross-section of the literature, results indicate convergence of evidence 
to suggest that smiles which feature the Duchenne marker (i.e. contraction of 
orbicularis oculi pars latera lis) have an ontological basis in positive emotional 
experience. Smiles without this marker are not linked to affective state. Consistent 
with self-reports of positive emotional experience and a distinct neurophysiology, 
smiles with the Duchenne marker have been shown to occur more frequently in 
contexts where positive emotion would be expected (e.g. winning a game, being part 
of a successful relationship), and less frequently when positive emotion would not be 
expected (e.g. among those suffering depression or who have experienced trauma), 
thereby suggesting that genuine smiles of enjoyment can be identified by means of the 
presence or absence of the contraction of the orbicularis oculi muscle. 
Symmetry. 
The symmetry marker proposed by Ekman and Friesen (1982) consists of the bilateral 
contraction of the zygomatic major muscle. Ekman and Friesen predicted that genuine 
smiles of enjoyment would show symmetrical contraction of zygomatic major, 
distinct from posed smiles, which would show asymmetrical contraction of this 
muscle. Consistent with this suggestion, the literature provides some evidence to 
indicate that spontaneous expressions may in general differ from more voluntary 
expressions in terms of facial symmetry, with the former being more symmetrical 
than the latter (Gazzaniga & Smylie, 1990; Rinn, 1984). In relation to smiling, 
Ekman, Hager and Friesen (1981) reported that participants' spontaneous smiles in 
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response to jokes were markedly more symmetrical than deliberately posed smiles 
requested by the experimenter. In a more detailed analysis, Hager and EkmaJ? (1997) 
revealed that the contraction of both the zygomatic major and orbicularis oculi 
muscles were more symmetrical when participants were spontaneously smiling 
compared to smiles requested by the experimenter. Together, these studies provide 
evidence that the bilateral symmetry of facial action during a smile may indicate 
whether a smile is related to an underlying positive emotional state. 
Smoothness. 
The third marker predicted by Eleman and Friesen (1982) to differentiate veridical 
from non-veridical smiles involves the nature of the ballistic transition of the 
expression from the onset to the apex to the offset. They suggested that genuine 
smiles would show a regular flow of muscle contraction throughout the duration of 
the expression, while posed smiles would appear more irregular and abrupt, consistent 
with differences expected between voluntary and involuntary muscular contractions in 
general (Rinn, 1984). In support of this notion, Hess and Kleck (1990) reported that 
deliberate smiles contained more phases, that is, more pauses and categorical changes 
in intensity, than did spontaneous smiles. Furthermore, Frank, Ekman and Friesen 
(1993) reported that smiles containing the Duchenne marker were consistent in terms 
of the proportional duration of the onset, apex and offset components of the 
expression, but no such consistency was found for smiles without this marker. In fact, 
when the duration of each component was correlated with the others, significant 
patterns of relationships were revealed for smiles with the Duchenne marker present, 
but not for those without it. Frank (2002) has suggested that these findings indicate 
that genuine smiles, in terms of ballistic action, resemble a single behaviour rather 
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than a combination of individual elements that coincide under deliberate control. This 
description is consistent with the nature of other involuntary movements and therefore 
is in support of Ekman and Friesen~s prediction that the smoothness of the transition 
of the expression is relevant for determining whether a given smile is accompanied by 
a positive emotional experience. 
Duration. 
Ekman and Friesen (1982) also suggested that the overall duration of genuine smiles 
would be more consistent in comparison to the duration of posed smiles. Specifically, 
they predicted that genuine smiles would typically last for between 0.5 and 4 seconds, 
and that posed smiles would not conform to these temporal constraints and would 
therefore show greater variability of duration. Initially evidence strongly supported 
this prediction, with Hess and Kleck (1990) reporting that spontaneous smiles did 
indeed last between 0.5 and 4 seconds and that posed smiles were expressed for a 
significantly longer duration. However, further research conducted by Frank, et al. 
(1993) failed to replicate these findings. They reported no difference in mean duration 
of smiles that contained the Duchenne marker and those that did not. However, these 
authors did report a significant difference in the variability of the duration of the 
respective types of smile. Smiles with the Duchenne marker were less varied in terms 
of overall duration, while those without this marker were markedly more erratic. 
Although the precise nature of the relationship remains unclear, it appears as though 
the veracity of a smile may have bearing on the duration of that expression. 
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Synchrony. 
The final physiognomic marker predicted by Ekman and Friesen (1982) to 
differentiate posed from genuine smiles concerns the degree of synchronisation 
between contraction of zygomatic major and that of orbicularis oculi. In particular, 
Ekman and Friesen suggested that the onset, apex, and offset of the contraction of 
these muscles would coincide in smiles linked to positive emotional experience. 
However, research to examine this claim has been scant. Although Frank, et al. (1993) 
reported that for smiles with the Duchenne marker the apex of zygomatic major 
contraction co-occurs with the apex of the smile considered as a whole, no research is 
known to have systematically compared the synchronicity of zygomatic major 
contraction with other facial muscles when contracted voluntarily. Therefore, the 
validity of the synchrony of contraction of zygomatic major and orbicularis oculi as a 
marker of a genuine smile of enjoyment has yet to be established. 
Overall, it appears that four of the five markers proposed by Ekman and Friesen 
(1982) to differentiate posed from genuine smiles have been, to varying extents, 
validated by research. Clearly the contraction of orbicularis oculi has been the marker 
receiving the most attention by researchers, and there is now a substantive body of 
research to support Duchenne' s (1862/1990) original observation. Smiles that show 
evidence of orbicularis oculi contraction have been demonstrated to coincide with 
self-reported positive emotional experience, specific patterns of neurophysiological 
activity, and within contexts in which positive experience may be expected. 
Importantly, smiles that do not exhibit these characteristics do not show any 
relationship to emotional experience, are not associated with any particular pattern of 
neural activity, and are often exhibited in contexts when a positive emotional 
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experience would not be expected (e.g. watching an unpleasant film). In addition, 
smiles that occur in concert with positive emotion tend to be more facially 
symmetrical, show a smoother, more regular transition between onset, apex and 
offset, and are of a more consistent duration when compared with smiles that are not 
accompanied by positive emotion. 
Of particular interest for the present research is the availability of the information 
specifying a genuine smile of enjoyment to the perceiver. If, as argued earlier, the 
social perceiver is well served by knowing the veracity of a given smile, then there 
must be information available for perception that reliably specifies this difference. As 
reviewed above, it appears as though such information is available during regular 
social interaction. The contraction of orbicularis oculi leads to changes in appearance 
around the eye region, most notably the appearance of wrinkles that extend radially 
from the outer comer of each eye. This information, along with the bilateral symmetry 
of the expression is potentially available for perception at any point during the 
unfolding of the expression, 11 and therefore may also be available in a static 
representation such as a photograph. On the other hand, the smoothness and duration 
of the expression have a temporal basis whereby at least a portion of the expression 
must occur for this information to be available. The smoothness and duration markers 
will therefore only be informative to the extent that the dynamic properties of the 
expression occur in a natural and unmediated manner. Outside of an actual 
interaction, smoothness and duration can only be represented by video. In short, the 
evidence indicates that there is information available to the perceiver to allow them to 
know whether a given smile occurs as a function of experienced positive emotion or, 
11 Although both the contraction of orbicularis oculi and expression symmetry are likely to be most 
prominent at the apex of the expression. 
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alternatively, is unrelated to emotional state. A part of the purpose of the present 
research is to investigate the sensitivity of perceivers to the information that specifies 
the emotional state of a smiling individual. 
Alternative Accounts of Posed and Genuine Smiles 
To this point, the account of posed and genuine smiles provided has been presented 
according to what is commonly described as the emotions view12 of facial expressions 
(Fridlund, 2002). In brief, proponents of this approach (the most prominent being 
Ekman, e.g. Ekman, 2003), argue that there are there are approximately 7 ± 2 basic 
emotions, each of which has a unique facial expression that is both expressed and 
recognised panculturally. In this sense, facial expressions of emotion are thought to be 
inextricably linked to experienced emotions on the basis of some form of innate read-
out mechanism. Expressions that do not conform to the universal set of expressions 
may be either blends of two or more emotions, or the result of socialised display rules, 
whereby expression becomes decoupled from emotional experience in order to meet 
social convention. On these grounds, smiles are argued to be distinct on the basis of 
whether they are a display of a positive emotional experience, or alternatively 
intentional simulations of such a display in the absence of positive emotion. However, 
this view is not the only approach that has been offered in terms of explaining facial 
expressions, or more specifically in this context, explicating distinctions between 
posed and genuine smiles. Several alternative theories have been proposed to explain 
the relationship between emotional experience and facial expressions. A brief critical 
review of the two more widely cited approaches, the behavioural ecology view 
12 This approach has also been described as the facia! expression program (Russell & Fernandez-Dols, 
1997) 
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(Fridlund, 1994, 1997) and differential emotions theory (Izard, 1990), is presented 
below. 
Behavioural ecology view. 
The behavioural ecology view of facial displays as proposed by Fridlund13 (1991; 
1994; 1997; 2002), posits that facial expressions are not read-outs of any particular 
emotional state, but instead are best understood as social signals which communicate 
to interaction partners an individual's intentions and anticipated behaviours. Fridlund 
argues that with respect to adaptive function, automatic signalling of emotional state 
by means of a facial expression of emotion is likely to be detrimental to the displayer, 
particularly when their goals may conflict with those of the interaction partner. 
Instead, expressions serve as a signalling mechanism that enables individuals to 
communicate social goals and motives in order to facilitate smooth social transaction. 
Accordingly, from Fridlund's view, smiles should not be considered to be expressions 
of a positive emotional experience, but rather as signals of an individual's intention to 
interact, appease, affiliate or the like. In fact, according to the behavioural ecology 
view, smiles do not carry any particular inherent meaning independent of the social 
context in which they are exhibited. 
In support of this explanation Fridlund (1991; Fridlund, Kenworthy, & Jaffey, 1992) 
reported the results of laboratory studies which he claimed demonstrated that smiling 
was merely a display to serve social motives and therefore did not have any 
underlying link to emotional state. In these studies, participants watched pleasant 
films in a variety of social contexts (i.e. alone, alone but believing a friend was 
13 Although Fridlund has been the main proponent of the behavioural ecology view, other researchers 
(e.g. Chovil, 1991; Provine, 1997) have adopted similar, albeit less extreme versions of this approach. 
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nearby, alone but believing a friend was nearby engaged in the same task, or with a 
friend) while zygomatic major activity was measured using electromyography 
(henceforth EMG). Fridlund reported that the amount of smiling as indexed by EMG 
recordings was not related to self-reported emotion, but instead solely attributable to 
the social context. Those watching the film with a friend, or with the understanding 
that a friend was nearby (Fridlund described this condition as implicit sociality), 
displayed more smiles. In fact, the amount of smiling varied monotonically with the 
degree of sociality of the viewing conditions. No relationship was found between 
reported emotional experience and smiling. 
However, a number of researchers have been critical of Fridlund's theoretical position 
and, as a consequence, of his research (e.g. Ekman, 2003; Frank, 2002; Hess et aI., 
1995). Clearly, the fact that only zygomatic major activity was measured to index 
smiling in the research described above indicates that this method is unable to shed 
any light on the relationship between experienced and expressed emotion. By failing 
to distinguish between smiles that feature contraction of orbicularis oculi and those 
that do not, there was no means to differentiate between smiles likely to be coupled 
with emotional experience and those that were simulated displays. It is not surprising 
that zygomatic major activity alone did not relate to self-reported emotion - no 
proponents of the emotions view claim that all contractions of zygomatic major are 
linked to emotional state, only contractions that co-occur with orbicularis oculi 
activity. Hess et aI. (1995) provided a partial replication of Fridlund's studies and 
reported that emotional experience did in fact have bearing on facial expression. 
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Furthermore, the behavioural ecology view appears inconsistent with the available 
empirical data. Fridlund provides no explanation for the neuroanatomical differences 
between the innervation of spontaneous and deliberate expression, instead simply 
claiming that all expressions are volitional. Nor does he account for the 
neurophysiological distinctions observed between posed and genuine smiles (Frank, 
2002). Thus, it appears that the behavioural ecology view of facial displays falls short 
in terms of providing an adequate account of either the existing theoretical 
explanations of facial expressions, or the empirical findings reported in the literature 
concerning facial expressions of emotion, specifically as they apply to the meaningful 
distinctions between posed and genuine smiles. 
Differential emotions the01Y. 
Initially proposed by Izard (1977), differential emotions theory, in contrast to the 
behavioural ecology view, claims that facial displays serve both expressive and 
communicative functions. Furthermore, proponents of this approach (e.g. Abe, 
Beetham, & Izard, 2002; Abe & Izard, 1999) claim that there is an innate concordance 
between experience and expression of emotion that has an evolutionary basis. 
Children are believed to be born with the capacity to express emotion and over the 
course of development learn to regulate these expressions in accordance with social 
conventions. To this point, differential emotions theory closely resembles the 
emotions view, however an important difference between the two approaches 
concerns the distinction between posed and genuine smiles. In contrast to Elanan and 
colleagues (e.g. Elanan & Friesen, 1982; Frank et aI., 1993), proponents of 
differential emotions theory claim that the difference between smiles featuring 
contraction of orbicularis oculi and those that do not may be explained in terms of 
35 
differences in the intensity of experienced emotion Of, alternatively, the ability to 
regulate emotions. Abe, Beetham and Izard draw a distinction between full-faced 
expressions (e.g. a smile with both ~ygomatic major and orbicularis oculi contraction) 
and component expressions (e.g. a smile with only zygomatic major contraction), 
suggesting that the latter are "likely to reflect milder or more regulated emotions" 
(p.89). To support this view, these authors cite evidence showing that smiles without 
orbicularis oculi have been associated with positive emotional experience (e.g. Hess 
et aI., 1995) and, in research with infants, linked to success in games (Schneider & 
Josephs, 1991) and social interactions (Messinger, Fogel, & Dickson, 2001). In 
addition they point out that orbicularis oculi contraction is also observed in relation to 
the expression of other emotions such as intense anger (Messinger, Fogel, & Dickson, 
1997). 
However, it is not clear that the research cited in support of differential emotions 
theory provides any evidence that is contrary to the emotions view. Social signalling 
and non-verbal behaviour can occur in concert with any emotional experience. The 
fact that smiles without orbicularis oculi contraction can be linked to positive 
emotional state may simply suggest that display rules are in operation. Given there is 
no isomorphic relationship between experience and expression of emotion (i.e. not 
every incidence of experienced emotion is expressed) it is reasonable to assume that 
individuals may be happy and simultaneously employ voluntary facial displays. 
Furthermore, contraction of orbicularis oculi in the context of an emotional 
experience other than happiness does not undermine the emotions view. No claims are 
made regarding the information specified by orbicularis oculi contraction alone, 
rather when this muscle contracts in concert with zygomatic major it is argued that 
positive emotion is expressed. In addition, the differential emotions theory does not 
account for the evidence of neuroanatomical or neurophysiological distinctions 
between posed and genuine smiles. 
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Thus, it appears that the emotions view provides the most comprehensive account of 
the available evidence whereby it is suggested that a categorical demarcation exists 
between posed and genuine smiles. Although both the behavioural ecology view and 
differential emotions view have provided serious and distinct challenges to the 
emotions view, neither approach is able to provide a comprehensive explication of the 
body of research that has to date examined, by various means and at various levels of 
explanation, the distinction between posed and genuine smiles. Hence, the present 
research is informed by the emotions view of facial expressions. 
Posed and Genuine Smiles in Social Interaction 
On the basis of the theory and research reviewed to this point it has been suggested 
that posed and genuine smiles may play an important functional role during social 
interaction. As has been discussed, emotions help equip the individual to cope 
adaptively with the contingencies of their environment. Frijda and Tcherkassof 
(1997), in explaining this phenomenon described the emotional response as a state of 
action readiness, enhancing the means by which an individual can "establish, 
maintain, or change a particular kind of relationship with some object in the 
environment or in thought, or with the environment as a whole" (p. 87). The 
emotional response is comprised of several components: typically physiological 
changes, phenomenological experience, and an expressive component. The latter has 
important implications for social interaction in that by attending to expressions of 
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emotion, the social perceiver is able to acquire knowledge about the emotional state of 
conspecifics. To the extent that emotional experience is linked to behavioural 
consequences, such information is useful for predicting the likely future behaviour of 
others, and can therefore help facilitate smooth social transaction. However, if the 
interests of the parties of an interaction are in conflict, simulated expressions of 
emotion (i.e. attempts to appear emotional in the absence of emotional experience) 
may be employed to gain some form of advantage over interaction partners. For 
instance, posed and genuine smiles are seen to reflect the distinction between an 
intentional simulation of an expression of emotion and a spontaneous veridical 
emotional expression. While genuine smiles are indications of positive emotional 
experience, posed smiles appear to be generally unrelated to emotion. Given that there 
are physiognomic differences between posed and genuine smiles that specify honest 
enjoyment as opposed to that which is simulated, it follows that the social perceiver 
may use these distinctions to enable accurate detection of positive emotional state. 
However, to this point, little attention has been given to what, specifically, the social 
perceiver is detecting when differentiating between posed and genuine smiles. That is, 
what specific function does positive emotion play within the context of social 
exchange that makes it advantageous for the perceiver to be sensitive to the 
differences between veridical and simulated expressions of this emotion? To address 
this question, Owren and Bachorowski (2001) have recently presented a theoretical 
account of the evolutionary origins of smiling in humans. A brief overview of their 
account follows. 
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Selfish Genes and Smiling in Social1nteraction 
Owren and Bachorowski (2001) explicitly adopt a selfish-gene perspective from 
evolutionary biology (e.g. Dawkins, 1989) to describe and explain the evolutionary 
origins and function of smiling in early hominids and humans. Basing their argument 
on the rather controversial position that smiles are facial expressions that are more 
uniquely human than facial expressions of negative emotions,14 these authors propose 
that smiling (and subsequently laughter) in the present form emerged as the result of 
selection pressure operating specifically on our hominid ancestors. That is, while the 
features of emotion necessarily evolved from a common ancestor of both modem 
humans and higher-order apes, smiles have undergone further selection at some point 
after these lines had diverged in response to changing ecological niches. Specifically, 
the shift from being arboreal to terrestrial dwelling creatures brought with it a range of 
new environmental challenges, not the least of which was the increased reliance on 
group living. 
Successful living in extended groups requires the formation and maintenance of 
cooperative relationships between individuals who are often (relatively) genetically 
unrelated. However, truly cooperative behaviour may tend to be reasonably 
uncommon as, according to the selfish-gene approach, natural selection favours those 
who ultimately gain rather than lose from social interaction. Hence, any strategy of 
cooperation must be mutually beneficial for all parties; or else those who lose out may 
not cooperate in the future either by choice or consequence (i.e. being selected 
against). Furthermore, such a strategy must be resistant to an attempt to cheat, that is, 
14 Although Owren and Bachorowski (2001) acknowledge that some non-human primates express 
prototypically positive information such as a 'play-face' or laugh-like pants in chimpanzees, they 
suggest these expressions primarily serve functions distinct from the expression of positive emotion, 
such as affiliation or appeasement. 
to enter into a cooperative interaction, but not cooperate. To achieve stable 
cooperation, a system of reliable communication is required in order to minimise 
opportunities for dishonesty during otherwise cooperative interactions. 
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Accordingly, Owren and Bachorowski (2001) argue that smiling evolved in humans 
as a reliable indicator of a positive emotional state, which, in tum, led to the selection 
for accurate detection of this indicator. Crucial to this argument is the selection for 
both the expression and recognition of smiling in that both of these components are 
required to resist exploitation. Therefore, communication from this perspective is 
conceived not as information sharing, but an attempt to influence others. Detection of 
positive emotion in others leads to experiences of positive emotion (Surakka & 
Hietanen, 1998), thereby 'matching' the emotional state of interaction partners, which 
in tum is likely to lead to an escalation of the intensity of the positive emotional 
experience in a form of feedback loop between interaction partners. This feedback 
fosters positive affect between individuals, which according to Owren and 
Bachorowski, is an important causal component of reciprocal cooperative behaviour. 
Indeed, if either party of an interaction does not detect and respond to a signal of 
positive affect in kind, the feedback loop is broken and positive affect dissipates, as 
does the likelihood of cooperation. Thus, in essence, Owren and Bachorowski argue 
that genuine smiling has evolved in humans alongside the ability to detect this signal 
as a mechanism for eliciting reciprocal cooperation amongst interaction partners. 
Of course, this system is still open to dishonest signalling in terms of simulating an 
expression of positive emotion, thereby eliciting cooperation without any necessity 
for reciprocation. However, as we have seen, simulations of smiles expressing 
positive affect are neurologically and physiognomically distinct from spontaneous, 
genuine smiles. There is, therefore, a basis for the attuned perceiver to discriminate 
between individuals who are genuinely cooperative and those attempting to elicit 
cooperation without possessing an intention to reciprocate. A focus of the present 
research centres on whether social perceivers do in fact use smile veracity to guide 
cooperative behaviour. 
The Present Research 
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On the basis of the arguments outlined in this chapter for the adaptive function of the 
accurate detection of emotional state in others, the present research will provide an 
examination of the sensitivity of perceivers to positive emotional state as specified by 
posed and genuine smiles. This very notion was the subject of an early investigation 
by Darwin (1872/1998), who, after showing Duchenne's photographs of a genuine 
smile to a range of individuals, concluded that everyone could instantly recognise the 
expression as a smile of enjoyment. However, in regard to the photograph of the 
simulated smile, Darwin reported: 
That the expression is not natural is clear, for I showed this photograph to 
twenty-four persons, of whom three could not in the least tell what was meant, 
whilst the others, though they perceived that the expression was of the nature 
ofa smile, answered in words such as 'a wicked joke', 'trying to laugh', 
'grinning laughter', half-amazed laughter' etc. (p.202). 
However, since Darwin's observation, in contrast to the research that has investigated 
the physiognomic distinction between posed and genuine smiles, there has been a 
paucity of research investigating the nature of the sensitivity of perceivers to these 
differences. The remainder of this thesis provides a review of the extant research 
investigating this issue, and presents the results of four experiments designed to 
replicate and extend these studies. 
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Initially, consideration will be given to the theoretical framework adopted for this 
thesis, that is, the Gibsonian ecological approach to psychology (Gibson, 1979), in 
order to outline the theoretical basis from which the empirical components of the 
present research were informed. Following this, consideration will be given to 
requirements for ecologically valid facial expressions for use in research settings. The 
procedure for generating the facial displays used in the present research is then 
described. Three experiments are reported. The first two studies were intended to 
investigate the sensitivity of perceivers to the meaningful distinctions between posed 
and genuine smiles; the first by means of an explicit discrimination task, and the 
second under conditions where the participant's attention was not drawn to any 
requirement to evaluate these facial displays. The third experiment was designed to 
investigate the functional role of posed and genuine smiles in social interaction. 
Specifically, this study was intended to provide a preliminary assessment of the social 
affordances specified by posed and genuine smiles by operationalising Owren and 
Bachorowski's (2001) theoretical proposition that genuine, but not posed smiles, elicit 
cooperative behaviour from interaction partners. Finally, consideration is given to the 
implications of the present research, both in terms of the results reported, as well as 
the application of an ecological framework to the study of social perception within 
psychological science. 
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CHAPTER 2 
An Introduction to Gibsonian Ecological Psychology 
The research reported in this thesis has been conducted from within the theoretical 
framework of Gibsonian ecological psychology. Given this approach has seldom been 
applied to the study of social perception (McArthur & Baron, 1983), the current 
chapter presents on overview of the study of psychology from a functional ecological 
perspective, contrasted with the more traditional mechanistic cognitivist treatments 
that dominate contemporary psychological theorising. Initially, a brief critical 
overview of the information processing approach to psychology will be presented as 
an· introduction to the theoretical issues relevant to the present work. Subsequently, an 
outline ofthe Gibsonian ecological approach to psychology will be presented as an 
alternative theoretical position from which to study psychology. In particular, the 
focus of this chapter will be on the notion of direct perception and the theory of 
affordances, which together provide a basis for considering the individual-
environment system as the unit of analysis for psychology. Consideration will be 
given to the suitability of an ecological approach for the study of social psychology 
and, more specifically, the phenomena of social perception. Finally, the present 
research will be discussed in terms of an ecological analysis of the function of posed 
and genuine smiles in the context of social interaction. 
Cartesian Dualism, Ecological Monism, and Psychological Science 
Virtually every branch of contemporary mainstream scientific psychology has at its 
core a theoretical commitment to the notion of a dualistic individual. Any cross-
section of the discipline is likely to reveal the common assumption of a distinction 
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between the mental and physical aspects of the human condition. That is, a distinction 
between the mind and the body, or in some cases the brain and the rest of the body. 
Such thinking is evident across the spectrum of psychological research ranging from 
the micro-level analyses of the neurosciences (e.g. Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Magnum, 
2002) through to the study of psychophysiology (e.g. Cacioppo, Tassinary, & 
Berntson, 2000), sensation and perception (e.g. Schiffman, 1996), developmental 
psychology (e.g. Piaget, 1967), cognitive psychology (e.g. Anderson, 1995), 
evolutionary psychology (e.g. Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992), personality 
psychology (e.g. Funder, 1997), social psychology (e.g. Carr, 2003) and extending to 
the more macro-level investigation of cultural and cross-cultural psychology (e.g. 
Berry, Poortinga, & Pandey, 1997). 
The origins of the premise that the mental entity of the mind exists separately from 
the physicality of the body can be traced to the ancient Greek philosophers, and in 
particular Plato (Hacking, 2002; Trigg, 1988). However, it was the French 
philosopher and mathematician Descartes, who in the seventeenth century offered the 
theory of mind-body dualism that is seen in various forms throughout modern 
psychological science. After observing hydraulically mechanised statues in the Royal 
French Gardens, Descartes conceived of the human body as an organic mechanical 
device under the control of the mind, a distinctly separate non-mechanical, non-
physical entity. 15 Although the separation of the body from the mind was certainly not 
a novel concept at the time, Descartes was among the first to emphasise a relationship 
between the two, suggesting a bidirectional link whereby the mind could influence the 
15 For Descartes, in keeping with the prevailing religious doctrine of the time, the mind was actually the 
soul (in fact, psyche originally meant soul), and could be located in the pineal gland. However, his 
ideas were not entirely in synchrony with the church in that the physical world was conceived by 
Descartes as entirely mechanistic, that once initiated by God needed no further divine intervention. 
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body as well as the body being able to influence the mind. For example, he suggested 
that the human 'passions' (e.g. love, hate, sadness) were bodily states that exerted 
influence over mental function, while in tum, mental function governed various 
bodily activities by means of controlling volitional action. 
Information Processing Theories of Psychology 
The central assumptions of Descartes theory of mind-body dualism have been so 
influential amongst theorists of modem psychological science that the term Cartesian 
dualism is now an accepted nomenclature to refer to a functional separation of the 
mental and the physical. Indeed, the advent of the cognitive revolution within 
psychology brought with it a rigorous endorsement of this form of dualism, derived in 
large part from the mechanistic approach of cognitive science to psychology. 
Typically, computational models of psychology have been a hallmark of the cognitive 
science approach (Eysenck & Keane, 1990), whereby the brain is conceived as a 
central processing machine that receives and interprets input from the sensory organs, 
and in tum issues commands to which the body responds. These ideas were very 
influential amongst the early cognitive psychologists (e.g. Broadbent, 1958; Miller, 
1962; Neisser, 1967) and led to the formulation of a linear information processing 
approach as the dominant model within cognitive psychology (Anderson, 1995). 
Often represented as a computer metaphor of the mind, the information processing 
approach posits the brain (by analogy the central processing unit or hardware of the 
computer) as a device that processes information (by analogy the software of the 
computer) gleaned from the senses into a form that allows the perceiver to make sense 
of the world and ultimately behave in accordance with this interpretation. 
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Contemporary psychological science has drawn heavily on the information processing 
view of cognition, initially as an alternative to the 'black box' of behaviourism, and 
more recently as fully fledged theories of mental function and cognition (Leahey, 
2001). Central to these theories is the notion of the mind as a mediating structure 
between the individual and the external world. By processing the sensory stimuli 
received from the environment, it is believed that the mind forms and stores mental 
representations of the external world in order that, by means of inferential processing, 
it can be meaningfully perceived. This internalised version of the world is assumed to 
be formed via sequential stages of information processing whereby the symbolic 
nature of the world is encoded into a meaningful mental representation which is 
subsequently accessed to inform behaviour (Anderson, 1995). Mental knowledge 
structures, often known as schema or schemata, (Eysenck & Keane, 1990) have been 
proposed in various forms by researchers (e.g. Bartlett, 1932; Piaget, 1967; 
Rumelhart, 1980) to explain the inner workings of the mechanisms of information 
processing. In short, a schema is a "structured cluster of concepts and ... generic 
knowledge about stereotypical situations" (Eysenck & Keane, p. 249) that can operate 
as both a script for the execution of behaviour (Schank & Abelson, 1977) and a 
template for the integration of new knowledge into memory (Gluck & Bower, 1988). 
The schema, therefore, is seen to be a basic unit by which meaning is imposed on 
stimulus information in order for sense to be made of the world and behaviour 
exhibited accordingly. Thus, information processing accounts of psychology posit 
perception as an indirect process mediated by the mind. 
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Implications of indirect perception. 
Theories of indirect perception, that is, perception mediated by the mechanistic 
processing of the mind, such as those proposed within the information processing 
approach to psychology, conceive of cognition in a manner explicitly consistent with 
that of Cartesian dualism. Although mental structures (e.g. schema) have been 
proposed to describe how a representation of reality is constructed from stimulus 
information, and further, how behaviour is informed by this representation, the mind 
remains both theoretically and functionally separable from the body, an assumption 
shared by both Descartes and modem mainstream psychology (Reed, 1996). Thus, 
theories of indirect perception are also necessarily dualist theories of psychology. 
Furthermore, inherent to psychological dualism is the theoretical assumption of 
construction, in that the mind must construct the reality with which the body engages. 
Hence, with dualism there comes a commitment to the notion of constructivism 
within cognition. 
An important philosophical implication arises from conceiving of psychological 
activity as construction. If the mind is thought to construct meaning, it must be 
assumed that the sensory input arriving from the world via stimulation has no inherent 
meaning to the perceiver, that is, it arrives in an impoverished form (Michaels & 
Carello, 1981). Sensation resulting from stimulation of the sense organs is given 
meaning by way of the mechanisms of information processing before it can be 
coherently perceived. Thus, sensation and perception are seen as distinct but related 
activities, with the former involving the registration of stimulation by the sensory 
organs, while the latter refers to the constructive process by which this stimulation is 
prescribed meaning. Together, sensation and perception comprise the initial 
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sequential stages of a chain of causality resulting in a response to the original 
stimulating conditions, that is, the initial stages of a stimulus-response cycle. The 
mind, or perhaps more correctly the information processing capabilities of the mind, 
are considered to construct a meaningful representation of reality from the input of the 
sense organs. Meaning, therefore, is seen as a property of psychological construction, 
not of the world. Thus, according to the information processing view, it is the mental 
models, schema and representations that provide the individual with an understanding 
of the world, not the world itself. 
Ecological Psychology 
The information processing approach to psychology has been widely accepted as a 
ubiquitous theory of psychology (Reed, 1996), and this view has indeed contributed 
much to the current understanding of human behaviour and psychological science in 
general. However, this approach has not been without serious philosophical criticism. 
Among the most vocal opponents to information processing have been a group of 
theorists and researchers promoting what has now come to be known as ecological 
psychology. 16 This theoretical approach has largely emerged from the work of 1.1. 
Gibson (1950; 1966; 1979), who, upon recognising philosophical inadequacies 
inherent to the information processing approach to psychology, and in particular to 
the study of perception, set about devising an alternative theoretical view. Indeed, 
Gibson was not alone (e.g. Hirst, 1957) in identifying logical inconsistencies within 
the framework of mediational theories of perception. At the heart of such criticism is 
what Wilcox and Katz (1981) have termed the cognitive paradox. lfit is accepted that 
16 It is important to note at the outset that ecological psychology as referred to in this and subsequent 
chapters does not refer to all approaches to psychology labelled ecological (e.g. Fridlund's (1991) 
behavioural ecology view of facial expressions), but to the theoretical approach of ecological realism 
first devised and championed by Gibson (1950; 1966; 1979), hence the label Gibsolliall. 
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the mind (or brain) constructs representations of the external world in the form of 
schemas (or other such knowledge carrying mental structures), then one mus~ question 
how such representations accommodate new information (or indeed how they came to 
exist in the first instance)? If knowledge is based in a schema, then something 
independent of that schema must be present, in order to know whether or not new 
information ought to be incorporated into the existing representation. Some other 
source of knowledge is required to decide whether incoming information needs to be 
encoded, or alternatively, is already represented within the existing schema. Schema 
themselves cannot logically perform this task since they are the knowledge structures 
potentially in need of change and therefore cannot simultaneously be the agents of 
change as they cannot know what they do not know. Wilcox and Katz illustrate the 
paradox as follows 
Suppose that all person X knows is what person Y tells him. How could X 
ever find that Y was lying? If X shows that he knows Y is lying, we have to 
conclude that we were wrong to believe that all X knows is what Y tells him. 
Ifwe modify our position to include another informant Z, the same problem 
obtains. There might be a conflict between the reports of Y and Z, but X 
would have no way of deciding who to believe without information from 
another source. We can continue to multiply X's sources of information ad 
infinitum, but as we do so the claim that all he knows is what his informants 
(schemas) tell him will eventually become trivialised, because we would then 
say that all X knows is what every possible source of information tells him. 
(p.253) 
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Clearly, this reasoning becomes circular and somewhat fallacious when one begins to 
consider an infinite number of schema as the result of proposing higher and higher 
order knowledge structures. Reed (1996) takes a similar approach, questioning how 
schemas may operate to inform action. Reed suggests that in order for a 
representational system of knowledge to be of use, there must be some means to 
select "just those particular aspects of the representation that conveyed the 
information relevant to the task at hand" (p.ll). To select such aspects of the 
representation, one must have an understanding of context (i.e. what is required by the 
current situation) independent of the representation, which again requires a means of 
knowing in addition to the representation. This same logical argument can be applied 
when considering the origin of schema in the individual. How does the newborn 
acquire their first schema? If the sensory world impinges on the newborn in a 
completely meaningless manner, how is meaning first applied in the absence of any 
schema, representation, or other knowledge structure? Thus, the paradox lies in the 
claim that knowledge is constructed cognitively, a process, which a priori requires the 
knowledge that it constructs, in order to perform the construction. 
Gibson's solution to this paradox was to propose an alternate theory of perception 
that, as it developed, came to be antithetical to the information processing approach. 
At the heart of Gibson's theory, which he termed an ecological approach (1979), is 
the epistemic claim that the world can be perceived directly, without recourse to 
mediation by any hidden mental structures such as the representations or schema of 
the mind. Such a departure from the received view is plausible in light of another 
seemingly radical claim of Gibson's, namely that information about the world 
acquired by the individual is inherently meaningful. The traditional information 
50 
processing view posited a physical account of the stimuli available for perception, and 
describes the various forms of energy available to the senses in the metrics of physics 
(e. g. the amplitude and frequency of sound waves, intensity and wavelength of light 
waves, the distance and size of objects etc.). Gibson rejected this reductionist view, 
along with the use of the term stimuli and the stimulus-response framework!7 
(Gibson, 1979; Reed, 1988), suggesting instead that for psychology a description of 
the world in psychological terms was warranted (Michaels & Carello, 1981). This was 
not a rejection of physical science per se, since ecological psychologists remain 
theoretically consistent with the laws of natural science and place psychological 
activity firmly within the constraints of both biology and more widely physics. The 
significant point of departure from traditional theorists however, is the claim that the 
appropriate level of explanation for psychology was the level at which the individual 
engages with the environment, that is, the ecological level. 
Thus, information, according to a Gibsonian ecological approach is considered to be 
the structures or patterns of energy that specify an environment, including the objects, 
places, and events of an environment, to an individual (Gibson, 1979). Gibson 
emphasised that this was not a definition of information as would be found in a 
dictionary in that ecological information is not communicated or transmitted to a 
receiver, rather it is simply available in the environment to be detected. Hence, if 
information about the environment is available in the environment, then the 
acquisition of this information requires no form of mediation, construction, or 
representation. Instead, it can be directly perceived, no elaboration over and above 
acquiring the information available is required to apprehend meaning. 
17 Consistent with the Gibsonian ecological approach to psychology, these tenns are not used in the 
present research in the traditional, infonnation processing sense. 
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To further elucidate Gibson's conceptualisation of ecological information, 
consideration must be given to the notion of invariants, that is, patterns of information 
"over time and/or space that are left unchanged by certain transformations" (Michaels 
& Carello, 1981, p. 20). These patterns are intrinsic to the energy fields (e.g. light, 
sound, heat etc.) that surround the individual, or what Gibson (1966) referred to as the 
ambient array, and are lawfully and uniquely constrained by their various sources in 
the environment. The structure of the light surrounding an individual (i.e. the optic 
arrayI8), for example, is determined by the surfaces off which that light is reflected. 
The particular nature of these surfaces yields patterns of light specific to that surface. 
The light reflected by a banana differs from that reflected by a bowling ball in a 
lawful and predictable mamler so that for each object there is an isometric 
correspondence between characteristics ofthe object (e.g. surface composition, size, 
shape etc.) and the structure within the light reflected by that object. It is the lawful 
specificity of this structure that carries meaning for the perceiver. Of course, different 
bananas structure light differently according to the characteristics of each individual 
piece of fruit (e.g. size, shape, ripeness). However, common elements in the structure 
of the light reflected by bananas persist regardless of the nature of the differences in 
structure among individual bananas. Thus, each banana is part of a larger equivalence 
class determined by the structural invariants within the light modulated by bananas. 
There exists an invariant structure in the optic array specifying bananas, or, for that 
matter, any object that is available for perception. This invariant structure is shared by 
all objects that at some level of description can be considered the same (Michaels & 
Carello). 
18 Although the notion of invariants applies equally to any infonnation in the ambient array, for 
simplicity the present discussion will be limited to that in the optic array. 
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The notion of invariants also has important implications for the perception of events. 
As objects or collections of objects change over the temporal course of an event, 
certain properties of the objects are preserved while others change. It is the style of 
change, or the transformational invariants, that are preserved and therefore available 
as information in the ambient array. To illustrate, evidence for transformational 
invariants within the patterns of human movement has been provided by Johansson 
(1973) who used the point-light technique, whereby reflective patches or lights are 
attached to the major joints (i.e. ankle, knee, hip, elbow, shoulder and wrist) and 
individuals are filmed so that only the lights are visible. Johansson reported that 
observers saw a random pattern oflights when the target was stationary, but observed 
a human form once the target began to move. Something specific to the movement of 
the lights allowed perceivers to know that they were viewing a human. Indeed, in a 
point-light display, the nature by which the lights move relative to each other in time 
and space is invariant by virtue of the biological constraints underlying the 
movement. The composition of the human body provides some constraint to 
movement in that there is a regular and lawful manner to which human movement 
conforms. For example flexion of the arm at the elbow has a range of approximately 
1800 and necessarily results in movement of the wrist along a regular arc, the radius 
of which is determined by forearm length. Given that observers were unable to 
identify the patterns oflights when the target was stationary, but were able to when 
movement was introduced suggests that it is the movement itself that specified 
meaning. The transformation or style of change of the pattern of lights, rather than the 
pattern itself, provided invariant structure, and hence specification of the event in the 
optic array. Michaels and Carello (1981) contrast the role of transformational and 
structural invariants in the provision of information in the ambient array suggesting 
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that "if an event is something happening to something, the 'something happening' is 
presumed to be specified by transformational invariants while the 'something' that it 
is happening to is presumed to be described by structural invariants." (p. 26). 
Extending the concept of invariants to consider all the surfaces and events of an 
environment, there is a global structure in the ambient array that specifies precisely 
that environment along with the contents and events of that environment to a 
perceiver. Obviously, the perceiver cannot apprehend all of this information 
simultaneously, so they must continuously sample the global structure by active 
exploration (e.g. shifting gaze direction, turning their head, looking or moving 
around). However, although some elements of the global structure remain constant 
(i.e. the invariants), the overlapping samples are not identical. The nature of this 
change may also be.considered invariant in terms of the relationship between the 
actions of the perceiver and the environment. Moving to the left of an object always 
means that object is now to the right of the perceiver. Sampling the ambient array 
provides the perceiver with information not only about the environment, but also 
about their location in, and movement around, that environment (Michaels & Carello, 
1981). Thus, 
according to the theory being proposed, perceiving, is the registering of certain 
definite dimensions of invariance ... together with definite parameters of 
disturbance. The invariants are the invariants of structure, and the disturbances 
are disturbances of structure .... The invariants specify the persistence of the 
environment and oneself. The disturbances specify the changes in the 
environment and oneself. (Gibson, 1979, p. 249, italics original). 
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However, even when one considers the environment to be information rich, therefore 
obviating the necessity for the individual to prescribe meaning to their world, only 
half of the story is being told. In addition to describing the information in the 
environment, the nature of the animal perceiving the information must also be 
considered. Not all invariant structures within the ambient array have significance to 
all animals. Some animals cannot detect some forms of information (e.g. bees are 
sensitive to the ultraviolet light reflected by some flowers but humans are not), hence 
it makes little sense to regard information simply as a property of the world without 
considering the properties of the organism that detects such information. Thus, 
Michaels and Carello (1981) suggest that information must be considered in terms of 
both what it is about (i.e. the environmental properties) and what it isfor (i.e. the 
animal). The structure in an array of ultraviolet light reflected by flowers is 
informative about the location of pollen for pollinating insects. Information, therefore, 
cannot be described ecologically without reference to both the animal and its 
environment. In this sense, ecological information 'points both ways' , implicating 
both the perceiver and that which is perceived in an animal-environment system 
(Turvey & Shaw, 1979). One cannot be studied without recourse to the other. Hence, 
the unit of analysis for the study of psychology from the ecological perspective must 
be the animal-environment system. 
Defining the domain of study for psychology as the animal-environment system is 
still however, short of a full and complete description of psychological activity. Given 
the environment contains meaningful information to which the perceiver has direct 
access, it is reasonable to question the course by which an animal detects only 
information that has contextual significance to it, from amongst the virtually infinite 
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variety of potentially available information. As discussed above, not all animals 
exploit all available information, that is, not all animals are attuned to all inv~riant 
structures. What animals then, are attuned to what information? To address this 
question, Gibson (1966; 1979) proposed what was possibly the most radical element 
of his ecological view of psychology, specifically, the concept of affordances. A 
description of affordances and the theoretical basis for the direct perception of 
affordances follows. 
Affordances. 
To be adaptive, an animal needs to engage with certain benevolent aspects of their 
environment and avoid potentially harmful aspects. The initial step in achieving such 
goals is to know about both the 'good' and the 'bad' aspects of the environment. This 
may be achieved by detecting the structured information in the ambient array which, 
as described above, allows meaning to be directly perceived. General detection of 
information in the environment alone is not sufficient to support adaptive functioning 
by an animal. Although there is invariant information specifying, for instance, 
bananas, this may well simply be incidental to the perceiver if the banana is not 
perceived as an edible, nutrition providing object. In addition to the detection of 
information, the animal must know what the information means to them, or as coined 
by Gibson (1979), what the affordances of their environment are. For Gibson, a 
description of the affordances of an environment involves describing what that 
environment "offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill." 
(p. 127, italics original). In other words, an affordance is an opportunity within the 
environment for an individual to act or interact relative to the objects, places and 
events of that environment. 
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To illustrate, an affordance of a chair is that it provides one with a place to sit if so 
motivated. Similarly, a rock ledge, a tree stump or even a table may also offer the 
individual an opportunity to sit. However, affordances are more complex than merely 
static qualities of the environment. The same chair that was sat upon by an individual 
also offers them something to stand on if extra height is required or it may serve as a 
shield to avoid being injured if taming a lion. Furthermore, a child's high-chair will 
not provide a seat for an adult, nor will a bar stool to a newborn. The chair is able to 
be sat (or stood) on only because an individual is suitably equipped to sit (or stand) 
and the chair is able to withstand sitting (or standing) on by that individual without 
breaking. An affinity must hold between the properties ofthe environment and the 
potential actions of the perceiver for it to be possible for an affordance to be realised. 
Shaw, Turvey and Mace (1982) formalised this relationship as follows, "a situation or 
event X affords action Y for animal Z on occasion 0 if certain relevant mutual 
compatibility relations between X and Z obtain" (p. 196). Gibson highlighted this 
point, explaining that affordances cannot be measured solely in the metrics of physics, 
but "have to be measured relative to the individual" (p.127), thereby further 
reinforcing the position of the animal-environment system as the proper unit of 
analysis for ecological psychology. 
Importantly, the fact that affordances exist and can be realised rests on the historical 
compatibility between the individual and their environment. Animate life has evolved 
within a relatively invariant environment (Gibson, 1979) such that certain adaptive 
propensities have been selected for which allow the organism to succeed within that 
environment. There exists a mutual reciprocity between the characteristics of the 
environment and the characteristics of the animal required for coping with this 
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environment. As outlined above, Gibson has described the environmental 
characteristics as the affordances of the environment. Taken together, the set of 
affordances available to a particular animal can be thought of as the niche of that 
animal, a term borrowed from ecology (e.g. Elton, 1927) to refer to the functional role 
of an animal within an ecosystem, or as Gibson (1979) suggested, "how an animal 
lives [rather] than .. . where it lives" (p. 128, italics original). Therefore, an animal 
must have a set of abilities compatible with the niche which they occupy in order for 
both to coexist (Michaels & Carello, 1981). Such abilities or ways of being effective, 
have been described as effectivities (Shaw & McIntyre, 1974). Effectivities are the 
capabilities for action that a particular animal has with reference to a particular 
opportunity (or set of opportunities) for acting. Shaw, Turvey and Mace (1982) 
formalised the description of an effectivity as follows, "an animal Z can effect action 
Y on environmental situation or event X on occasion 0 if certain relevant mutual 
compatibilities between X and Z obtain" (p. 197). Thus, effectivity and affordance 
properties are seen as the complementary, co-implicative components of the 
relationship between the animal and its environment. To claim, for example, that a 
banana provides nutrition to a particular animal is to claim that the animal which 
obtains nutrition from a banana has effectivities specific to the properties of the 
banana. That is, the 'banana-eater' must be sensitive to information in the ambient 
array specifying bananas (e.g. bananas are visible to animals sensitive to the optic 
array), be able to grasp the banana (e.g. bananas are graspable to animals with 
appendages that can grasp) in order to pick it from the tree (e.g. bananas are pickab1e 
to animals with appendages that grasp and which have sufficient strength to pick), and 
be able to digest the banana to obtain the nutritional benefits (e.g. bananas are 
digestable for animals with an appropriate digestive system). Hence, effectivities and 
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affordances are symmetrical to the extent that each must be reciprocal to the other for 
the animal and its niche to coexist (Michaels & Carello).19 
Given that the environment contains a multitude of affordances, it is reasonable to 
question the nature of the selection of some affordances over others. Clearly no 
individual can realise the virtually infinite number of affordances in their 
environment, nor should they need to. Instead, the affordances that meet the goals and 
intentions of the individual are those which are searched for and acted upon. To return 
to an example provided above, a chair provides a place to sit for a weary individual, 
as well as something to stand on for someone wishing to retrieve something from a 
high shelf. Perceiving the affordances of a chair is not to know that an object is called 
a chair (even if one knows what chairs are for), but to know what one can do with the 
chair. That is, what the chair means to the perceiver. In this sense, the detection of an 
affordance is the detection of the meaning (Michaels & Carello, 1981) or value 
(Gibson, 1979) of the objects, substances, places, and events of the environment 
relative to the goals, intentions, and effectivities of the individual. Although there 
must be information available that specifies an affordance for a suitably attuned 
perceiver to detect, it is the meaningful opportunities for behaviour for an individual, 
that is the affordances, that Gibson described as the functional referent of perception. 
19 There is a controversy here in that the concept of effectivities may be viewed as redundant (Cutting, 
1982). Gibson's notion of an affordance 'pointing both ways' takes account of both the properties of 
the environment and the properties of the animal simultaneously. However, for the researcher 
attempting to uncover such relationships between an individual and their environment, there is often 
utility in knowing the abilities and capacities of the individual relative to the characteristics of the 
enviromnent in order to inform coherent theorising regarding a specific animal-environment 
interaction. For example, there is little point in investigating the role of the magnetic poles for human 
navigation given that humans are not sensitive to magnetic fields (cf pigeons and many other migratory 
animals). In this sense, describing the properties of the animal (i.e. effectivities) together with the 
properties of the environment (i.e. affordances) is potentially a necessary initial step toward explicating 
a genuinely monistic affordance relationship whereby both sets of properties are considered 
simultaneously. An important point to make here however is that affordances, when described as 
properties of an environment distinct from the effectivities of the individual, are essentially only 
potential affordances that are able to be realised by a suitably effective individual, but may not 
necessarily be acted on. 
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The perceiver does not simply register information, but actively detects relevant 
affordances. The name of an object or event, or knowledge of a category or class to 
which it may belong is arbitrary; it is the functional significance of the object or event 
that is perceived. As described by Gibson, "the special combination of qualities into 
which an object can be analysed is not normally noticed .. .If you know what can be 
done with an ... object, what it can be used for, you can call it what you please" (p. 
134). This point is further illustrated when the intentions and goals of an individual 
are considered. The same individual can use a chair in many different ways depending 
on their motivation. Again, it is not the fact that the object is called a chair that makes 
it useful, but that it provides a variety of opportunities for acting depending on the 
goals and requirements of the user. 
It is important to note that this is not to suggest that affordances are simply subjective 
extensions of an individual's phenomenological experiences, nor that affordances are 
concrete objective properties of the environment. In fact Gibson (1979) rejected the 
distinction between 'subjective' and 'objective' as it applied to psychology, placing 
affordances firmly in the domain of the relational animal-environment system 
whereby such opportunities are "equally a fact of the environment and a fact of 
behaviour" (p.129). As facts of the environment, affordances are real. Even if they are 
not realised, affordances are not mere possibilities for behaviour (Reed, 1988). A 
chair is a real object that provides a range of affordances (sitting on, standing on etc.) 
regardless of whether anyone is actually sitting or standing on it. Clearly then, 
affordances must exist outside of the subjective domain. However, as facts of 
behaviour, affordances "are not specifiable independent of an individual" (Heft, 1989, 
p.4). Thus affordances must also exist outside of the objective domain. Instead of 
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conceptualising affordance in terms of a subjective-objective dichotomy, Gibson 
suggested that affordances be considered "as facts of the environment of all observers 
that can be used by particular observers" (Reed, 1988, p. 294). 
An implication of the theory of affordances is that there must be some means by 
which the animal has knowledge of the relationship between its own effectivity 
properties and the affordance properties of the environment. Perception of this 
relationship must occur to enable the individual to know its effectivities in relation to 
its environment. Gibson (1966) suggested that any act of perception necessarily 
entails perception of the self in combination with perception of the environment. 
Therefore, for effective perception and action the animal requires two basic types of 
information: exterospecijic information that specifies the environment (in relation to 
the animal), and propriospecijic information that specifies the animal itself (in 
relation to the environment). Reed (1996) further explicated this distinction, 
describing exterospecific information as that which "remains invariant regardless of 
anything the animal does ... meaning that it specifies a fact of the environment" and 
proprio specific information as "information that varies in specific ways as a function 
of what the animal is currently doing ... meaning that it specifies how an animal is 
encountering its environment" (p. 49). In the sense that exterospecific information 
must always coexist with proprio specific information, Lee (1978; 1980) has 
consolidated this notion of dual information into a singular concept, that of 
expropriospecijic information, or information that specifies, in a relational manner the 
ongoing interaction between the individual and their environment. These formulations 
help overcome a further theoretical difficulty inherent within indirect theories of 
perception in that theories of mediated self-perception inevitably end up with either 
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the same cognitive paradox as described earlier: knowledge of the self by means of 
mental representation requires knowledge of the self external to the representation; or 
the hypothesising of a distinct proprioceptive specific nervous system (Reed, 1988). 
By proposing that all perception of the environment is accompanied by perceptions of 
the self, ecological psychologists avoid the postulation of there being distinct forms or 
types of perception, and instead put forward that information about both the self and 
the world is simultaneously available for detection by the perceiver. 
Finally, it should also be noted that reference to affordances is in terms of action, that 
is, an object or event affords acting upon (Michaels & Carello, 1981), or indeed has 
consequences for such action (or inaction). The function of perception, as suggested 
above, is not to know the environment, but to know what one can do in that 
environment. Seeing a rapidly approaching object is useful for avoiding, or catching 
that object, rather than simply lmowing about the imminence of collision. The 
detection of affordances helps tailor or regulate the perceiver's actions relative to the 
opportunities for action present in the environment (Reed, 1996). Perception and 
action are therefore co-implicative in that the value of perception is in the 
manifestation of appropriate action, which in itself is constrained by, and dependent 
on, accurate perception. Therefore, perception and action, to ecological psychologists 
are in fact functionally inseparable, and are therefore frequently referred to in terms of 
a perception-action cycle. 
In summary, proponents of Gibsonian ecological psychology argue that perception 
serves adaptive functioning in that perceiving entails the detection of the meaningful 
opportunities for an individual to act or interact that exist within their environment, a 
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concept Gibson termed the 'affordances of the environment'. Furthermore, in contrast 
to the established, information processing accounts of perception and psycho.logy 
more generally, Gibson proposed that the perception of affordances is direct, that is, 
not mediated by mental structures or representation. To support this view, the concept 
of information is reformulated to reflect lawful and specific invariant structures in the 
ambient energy array that surrounds the individual. For example, the structure of light 
reflected from the surface of an object has a lawfully isomorphic relationship to the 
nature of that object. In tum, the perceiver is attuned to detect such structure in terms 
of the affordances specified by this information. Thus, there is mutuality between the 
individual and their environment because affordances are properties of the 
environment taken with reference to the effectivities of the individual. The only way 
to satisfactorily understand the relationship between the individual and their 
environment, and in tum to understand psychology, is to consider each as an 
inseparable and reciprocal aspect of the other. Put briefly, we ought to consider 
human behaviour as arising from within a monistic animal-environment system. 
An Ecological Approach to Social Psychology 
In as much as Gibsonian ecological psychology represents a radical departure from 
the traditional cognitive constructivist account of psychology, this perspective also 
provides a fundamentally different approach to the study of psychological phenomena 
within social contexts. Contemporary social psychology is very much dominated by 
information processing theories of social behaviour as represented by the social 
cognitive framework being the standard theoretical approach in this field (Markus & 
Zajonc, 1985). For example, Kunda (1999), in an introduction to the area suggests 
that 
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many of the central questions that social psychology has been concerned with 
from the earliest days - how we form impressions of others, how we explain 
their behaviour, how our att.itudes relate to our actions, how we resolve 
conflicts among our beliefs, how our reactions can be tainted by prejudice -
revolved around complex mental processes. (p. 2) 
Similarly, in their overview of social cognition, Fiske and Taylor (1991) state that 
"social psychology has always been cognitive, in the broad sense of positing 
important steps that intervene between observable stimulus and observable 
response .... Social cognition research attempts to measure the stages of social 
information processing" (pp. 14-16). Social cognition makes use of the basic premises 
ofcognitivism, in that the mental structures and representations of the mind are said 
to mediate between the individual and the external world, in this case the social world. 
For many social psychologists, schema have become the central unit by which 
meaning is imposed on the apparently relatively meaningless world (McArthur & 
Baron, 1983), such that inherent to social cognition is an "unabashed commitment to 
mentalism" (Fiske & Taylor, p. 14). 
Alternatively, as discussed above, the ecological approach to psychology explicitly 
rejects mentalism and indeed repudiates the very notion of indirect perception that this 
dualistic assumption entails. Instead, proponents of ecological psychology propose 
that meaningful information exists in the environment which therefore is available to 
be perceived directly without mediation from any intervening mental structures or 
processing. What is meaningful to the ecological psychologist is the affordances of 
the environment, the opportunities to act or interact. These principles apply not only 
to the perception of the inanimate objects, places, and events of the environment, but 
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equally to the animate objects, the other animals and, in particular to the other people 
in the environment. This is to claim that what is perceived in regard to other people is 
not their qualities, nor their traits, identity, personality, character or any other category 
of psychological descriptors, but rather their affordances. The affordances of 
conspecifics, often referred to as social affordances, specify what can be done with, 
to, or by that person relative to the perceiver. These are the opportunities to act or 
interact relative to other people. 
The claim that perceivers detect the affordances of others requires a shift in the 
conceptual and theoretical foundations underlying the field of social psychology 
(Knowles & Smith, 1982). As has been discussed in the preceding sections of this 
chapter, a commitment to the ecological approach requires a rejection of mind-body 
dualism and the associated notion of indirect perception. Instead, proponents of the 
ecological position posit a monistic animal-environment system whereby perception 
of ambient energy patterns specified by environmental properties is direct. Although 
the basic premise of the ecological approach, that is information specifying 
affordances is able to be directly acquired, has been well developed and described, 
initially by Gibson (1950; 1966; 1979) and subsequently by a number of other authors 
(e.g. Michaels & Carello, 1981; Reed, 1988, 1996; Shaw et aI., 1982; Turvey & Shaw, 
1979), relatively little application of the ecological approach has been seen within the 
domain of social psychology (Zebrowitz & Collins, 1997). Gibson (1979) provided a 
foundation for conceiving of the social world in an ecological sense, suggesting that 
the perception of social affordances 
is enormously complex, but it is nonetheless lawful, and it is based on the 
pickup of the information in touch, sound, odour, taste and ambient light. It is 
65 
just as much based on ... information as is the simpler perception of the support 
that is offered by the ground under one's feet. For other animals and other 
persons can only give off information about themselves insofar as they are 
tangible, audible, odorous, testable or visible. (p. 135) 
Hence, to the Gibsonian ecological psychologist, social perception is simply a specific 
case of perception, albeit the perception of potentially highly complex objects and 
events. Such complexity is inherent to social perception in that the objects of 
perception, that is, the other people of the environment, are also animate and behave 
in complex ways. They are able to perceive and act in the same manner as the 
observer. In short, they are able to interact, both with the observer and with one 
another. 
To conceive of other people as ecological objects for perceiving is to claim that there 
is veridical information regarding the affordance properties of these individuals 
available for perception. That is, people structure the ambient array by the same 
principles (i.e. natural optical laws) as inanimate objects. In this sense, Berry and 
Misovich (1994) suggest that "just as the appearance and movement patterns of 
objects are constrained by their internal properties, the structural and dynamic 
characteristics ofpeop/e are lawfully related to their dispositional qualities" (p. 139, 
italics original). Thus, to consider social perception from an ecological perspective is 
to suggest that dispositions are in some way lawfully linked to occurrent properties, 
which in tum systematically modulate the ambient array such that information 
specifying disposition is available for perception (Baron & Misovich, 1993). What is 
perceived is the nature of these dispositional properties relative to the effectivities of 
the perceiver, that is, the social affordances of the environment. Thus, the 
epistemological position of the Gibsonian approach to social perception is that the 
affordance properties of individuals systematically constrain the ambient array such 
that information about others can be directly perceived (Baron & Boudreau, 1987; 
Knowles & Smith, 1982). 
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The extension of the premise of direct perception into the realm of social perception 
raises an important ontological question, namely: what is the basis of the invariant 
structure that specifies social affordances? How is it that the dispositions of people 
can lawfully constrain the ambient array? The path between the dispositional 
properties of inanimate objects and the specification of the affordances of these 
objects has been described above in terms of structural and transformational 
invariants. However, given the additional complexity social affordances entail, the 
path between the dispositional properties of the animate individual and structure 
within the ambient array may not be as clear. In suggesting that "the other person .. .is 
an ecological object with a ... surface that reflects light, and the information to specify 
what he or she is, invites, promises, threatens, or does can be found in the light", 
Gibson (1979, pp. 135-136) maintained that the same principles applied to the 
specification of the affordances of both animate and inanimate objects. Obvious 
parallels exist at the level of structural invariants in that the isometric correspondence 
between the characteristics of any object (e.g. a banana or a person) and the 
modulation of the ambient array by these characteristics potentially specifies 
information about the nature of that object to a perceiver. The attuned perceiver is 
able to acquire and use this information to know about the affordances of that object. 
For instance, the ripeness of a banana specifies its edibility, or the identity of an 
individual (e.g. acquaintance versus stranger) specifies how one should interact with 
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them (e.g. informal versus formal conversation). In each case the invariant structure 
of each object specifies what it is, or more cOlTectly what it offers, in relation to a 
perceiver. On the other hand, the role of transformational invariants in the seemingly 
ever-changing context of social interaction may not be as intuitive. What meaningful 
information persists despite the apparent multitude of dynamic changes inherent to the 
complexity and subtlety of two or more interacting individuals? 
To illustrate the role of transformation invariants in the specification of social 
affordances two relevant empirical demonstrations will be reviewed. The first of these 
concerns a program of research conducted by Shaw and colleagues (e.g. Pittenger & 
Shaw, 1975a, 1975b; Pittenger, Shaw, & Mark, 1979; Shaw, McIntyre, & Mace, 
1974; Shaw & Pittenger, 1977; Todd, Mark, Shaw, & Pittenger, 1980) to investigate 
the nature of the information that specifies human growth and aging. The age of an 
interaction partner is very pertinent to the opportunities to interact with that person 
(i.e. a baby, an infant, an adolescent and an adult all require quite distinct types of 
interaction) and therefore needs to be perceived for the interaction to be appropriate 
and successful. To this end, aging can be considered as an event, albeit a very gradual 
event, that results in the transformation of certain properties of the individual while 
preserving others. Individuals clearly change in facial appearance from infancy to 
adulthood, yet most often they are still easily recognisable as the same person. In 
particular, craniofacial morphology changes from a relatively circular head at birth, to 
a more elongated shape at maturity. These changes are due to the physical and 
biological constraints present during growth. Specifically, "the direction of growth 
along which the skull shape is strained follows lines of least resistance against such 
factors as muscle, cartilage, fluid pressure, gravitational attraction, atmospheric 
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pressure and growth of the brain" (Michaels & Carello, 1981, pp. 128-129). The 
morphological effects of growth can be accurately characterised in terms of a 
geometric transformation, specifically the cardioidal strain.2o If this transformation is 
applied to the outline shape of an infant skull, the resulting shape conforms to that 
expected with normal growth. This growth pattern pertains, for instance, when x-rays 
of an individual's skull at different ages are compared. If the cardioidal strain is 
applied to the outline of the skull as it appears in the earlier of the two x-rays, the 
resulting image is almost identical to the outline in the second x-ray (Todd et al., 
1980). In tum this information (i.e. the shape of the skull) can be used by perceivers 
to accurately predict age (Pittenger & Shaw, 1975a). In fact, Pittenger and Shaw 
(1975b) reported that 96% of the variance in participant's judgements of the age of a 
series of computer-generated facial profiles could be accounted for by the degree of 
cardioidal strain that had been applied to a standard profile. Similar results have been 
found when the cardioidal strain has been applied to cartoon drawings of the 'faces' 
of birds, monkeys, dogs and even Volkswagen 'beetle' cars (Pittenger et al., 1979). 
Importantly, not only can perceivers determine age from the degree of cardioidal 
transformation a given skull has undergone, but this information also specifies age-
related social affordances, including, for example, whether an individual requires 
nurturing and care, or whether there is biological potential for procreation. Thus, 
biological and physical factors are seen to lawfully constrain the nature of the 
transformation of craniofacial morphology associated with growth and aging such that 
there is invariant information which allows a perceiver to know the age and therefore 
information about the social affordances of an individual. 
20 Cardioid is the geometrical term that refers to a heart-shaped figure with a rounded tip. Cardioidal 
strain is the geometric transformation that follows this general pattern in that 'growth' is symmetrical 
around a nodal point. 
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A second illustration of transformational invariants providing an informational basis 
for social perception rests on Runeson and Frykholm' s (1983; 1986) principl~ of the 
kinematic specification of dynamics (KSD). This principle extends on the work of 
Johansson (1973), which, as described earlier suggested that the anatomical and 
biomechanical constraints on human movement specify an invariant pattern of 
information specific to human movement. The KSD principle explicitly distinguishes 
kinematics, that is, motion described in terms of movement properties (e.g. velocity, 
acceleration, direction) from dynamics, that is motion described in terms of causal and 
constraining properties (e.g. mass, force, biomechanics, intentions, emotions). The 
perception of events is considered to be based on the dynamic rather than kinematic 
properties of the world to the extent that the kinematics are constrained by the 
dynamics. In other words, "we tend to perceive causal aspects of events, not 
movements as such" (Runeson & Frykholm, 1983, p. 588), because "movements 
specify their cause" (Runeson & Frykholm, 1986, p. 262), italics added). Expressed 
more formally, the KSD principle states that if a dynamic factor a influences the 
kinematic shape of movement M, then the kinematics of M specify a (Runes on & 
Frykholm, 1983). Human movement (or movement of any animate object for that 
matter) is a lawful occurrence in that it is subject to extensive constraints with respect 
to the anatomical make-up of the individual (e.g. biomechanical factors) and the 
mechanical forces of the environment (e.g. laws of motion). The size and shape of 
bones, the elasticity and dampening properties of soft tissue, the distribution of mass 
over the body as a whole, as well as the natural laws (e.g. gravity), taken together 
govern what is and is not possible movement. The underlying assumption of the KSD 
principle is that the effect of these factors· on movement is revealed in the kinematic 
pattern produced by that movement. Thus, kinematics are constrained by, and 
therefore, specifjJ dynamics. 
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Evidence in support of the KSD principle has largely been derived from studies 
employing Johansson's (1973) point-light technique. This methodology is useful for 
evaluating the KSD principle as the display of an event is limited to almost entirely 
kinematic information. In this manner, by varying the underlying constraints (i.e. the 
dynamic properties of the event in question) any systematic effects on kinematics can 
be observed. Furthermore, by having perceivers evaluate relevant dimensions of the 
display (e.g. make judgments about what is happening) the utility of kinematic 
information as a specification of the dynamic properties of an event can be 
determined. For example, the typical anatomical make-up of males and females 
differs along a number of dimensions (e.g. shoulder width, hip width, distribution of 
mass) such that, according to the KSD principle, these structural differences are 
manifest in kinematic properties. Indeed, a number of studies have revealed that 
perceivers can accurately identify the sex of most individuals when they are walking 
from kinematic infonnation (e.g. point-light displays) alone (e.g. Barclay, Cutting, & 
Kozlowski, 1978; Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977; Runeson & Frykholm, 1983, 1986). 
Similar results have been obtained in terms of the specification of an individual's 
identity (Cutting & Kozlowski, 1977) whereby each individual presumably has a 
unique composition of anatomical and biomechanical properties that uniquely 
structure the kinematic pattern obtained when they walk.21 
21 Runeson and Frykholm (1983) describe this as a kinematicjingerprint. 
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Of particular interest for social perception is the application of the KSD principle to 
deceptive actions. In this regard, the KSD principle predicts that deceptive actions 
will not precisely simulate the kinematic nature of the actual action as the underlying 
dynamic factors are different in each case. The nature of the dynamic factors 
underlying movement (e.g. anatomical proportions, laws of mechanics etc) cannot be 
manipulated with sufficient precision (Runes on & Frykholm, 1986). Hence when 
attempting to simulate kinematic information (i.e. attempting to deceive), factors in 
addition to the dynamics constraining the equivalent non-deceptive action are also 
specified kinematically. Thus, Runeson and Frykholm (1986) suggest that deceptive 
action can "at best, recreate some kinematic details, but there will be other aspects of 
the kinematic pattern that are altered in an inappropriate manner" (p. 262, italics 
original). Furthermore, they suggest "the execution of genuinely deceptive 
movements would entail producing kinematic patterns that specify a model set of 
dynamic conditions, which does not in fact obtain (e.g. a different anatomical make-
up or a different action)" (Runeson & Frykholm, 1983, p. 593). In support ofthis 
claim, these authors demonstrated that when actors attempt to fake their movements 
to appear as a member of the opposite sex, observers could accurately determine the 
actual sex of the actor from kinematic information only. Comparable results have also 
been obtained whereby perceivers could determine from kinematic patterns whether 
an actor was actually lifting a heavy box, or simulating such an act with a relatively 
light box (Runeson & Frykholm, 1983). More recently Richardson and Johnston 
(2005) reported that the identity of young men can be accurately determined from 
kinematic information only, even when the young men were attempting to disguise 
their identity by attempting to "impersonate a 70 year-old man" (p. 31). 
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These examples highlight an important aspect of the KSD principle for social 
perception in that the dynamics that structure kinematic patterns include not only 
mechanical properties, but also the dispositional properties of the individual. 
Emotions, intentions and expectations as well as anatomy, biomechanics and physics 
are all considered to be dynamical properties that lawfully constrain kinematic 
information (Runeson & Frykholm, 1983). Perceivers are able to use kinematic 
information to determine the expectations of an actor in regard to the weight of a box 
they are about to lift. The preparatory actions (e.g. posture, stance, bending etc) for 
lifting a box of a certain weight are specified kinematically (Runeson & Frykholm). 
Furthermore, of particular relevance to the present research, Bassili (1978; 1979) 
reports that the kinematic patterns of facial expressions of emotion are able to be used 
by perceivers to discriminate between different emotions.22 Indeed, the notion that 
emotional experience influences movement patterns has been discussed by Kofflca 
(1935) who suggested that 
The slow dragging movements of the depressed, the jerky discontinuous 
movements of the irritable, correspond, indeed to the leaden state of 
depression or the disrupted state of irritability ... and will provide proximal 
stimuli for other persons who observe ... .If an emotional stress steers action, 
then the ensuing movements will, to some extent, mirror the emotions; 
characteristics of overt behaviour will map characteristics of the field in which 
this behaviour is started. (p. 658) 
22 These results should be interpreted with caution as Bassili used actors to simulate emotional 
expressions. In the context of the current research, and the predictions derived from the KSD principle 
pertaining to simulated action (see above) reservations regarding the ecological validity of this 
approach need to be addressed before these conclusions can be accepted without question (see Chapter 
3 for a discussion of the requirements for the development of ecologically valid facial displays for use 
in research). 
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Aronoff, Woike and Hyman (1992) demonstrated that the geometrical configurations 
inherent to particular facial expressions of emotion (specifically the 'angularity and 
diagonality' of an expression of anger, and the 'roundedness' of an expression of 
happiness, Aronoff, Barclay, & Stevenson, 1988), when present in the movement 
patterns of dancers portraying various characters from classical ballets, were 
perceived in a manner consistent with the original expression. Diagonal and angular 
kinematic patterns were perceived as threatening, while more rounded movements 
were perceived as conveying warmth. Similar results were obtained when these 
geometric patterns were represented as simple line drawings. Although further 
investigation is required in this area, it is contended that the characteristics of a given 
emotion, as a multi-componential mode of interaction (see Chapter 1), lawfully 
constrain the movement patterns of an individual experiencing that emotion. In this 
manner, disposition can, by means of constraining the available (kinematic) 
information, be directly perceived. 
Thus, consistent with the Gibsonian account of the direct perception of the 
affordances of inanimate objects, structural and transformational invariants pertaining 
to animate objects, that is the other people and other animals of the environment, have 
been shown to modulate the ambient array in a systematic manner. Information 
specifying the socially relevant dispositional properties of others is therefore seen to 
be available for perception in terms of the social affordances of these individuals. 
Accordingly, the epistemic claim of the ecological approach to social perception, 
specifically that the affordance properties of individuals can be directly perceived, 
appears to have a sound ontological basis. Dispositions, including intentions, 
expectations, and emotions, can be lawfully linked to occurrent properties in the 
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environment. As a result, invariant information is available that allows the perceiver 
to know the opportunities for action and interaction relative to the other people in 
their environment. 
In addition, in keeping with the conceptualisation of affordances in general, the 
perception of social affordances is similarly dependent on the properties of the 
environment (i.e. the dispositional properties of other individuals) in relation to the 
effectivities of the perceiver. That is, social affordances can be realised only in the 
conjoint activities of the perceiver and the subject of perception, in this case 
conspecifics (Baron & Misovich, 1993). Baron and Boudreau (1987) emphasised this 
point, suggesting, for example, that the perception of an opportunity to cooperate23 
truly only exists in the reciprocal, coordinated action of two or more 
individuals, that is, cooperative action involves two or more people engaged in 
actions that are mutually facilitative in the sense that there is joint movement 
toward a common goal (p. 1223). 
Hence, reciprocity must exist between the affordance properties of the social 
environment and the effectivities of the perceiver in order for the invariant 
information specifying disposition to be of utility in guiding social behaviour. To 
illustrate, in regard to sexual reproduction what males afford females is reciprocal to 
what females afford males (Gibson, 1979). Again, as indicated above, the required 
symmetry between effectivities and affordances, in this case as they pertain to social 
interaction, emphasises the importance of defining the unit of analysis for psychology 
as the monistic relationship between the individual and their environment. 
Considering either component to be in any way functionally separable from the other 
23 That is, the perception of the affordance of cooperability. 
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immediately undermines the theoretical coherency gained by adopting an ecological 
approach to psychology. Gibson in fact intimated the significance of defining the 
discipline monistically when he suggested that "behaviour affords behaviour, and the 
whole subject matter of psychology and of the social sciences can be thought of as an 
elaboration of this basic fact" (p. 135). 
Posed and genuine smiles considered ji'om the ecological perspective. 
At this point it is necessary to consider the suitability of the Gibsonian ecological 
approach to psychology as a theoretical framework for the present research. As 
outlined in the previous chapter, the general aim of this thesis is to provide an 
investigation of the function of posed and genuine smiles in social interaction. To this 
end, an assessment of the nature of the sensitivity of perceivers to the information that 
distinguishes posed from genuine smiles is the central focus of the strategy adopted 
for the empirical components of this work. This approach falls within the domain of 
social perception, a field that although dominated by the information processing 
approach to psychology, shows clear amenability to the ecological approach in that 
know ledge about others is considered to be perceptually based (McArthur & Baron, 
1983; Zebrowitz, 1990). Thus, at this stage two general questions need to be 
considered in regard to the applicability of the Gibsonian framework to the present 
research: 1. Does discriminating between posed and genuine smiles offer the 
perceiver any functional advantage? 2. If so, what information is available that 
specifies this difference? 
The first question derives from Gibson's basic dictum that "perceiving is for doing", 
that is, perception serves adaptive function. As discussed in Chapter 1, contemporary 
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theorists of emotion have variously considered emotions to be multi-componential, 
biologically based patterns of action and interaction that, as a result of natura} 
selection, serve specific ecological functions. Fridja (1986), for example, refers to 
emotional responses as changes in action readiness, that is modes of relating to or 
interacting with the environment. In a similar vein, McArthur and Baron (1983) 
suggested that from a Gibsonian perspective, emotions may best be considered "as a 
guide to action" (p.226). Lazarus (1991) commented similarly, suggesting that "an 
emotion may ... be informative to the person who experiences it ... as a source of 
insight into oneself and what is happening" (p. 18). In short, the various emotional 
states equip the individual to be able to deal more effectively with the contingencies 
ofa given situation (e.g. the increase in physiological arousal accompanying anger is 
helpful for fighting), that is, to regulate their interaction with the environment. 
Consequently, for a perceiver there may be considerable advantage in knowing the 
emotional state of interaction partners as a means of knowing their dispositional 
properties, and therefore the relevant opportunities for interaction with these 
individuals. In short, the perception of emotional state equates to the perception of 
social affordances. For instance, presuming that one wishes to avoid harm, there are 
distinctly different opportunities for interaction with an angry person than with a 
happy person. McArthur and Baron expressed this claim when they suggested that 
emotions can be considered as information about "social affordances in the sense that 
they call forth various interpersonal behaviours. For example, anger is likely to 
provoke avoidance, whereas joy is likely to encourage approach" (p.226). Thus, 
following this rationale directly, it is argued that there is considerable adaptive 
advantage for a perceiver to be able to perceive whether or not another individual who 
is smiling is happy, that is to be able to discriminate between posed and genuine 
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smiles. Genuine smiles specify the social affordances of an individual experiencing a 
positive emotional state. For instance, Owren and Bachorowski (2001) suggest that an 
individual exhibiting a genuine smile is somebody who affords cooperating with, that 
is, they are cooperable with. Posed smiles on the other hand, are unrelated to 
emotional experience, and therefore specify a distinct set of affordance properties. 
The affordances specified by posed smiles are likely to relate directly to the intentions 
of the smiling individual, ranging for instance from smiles intended as nonverbal 
greetings to smiles intended to deceive. An intention to deceive may involve 
attempting to have interaction partners erroneously believe you are experiencing 
positive emotion, or in other words, believe that you possess the affordances of a 
happy individual when you do not. Regardless however, of the motives of the person 
posing a smile, their dispositional properties, and therefore affordances, are 
categorically different compared to when the same individual is genuinely smiling. 
Hence, in the sense that there is clear functional advantage in the accurate detection of 
emotional state in others, perceivers need to be able to distinguish between posed and 
genuine smiles in order to interact adaptively. A failure to do so may result in the 
misperception of the social affordances of interaction partners, and, as a consequence, 
lead to interaction inappropriate to these affordances. For instance, according to 
Owren and Bachorowski's recent theory of the evolutionary function of posed and 
genuine smiles, if a posed smile is misperceived as a genuine expression of positive 
emotion, the perceiver runs the risk of attempting to cooperate with the smiling 
individual when cooperation is not appropriate, and therefore risks exploitation. 
The second question addresses the informational basis by which the perceiver can 
distinguish between posed and genuine smiles. For the affordances of the smiling 
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individual to be perceived, there must be information available that specifies the 
ontological basis of their expression. The claim of the present thesis is that the 
morphological distinctions between posed and genuine smiles (e.g. the Duchenne 
marker, symmetry, smoothness, duration and possibly synchrony, described in 
Chapter 1) structure the optic array in a manner consistent with the distinct 
dispositional properties underlying these expressions. This structure is the invariant 
information that specifies the ontology of any particular smile, and therefore specifies 
the social affordances related to the emotional state of the smiling individual. Thus, 
consistent with Runeson and Frykholm's (1983; 1986) KSD principle, it is suggested 
that the dispositional properties underlying each type of smile (i.e. positive emotion 
versus intention to simulate positive emotion) constrain the morphological appearance 
of each expression. The dynamic properties underlying a genuine smile, that is, the 
multi-componential properties of a positive emotional experience, systematically 
constrain the contraction of the facial muscles resulting in the kinematic pattern 
typical of a genuine smile. A separate set of constraints,24 unrelated to emotional 
experience, are responsible for the patterns of movement characteristic of a posed 
smile. The distinct neurological pathways that innervate spontaneous and volitional 
expressions respectively (see Chapter 1) not only result in some facial muscles (e.g. 
orbicularis oculi pars lateralis) being relatively less able to be wilfully contracted 
than others (Damasio, 1994), but also in different ballistic patterns of muscular 
contraction (e.g. smooth versus erratic contraction, facially symmetrical versus 
asymmetrical contraction) and differences in the variability of the duration of the 
expression (e.g. spontaneous expressions are less variable in duration than volitional 
24 Or plausibly sets of constraints as posed smiles may reflect one or more of many different intentions. 
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expressions). Importantly, these differences are manifest in the kinematics25 of the 
respective facial expressions, which in tum, provides invariant information for 
perception of the dispositional properties underlying each expression, that is, for the 
social affordances specified by posed and genuine smiles respectively. 
Thus, there appears to be both an adaptive and an informational basis for the perceiver 
to know the underlying dispositional properties, and therefore, the relevant 
opportunities for interaction, in regard to an individual exhibiting a smile. In so far as 
emotions have adaptive function in terms of equipping the individual to cope with the 
demands of their environment, the detection of the emotional state of others offers 
similar advantage in that the perceiver is able to use this information to regulate and 
control social interaction. For this reason, it is advantageous for the perceiver to be 
able to distinguish between genuine smiles that have an ontological basis in emotional 
experience, and posed smiles that have no such underlying emotional quality, but 
instead are likely to reflect intent. Furthermore, it is suggested that the relative 
presence or absence of positive emotional state accompanying a smile lawfully 
constrains the kinematic pattern of that smile such that invariant information is 
available which specifies the ontology of any particular expression. Although the 
precise nature of this information has yet to be expressed mathematically (cf. the 
cardioidal strain as a description of the growth transformation), the physiognomy and 
ontology of posed and genuine smiles has been described in sufficient qualitative 
detail to allow precise verification of the morphology of these expressions for use in 
25 It is also important to note that the kinematic patterns specific to posed and genuine smiles 
respectively result in different changes in observable facial morphology (e.g. deformation or wrinkling 
of skin, movement of 'landmarks' such as eyebrows, mouth, eye aperture etc) such that some of the 
relevant infonnation for detecting the dispositional properties (i.e. social affordances) specified by 
posed and genuine smiles is likely to also be available for perception in static photographs. See Chapter 
3 for further elaboration of this point. 
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research (see Chapters 1 and 3 for further detail). Therefore, what remains is to assess 
the sensitivity of perceivers to the information that distinguishes genuine from 
simulated expression of positive emotional state, and in turn whether perceivers are 
attuned to the differential affordances of these expressions. This is the empirical focus 
of the present research. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Generation of Facial Displays 
In order to investigate the sensitivity of perceivers to the differences between posed 
and genuine smiles in an experimental setting, participants need to be exposed to 
examples of these facial expressions. Although this requirement is seemingly 
straightforward, the nature of the facial displays employed can have dramatic 
implications for the generalisability of results from the laboratory setting to real-world 
social interactions. In short, it is fundamental to research of this nature that the facial 
expressions employed adequately replicate the relevant information available to 
perceivers during actual social interactions (Alley, 1988a; Gibson, 1979; Motley & 
Camden, 1988). This chapter explores the requirements for ecologically valid posed 
and genuine smiles, reviews the approaches of previous research with regard to the 
production of these facial expressions, and details the procedure employed for the 
generation of posed and genuine smiles for the present research. 
Requirements for Ecologically Valid Posed and Genuine Smile Displays 
Emotion Distinction 
The use of ecologically valid examples of posed and genuine smiles within an 
empirical context is critical to the generalisability of the research as a whole. By 
definition, a genuine smile is accompanied by a positive affective experience (e.g. 
happiness), while in comparison, a posed smile is not (Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 
1990; Ekman, Friesen, & O'Sullivan, 1988; Frank, Ekman, & Friesen, 1993). It 
follows, therefore, that research examining the sensitivity of perceivers to the 
differences between posed and genuine smiles must employ ecologically valid 
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examples of these expressions that adequately replicate the ontological distinctions 
between the smile types. In other words, smile type should be operationalised 
according to the emotional status of the expresser. In particular, genuine smiles must 
occur spontaneously and within the context of a positive emotional experience. 
Alternatively, posed smiles should be initiated under volitional control, preferably in 
the absence of any specific emotional state.26 
Furthermore, the significance of valid operationalisation of posed and genuine smiles 
has particular pertinence to the ecological approach to social perception. In line with 
1. 1. Gibson's dictum that perceiving is for doing, perceivers should be sensitive to the 
meaningful difference between posed and genuine smiles such that the relevant 
opportunities for interaction can be identified. What is meaningful to perceivers in 
this respect is the affective context within which another individual smiles; 
specifically, whether a smile occurs in the presence or absence of a positive emotional 
experience. It is this underlying emotional state that is meaningful with respect to 
social interaction, and which structures the information available to the perceiver. 
Thus, when generating posed and genuine smile displays, it is important to re-create 
the antecedent events (e.g. positive affect) that structure the information available for 
detection by the perceiver, rather than simply simulate this information in the absence 
of any underlying cause. Constructing genuine smiles in the absence of positive 
affect, while potentially offering a high degree of experimental control, provides no 
assurance that the structure present in the simulated expression corresponds 
sufficiently with that of an actual genuine smile, and therefore offers no guarantee that 
the information available to the perceiver accurately specifies any meaningful 
26 While posed smiles may, technically, occur in concert with any emotional state (with the exception 
of happiness), these emotions may also be expressed via the face and consequently confound the visual 
information specified by the posed smile with that of any other emotion being expressed. 
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difference in terms of the veracity of the expression (Alley, 1988a). A constructed or 
simulated genuine smile is, by definition, in fact a posed smile. Hence, the approach 
of simulating genuine smiles is equivalent to the construction of posed smiles, and 
therefore fails to adequately realise the ontological distinction between these 
expressions. As a consequence, ensuring that examples of genuine smiles are 
spontaneous expressions of positive affect, rather than simulations, will ensure that 
the information available to perceivers accurately reflects that present in the real-
world reference situation (e.g. an actual social interaction) thereby enhancing the 
ecological validity of the experimental procedure. 
Physiognomic Distinction 
As reviewed in Chapter 1, posed and genuine smiles differ physiognomically in a 
number of ways. To reiterate, while all smiles involve contraction of the zygomatic 
major muscles, only spontaneous, genuine smiles recruit the orbicularis oculi 
muscles, which results in a wrinkling of the skin at the outer comers of the eyes (i.e. 
the Duchenne marker). Hence, a requirement for valid posed and genuine smile 
displays is to ensure these physiognomic indicators vary appropriately and 
systematically between smile types. Therefore, the experimenter needs to assess if the 
requisite muscles (i.e. zygomatic major and orbicularis oculi) are contracted within 
the context of any given facial expression. The most direct means to determine if, and 
when, facial muscles are recruited is facial electromyography (EMG). However, facial 
EMG involves attaching electrodes to the facial muscles of interest to record the 
electrical activity associated with muscle contraction. The electrodes are problematic 
for the individual displaying the expression as they have a number of wires extending 
from the electrodes attached to his/her face that create a somewhat unnatural situation, 
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and for the perceiver, who must somehow look past this equipment to see the facial 
expressions of interest. Furthermore, the sensitivity of facial EMG measurement is 
such that muscular activity too slight to produce visible facial actions will readily be 
recorded (Cacioppo, Bush, & Tassinary, 1992). Obviously, only muscle contractions 
that produce visible, detectable deformations of facial tissue will provide information 
for the social perceiver. Hence, EMG measurement may be too sensitive when 
distinguishing between posed and genuine smiles for the purposes of the present 
investigation. 
An alternative to facial EMG is to code visual changes in facial appearance. Ekman, 
Friesen and Hager's (2002) Facial Action Coding System (F ACS) is a comprehensive 
anatomically based coding system for identifying all visually discernable facial 
movements. FACS classifies facial expressions into 46 unique action units (AUs) 
which, in being derived from facial musculature, correspond to each potential 
independent movement of the face. Criteria are also provided to score the intensity of 
each AU. F ACS has been widely validated and is frequently used as a systematic 
means of identifying and describing facial movements (e.g. Keltner, 1997; Prkachin, 
1997; Rosenberg & Ekman, 1997; Sayette, Cohn, Wertz, Perrott, & Parrott, 2001; 
Suzuki & Naitoh, 2003). In regard to the distinction between posed and genuine 
smiles, F ACS AU6 and AU12 describe the visible movements associated with 
contraction of orbicularis oculi and zygomatic major respectively. In brief, AU 6 
(orbicularis oculi contraction) draws the skin from the temples and cheeks towards 
the eyes and raises the infra-orbital triangle resulting in a narrowing of the eye 
aperture and wrinkles extending radially from the outer comers of each eye. AU12 
(zygomatic major contraction) is evidenced in terms of the comers of the lips being 
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pulled back obliquely toward the cheekbone resulting in an upturned mouth 
characteristic of smiling (e.g. U ), a deepening of the nasolabial fun-ow and at high 
intensities, bagging of the skin below the eyes. Full F ACS criteria for assessing 
changes in facial appearance resulting from the contraction of these muscles can be 
seen in Appendix A. Examples of a posed smile and a genuine smile are displayed in 
Figure 1. 
Individual Differences in Facial Configuration 
In addition to ensuring posed and genuine smile displays differ according to the 
physiognomic and affective state of the expresser, additional qualities of the face 
known to influence person perception also need to be considered when constructing 
these materials. At the broadest level, it is well documented that individual differences 
in facial structure and appearance can influence social perception. For example, facial 
attractiveness has been shown to influence social interaction according to a 'what is 
beautiful is good' heuristic, commonly termed the Halo Effect (Zebrowitz, 1997). 
Facially attractive individuals tend to elicit more favourable evaluations and 
impressions from others, and in tum experience advantages across a range of social 
settings such as interpersonal relationships (Feingold, 1990; Walster, Aronson, 
Abrahams, & Rottmann, 1966), the courtroom (Stewart, 1980; Zebrowitz & 
McDonald, 1991), and politics (Lewis & Bierly, 1990; Sigelman, Thomas, Sigelman, 
& Ribich, 1986). Effects of facial appearance on person perception have also been 
reported in regard to perceived facial maturity (e.g. the 'baby face effect', Berry & 
McArthur, 1986; McCabe, 1984; Zebrowitz, Kendall-Tackett, & Fafel, 1991), facial 
anomalies (Shaw, 1988), and specific facial features (Blair, Judd, Sadler, & Jenkins, 
2002; Livingston & Brewer, 2002). Of particular pertinence to the present research, 
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Zebrowitz, Hall, Murphy and Rhodes (2002) reported that certain structural qualities 
of the face, such as attractiveness, symmetry, and eye size influence perceptions of 
honesty. 
The requirement, therefore, for valid posed and genuine smile displays, is to ensure 
that the effects of facial configuration on person perception do not systematically bias 
perceptions of either posed or genuine smiles. Hence, effects of individual differences 
in facial structure need to be controlled if conclusions relevant only to the distinction 
between posed and genuine smiles are to be drawn. Experimental control may be 
attained by employing a sufficiently wide range of faces so that all relevant variations 
in facial structure are represented. However, the complexity of individual differences 
in facial structure and the related effects on person perception preclude this approach 
simply by virtue of pragmatics. Many thousands of individual faces would be required 
to ensure all dimensions of facial configuration are characterised, let alone all possible 
combinations of these features. 27 
An alternate approach to controlling the effects of facial appearance on social 
perception involves narrowing the range of morphological variation between faces by 
using composite or averaged faces. This is achieved by means of computerised 
morphing algorithms (e.g. Winmorph, Morph 2.4 etc) which mathematically combine 
images of individual faces into an interpolated hybrid face (e.g. Benson & Perrett, 
1993; Langlois & Roggman, 1990; Steyvers, 1999). The resulting images are 
essentially blends or averages of the original images and therefore contain 
27 Valentine (1991) characterised variations in faces in terms of a 'face-space', an n-dimensional space 
in which each individual face represents a point along the dimensions that specify differences between 
faces (e.g. age, symmetry, width between eyes, hair colour etc.). This representation illustrates the vast 
array of configurations of facial features that would be required if all socially relevant aspects of 
variation in facial morphology were to be controlled for. 
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information relevant to the configural qualities of all the original faces, but specific to 
none. However, although routinely used as referents in face and emotion perception 
research (e.g. Harmer, Perrett, Cowen, & Goodwin, 2001; Rhodes, Halberstadt, & 
Brajkovich, 2001; Sato, Kochiyama, Yoshikawa, Naito, & Matsumura, 2004), 
morphed or composite faces are not real faces and therefore may not generalise well 
to an actual social interaction. By combining one or more faces into a single 
composite image, the patterns of relationships between the features specific to a 
particular face will be lost, and replaced by the emergent patterns of the novel, hybrid 
face. Further, Busey (1998) has shown that morphing faces systematically biases the 
resulting face in terms of perceived age, adiposity, density and typicality compared to 
the original, parent faces. Given the effects of facial appearance on person perception 
discussed above, it appears that the method of construction of composite faces, rather 
than the information supplied by the face, may have greater influence on the social 
perceiver. To this extent, while morphing may offer a means to reduce the influence 
of individual differences in facial configurations on person perception, the artificial 
nature of the morphed face, as well as the bias introduced by the morphing procedure, 
undermine the ecological validity, and hence suitability, ofmorphed faces as 
materials for the present research. 
A third strategy for controlling the effects of individual differences in facial 
appearances is, in part, a compromise between (a) attempting to account for the range 
of facial variation by sampling many faces and (b) narrowing the variation between 
faces by using composite images. A basic requirement for posed and genuine smile 
displays is to ensure that both expressions are obtained from each individual face. As 
discussed, many factors are known to influence person perception, including factors 
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related to facial appearance. By removing all variation in facial appearance other than 
that of interest, or more specifically, by comparing responses to the same individual 
exhibiting either a posed or genuine smile, valid conclusions relevant to the smile type 
can be drawn without introducing potential for extraneous variables associated with 
comparison between individual faces. In addition, to enable generalisation beyond 
interaction with a particular individual, multiple individual faces should be used. 
While it has been acknowledged that this is an impractical method of accounting for 
all spurious effects of facial appearance on person perception, the use of several 
different faces provides a means to compare the effects of posed and genuine smiles 
of different individuals. In turn this provides the researcher with the potential to draw 
conclusions more widely applicable to general social interaction than would be 
possible if only a single individual face was employed. Alternatively, if the effects of 
posed and genuine smiles are not consistent across individual faces, exploration of 
how the faces differ, may provide important clues about how these facial expressions 
interact with general facial morphology in regard to person perception. Thus, the 
approach adopted for the present research obtains a full complement of facial 
expressions (i.e. in this case neutral expressions, posed smiles, and genuine smiles) 
from a range of individuals. 
Gaze Direction 
It has been suggested that within social contexts the orientation of another person's 
attention can have important implications for social perception (e.g. Jenkins & 
Langton, 2003; Langton, 2000). Given that animals, humans included, tend to orient 
toward objects in the environment that are relevant to them, gaze direction appears to 
be a reasonable indicator of attention. In this sense, establishing eye contact with 
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another person has particular social significance in that eye contact indicates that 
person is attending to you, which in tum, suggests that an interaction may be likely. 
Indeed, recent research has suggested that gaze direction (e.g. direct versus averted) 
has significant implications. Macrae, Hood, Milne, Rowe and Mason (2002) reported 
that aspects of person perception, specifically sex categorisation and stereotyping 
effects, were facilitated when the target's gaze is directed toward, compared with 
away from, the participant. Furthermore, Adams and Kleck (2003) recently 
demonstrated that in regard to person perception, gaze direction interacts with facial 
expressions of emotion. Of particular relevance to the present research, is the finding 
that expressions of happiness were more rapidly identified when displayed with a 
direct rather than with an averted gaze. These effects are in line with the ecological 
notion of social affordances in that attention from another person, specified in this 
instance by eye contact, suggests interaction is more likely than if gaze is averted. 
Taking these findings into consideration, it is necessary to ensure that all individuals 
are looking forward, directly into a camera (or other recording device) when 
generating posed and genuine smile displays. 
Dynamic and Static Expressions 
The ecological approach to perception asserts that information is best revealed in 
events; that is, in dynamic, often multimodal transformations of objects in the 
environment occurring over time (Gibson, 1979; McArthur & Baron, 1983; Michaels 
& Carello, 1981; Reed, 1996). In line with this proposition, transforming facial 
expressions of emotion ought to be more informative to perceivers than static 
representations of emotional facial expressions, since facial expressions are dynamic, 
temporally distributed occurrences. Indeed, several studies have demonstrated 
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superior recognition of emotional state (Frijda, 1953; Harwood, Hall, & Shinkfield, 
1999), age (Berry, 1990) and famous faces (Lander, Christie, & Bruce, 1999) from 
dynamic as compared to static presentation of faces. However, this is not to suggest 
that static representations of faces cannot be informative. A majority of the research 
concerning the detection of facial expressions of emotion has employed static 
photographs of faces and shown universal recognition rates substantially greater than 
chance (e.g. Ekman & Friesen, 1974; Frank & Stennett, 2001; Izard, 1994). In fact, 
many researchers have argued that very rapid detection of emotional state in 
conspecifics potentially offers substantial adaptive advantage (e.g. Dimberg, 
Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Stenberg, Wiking, & Dahl, 
1998). Immediate knowledge of the emotional state of others is likely to be more 
useful for guiding interaction than having to wait for a facial expression to 'run its 
course'. In short, facial expressions occur over substantially longer periods than 
required for detection of an emotional state. While dynamic presentations of facial 
expressions offers superior levels of ecological validity,28 for research concerned with 
the very rapid detection of emotional state, static photographs may indeed preserve a 
suitable degree of generalisability from the research context to the real-world where 
often only a glimpse of another person's face is required to know, accurately, the 
nature of their emotional state (Esteves & Ohman, 1993). A qualification of this 
approach is, however, that static facial photographs must be sourced from dynamic 
representations, thereby providing the researcher an opportunity to capture a specific 
aspect of a facial expression (e.g. the onset, apex or offset) for static presentation, 
rather than rely on accurate timing when taking photographs. 
28 After all we tend to move, especially our faces, rather than remain rigidly still during actual social 
interactions. 
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Extraneous Factors 
In the interests of experimental control, factors irrelevant to the difference between 
posed and genuine smiles, or those .that may confound or obscure this difference, 
ought to be eliminated when generating these facial displays. For instance, spectacles 
are likely to cover parts of the area of the face where the Duchenne marker occurs (i.e. 
the outer comers of the eyes), thereby potentially occluding relevant information. In a 
similar sense facial hair, hair styles that cover parts of the face, or excessive make-up 
may impede the detection of facial expressions29 . Efforts should also be made to 
ensure homogenous lighting, camera angle and background, as well as standardising 
the clothing worn by the 'models'. In short, all practical efforts should be made to 
control factors extraneous to the distinction between posed and genuine smiles. 
Summmy of requirements. 
In summary, to ensure the ecological validity of posed and genuine smile displays, the 
researcher must ensure that: 
1. Posed and genuine smiles are distinct in terms of the underlying emotional 
state of the expresser. Specifically, genuine smiles should be accompanied by 
positive affect, while posed smiles should occur, as far as possible, in the 
absence of any emotional state. 
2. Posed and genuine smiles are distinct in terms of physiognomy. Specifically 
genuine smiles should show evidence of orbicularis oculi and zygomatic 
major contraction (i.e. F ACS AU6 & AU12 respectively), while posed smiles 
should show evidence of zygomatic major contraction only (i.e. F ACS AU12). 
29 In this sense, individuals who do not have the normal range of movement of their facial muscles (e.g. 
due to illness, injury or cosmetic procedures such as Botulinium toxin injections) are also not suitable 
candidates for the generation of posed and genuine smiles. 
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3. All required facial expressions (i.e. neutral expression, posed smile, genuine 
smile) are sourced from all expressers. 
4. A direct gaze (i.e. eye contact is made and maintained with the recording 
device) is present during all expressions. 
5. The mode of presentation is appropriate for the research aims. Although both 
static and dynamic presentations of facial expressions provide valid 
information to the social perceiver, dynamic expressions are more informative 
and, therefore, preferable. If the research dictates that static photographs of 
facial expressions are required, these should be sourced from dynamic 
representations. 
6. All extraneous factors such as clothing, hairstyle, lighting, and facial hair are 
controlled for. 
Facial Displays Used in Previous Research 
Line Drawings, Cartoon Faces and Computer Generations 
Previous research investigating the perception of emotional facial expressions has 
employed a range of materials with varying degrees of ecological validity. At the 
lower end of mundane realism, several researchers have employed cartoon caricatures 
or line drawings to represent facial expressions of emotion (e.g. Eger, Jedynak, Iwaki, 
& Skrandies, 2003; Niedenthal, 1990; Stapel, Koomen, & Ruys, 2002). Often as 
simple as a typical emoticon30 commonly used for electronic communication (e.g. ©), 
cartoon depictions of emotional expressions fall substantially below acceptable levels 
of realism and fidelity. While impoverished displays are routinely used in social 
perception research to isolate partiCUlar information to which perceivers can be 
30 The Collins Concise Dictionary 21 st Century Edition (2001) defines an emoticon as: any of several 
combinations of symbols used in electronic mail to indicate the state of mind of the writer, as in :-) to 
indicate happiness or :-0 to indicate surprise. 
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sensitive (e.g. Hill, Jinno, & Jolmston, 2003; Johansson, 1973; Runeson & Frykholm, 
1983), such displays are typically derived from actual events. Cartoon faces, on the 
other hand, are constructions intended to simulate an actual face. While very high-
fidelity drawings and animations approaching photographic realism, are possible to 
create using specialist software (e.g. Poser4), the dynamic nature of facial expressions 
of emotion has not been described or modelled in sufficient detail to enable accurate 
mapping from a real face to a cartoon or computer animation3l . Hence, without 
specific knowledge of the nature of the complex changes occurring across the entire 
face when an expression of emotion is evident, the information available to the 
perceiver from cartoon or computer generated faces can at best, only be an 
approximation of that available during social interaction. As a consequence, the 
ability to generalise from responses to cartoon faces to responses in the real world is 
severely limited. In summary, in light of the current knowledge of the exact dynamics 
of facial expressions of emotion, these abstract representations of facial expressions of 
emotion do not fulfil criteria for ecological validity in that simplified cartoons or 
drawings, or computer generated faces are unlikely to contain the emotion specific 
information present in actual human faces that specifies the social affordances of an 
interaction situation. 
Posed Emotional Expressions 
An obvious alternative to schematic drawings of faces and cartoon figures is to use 
actual faces. However, the researcher is then confronted with the issue of how to elicit 
the requisite expressions of emotion when photographing or video-taping a face. A 
very common solution is to ask the individual to assume or pose a particular facial 
31 By comparison, the dynamics involved with the changes in facial appearance and stmcture 
associated with aging have been mathematically modelled in detail (e.g. Mark, Shaw, & Pittenger, 
1988) and hence can be applied with accuracy to a computer generated image. 
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expression or emotion. Several approaches to posing emotions have been adopted by 
investigators that generally vary in regard to the context and instructions provided to 
the poser. For example, Mehta, Ward and Strongman (1992) constructed expressions 
of anger, contempt, disgust, fear, sadness, happiness, and surprise with "the assistance 
of six male models who posed seven emotions and a neutral expression" (p. 75). 
Alternatively, Leonard, Voeller and Kuldau (1991) provided more contextual cues for 
the required facial expression of happiness by asking participants to "think of a 
situation that would make them very happy and then to show the experimenter how 
they would look in that situation" (p.167). Other researchers (e.g. Ekman & Friesen, 
1971; Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972) have used a similar technique which 
requires individuals to read a vignette about a person having an emotional experience, 
and then adopt the facial expression that person would be showing as a form of role-
playing. Finally, researchers often simply provide instructions as to how the 
behaviour is meant to occur. For instance, Rochat, Striano and Blatt (2002) reported 
research concerning the effects of facial expressions of emotion on infants, whereby 
the experimenter "assumed a large, toothy, static smile with an upturned mouth, lifted 
cheeks, and creased outside eye corners" (p.292). 
Unfortunately, employing posed facial expressions of emotion has the potential to 
severely limit the generalisability of results obtained from research employing these 
expressions to spontaneous facial expressions occurring in the context of actual social 
interactions. According to Motley and Camden (1988), "it seems quite possible that 
findings from typical studies of posed facial expressions in fact have little to do with 
the more spontaneous nonverbal behaviours of interpersonal communication 
interactions" (p.3). Taking the case of smiling as an example, it appears unlikely that 
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even accomplished actors will be able to consistently and adequately pose genuine 
smiles. As discussed in Chapter 1, there is evidence to suggest separate neural 
pathways are associated with the production of spontaneous and deliberate facial 
expressions, which result in visibly distinctive patterns of facial movement 
(Gazzaniga & Smylie, 1990; Rinn, 1984). Indeed, Ekman, Roper and Hager (1980) 
reported that less than 20% of individuals are able to voluntarily contract orbicularis 
oculi pars lateralis. If, in fact, an individual can produce a physiognomically genuine 
smile on demand, there is still no guarantee this expression will adequately resemble 
that produced spontaneously when an individual is actually happy.32 Deliberate facial 
expressions are unlikely to reflect the distinction in emotional state that is required for 
ecologically valid posed and genuine smiles (Alley, 1988b; Motley & Camden, 1988), 
and therefore are not suitable for use in the present research. 
Imitated Emotional Expressions 
A further strategy for generating facial expressions of emotion is to instruct models to 
imitate a prototypical photograph of the expression being sought, often by being told 
which facial muscles to contract or relax (e.g. Ekman, Friesen, O'Sullivan, Chan, 
Diacoyanni-Tarlatzis, Heider et aI., 1987; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1988). The 
researcher then compares the resultant expression with the prototypical expression 
32 Even if a posed genuine smiles appears morphologically adequate, as discussed, the relative presence 
or absence of a positive emotional state is critical to the valid operationalisation of genuine smile facial 
displays. Simulating a genuine smile in the absence of positive affect does not qualify as a genuine 
smile, while, alternatively the presence of sufficient positive affect suggests that posing isn't necessary 
to produce the required genuine expression. In this sense, the Stanislavski method of acting whereby 
the actor 'inhabits the mind' of the character they are playing (e.g. if the character is happy, the actor 
ought to be happy as well, rather than simply 'acting happy') may be a useful approach to such mood 
induction and subsequent production of a genuine expression of emotion. Furthermore, the Facial 
Feedback Hypothesis (Tourangeau & Ellsworth, 1979), which states that facial movement can 
influence emotional experience, may also assist the actor to generate genuine smiles. Ekman and 
Davidson (1993) and Soussignan (2002) have demonstrated that specific manipulations of the face to 
resemble a smile can evoke a positive emotional experience, which in tum may provide the ontological 
basis for a genuine smile. 
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and often, after feedback, repeats the process until a suitable match is obtained. This 
approach suffers from similar shortcomings to simply posing facial expressions in that 
it is likely there will be no emotional experience to accompany the expression and 
most individuals are not able to contract orbicularis oculi pars lateralis on demand. 
Furthermore, imitating prototypical expressions requires precise knowledge of the 
meaningful features of those expressions that need to be replicated. In the case of 
smiling, there is still much research to be conducted to adequately identify the nature 
of the transformational invariants necessary and sufficient to specify positive affect to 
the observer (Frank et al., 1993). Thus, comparison between an imitated genuine 
smile and a spontaneous genuine smile is, at best, an approximate evaluation of those 
factors currently acknowledged to reflect the distinction between posed and genuine 
smiles. In view ofthese shortcomings, imitated facial expressions of emotion are 
unlikely to offer sufficient levels of ecological validity. 
Spontaneous Facial Expressions 
Finally, although clearly in the minority, a number of researchers have employed 
spontaneous facial expressions of emotion as experimental displays (e.g. LaRusso, 
1978; Motley & Camden, 1988; Scherer & Ceschi, 2000). Obviously, using 
spontaneous facial expressions provides a convenient match from the laboratory to the 
reference situation of actual social interaction where spontaneous expressions occur, 
which, in turn, provides potential for high levels of ecological validity. However, 
there are a number of practical difficulties in sourcing such spontaneous expressions. 
Essentially, as outlined above, the researcher must have a means to control for any 
extraneous factors accompanying the emotional expression. Spontaneous expressions 
of emotion are likely to be influenced by context because emotions other than the 
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emotion of interest may also be expressed, thereby confounding the resultant 
expression. For instance, in a naturalistic setting, participants, without speci~c 
instruction, may not always maintain eye contact with the recording device. 
Nonetheless, it appears at present that if these issues of experimental control can be 
addressed, using spontaneous expressions of emotion may represent the best available 
option for ensuring ecologically valid genuine smile displays. To this end, a 
reasonable approach is to attempt to elicit spontaneous expressions in a controlled 
laboratory environment. As such, this approach was adopted for the present research 
and is described in the method section below. 
Facial Expression Sets 
In addition to the varieties of facial expression displays described above, a number of 
sets of facial expressions are available either commercially or for research purposes. 
Among these sets, 'Pictures of Facial Affect (POFA), (Ekman & Friesen, 1976); 
'Photographs of Chinese Facial Expressions' (Wang & Markham, 1999); 'Japanese 
and Caucasian Facial Expressions of Emotion (JACFEE), (Matsumoto & Ekman, 
1988); and Diagnostic Analysis of Nonverbal Accuracy (Nowicki, Glanville, & 
Demertzis, 1998) are commonly employed as sources of facial displays for emotion 
perception research (e.g. Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003; Esteves & Ohman, 1993; 
Fernandez-Dols, Carrera, & Russell, 2002; Frank & Stennett, 2001; Glanville & 
Nowicki, 2002; Marsh, Elfenbein, & Ambady, 2003; Williams, Senior, David, 
Loughland, & Gordon, 2001). Unfortunately, none of the aforementioned sets of 
facial expressions are known to include the range of expressions (i.e. neutral 
expression, posed smile, genuine smile) at the level of ecological validity required for 
the present research. 
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Posed and Genuine Smile Displays Used in Previous Research 
Approaches to the operationalisation of facial expressions of emotion discussed to this 
point have considered facial expression research in a global sense. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, a small number of studies have specifically examined aspects 
of social perception relevant to posed and genuine smiles, which, for obvious reasons; 
warrant attention here. These studies have employed various forms of experimental 
materials to examine perceiver's sensitivity to the difference between posed and 
genuine smiles. At the lower end of ecological validity, Brown and Moore (2002) 
used emoticons featuring eyebrows, eyes, and mouth only. Smile type was 
manipulated by representing the mouth as a symmetrical, upwardly curving line for 
the genuine smile, and an asymmetrical upwardly curving line for the posed smile. 
The asymmetry manipulation was applied to the left-hand side of the face in 
accordance with the literature describing the differences in symmetry between posed 
and genuine smiles (Ekman et aI., 1988; Gazzaniga & Smylie, 1990; Rinn, 1984). 
Although this manipulation appears theoretically sound, line drawings may not, as 
discussed above, adequately replicate the information available to perceivers during a 
social interaction, and hence cannot be generalised to actual faces and interactions. 
Surakka and Hietanen (1998) reported guiding actors to produce static facial 
expressions corresponding to a neutral expression, a posed smile, and a genuine smile. 
The resultant expressions were then assessed against F ACS criteria. Again, as 
discussed above, either posing or imitating spontaneous facial expressions is not 
sufficient to produce ecologically valid facial expressions. Although Surakka and 
Hietanen verified the physiognomic distinction between the posed and genuine 
smiles, they failed to report any distinction in terms of the emotional state 
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accompanying the respective expressions. The results of this study, therefore, are also 
shaded by questionable generalisability. 
Finally, Frank et aI., (1993) employed posed and genuine smile displays when 
investigating differences in perceptions and impressions of individuals exhibiting 
these expressions. The expressions employed were sourced from two previous 
studies: namely Davidson, Ekman, Saron, Senulis and Friesen's (1990) study which 
investigated brain activity during facial expressions of emotion, and the classic 
Ekman et aI. (1988) study with nursing students (see Chapter 1 for details). To recap, 
Davidson et al. filmed participants while they were wearing lycra skull caps to 
measure brain activity using electroencephalogram (EEG). The presence of the skull 
cap creates a somewhat unusual appearance that is potentially problematic for the 
present research. It is simply unknown what effect these caps may have in regard to 
social perception. Alternatively, Ekman et al. surreptitiously recorded facial 
expressions while nursing students were viewing either nature scenes or graphic 
medical scenes, under the instruction to suppress any negative expressions. While this 
is a laudable approach, the posed smiles generated were in fact masking smiles 
(Ekman et al.; Frank et aI.), intended to hide signs of negative affect. Hence, these 
smiles are likely to be confounded with the presence of micro-expressions and other 
visible contaminants of the negative affective experience. As a consequence, any 
comparison between posed and genuine smiles using these displays must somehow 
account for the underlying negative emotion, which, in theory, accompanied the posed 
smiles. As outlined above, it is preferable to employ materials that only reflect the 
difference between the positive affective state accompanying genuine smiles and the 
THE LIBRARY 
UNIVERSllY OF CANTERBURY 
CHRISTCHURCH, N.Z. 
100 
relative absence of affective state accompanying posed smiles, rather than any, more 
complex interplay of other emotional states. 
The Present Research 
Because of the limitations of the aforementioned approaches to the generation of 
ecologically valid facial displays, and hence the lack of suitable commercially 
available experimental materials, there was a necessity to generate original posed and 
genuine smiles for use in the present research. The remainder of this chapter will 
outline the procedure employed for generating and recording posed and genuine 
smiles. The resulting expressions will be described following the overview of the 
procedure. 
Overview of Facial Display Generation Procedure 
The intention of this procedure was to elicit ecologically valid posed and genuine 
smiles in accordance with the requirements outlined above, and in a context where 
recording these expressions using video would be feasible. As such, participants were 
recruited individually and were made aware that the procedure involved recording 
their facial expressions, but they were not informed of the specific purpose of the 
procedure, namely the generation of posed and genuine smiles. The procedure 
implemented involved asking participants to pose smiles as they would in various 
contexts as well as exposing them to sounds and pictures that have previously been 
shown to elicit positive affect in order to elicit spontaneous genuine smiles. Motley 
and Camden (1988) have criticised the use of emotionally laden materials to elicit 
spontaneous facial expressions of emotion on the basis that "the kinds of emotional 
responses they try to elicit. .. differ from those likely to be found in natural 
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communication settings" (p. 5). It remains an empirical question as to whether this 
criticism is warranted with respect to the validity of this specific procedure. No 
research is known to have considered this issue with any rigour. The approach of 
employing emotionally laden sounds and photographs is favoured in the present 
research as these materials have been previously shown to reliably elicit emotions 
(e.g. Bradley & Lang, 1999b; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001) at reasonable levels 
of intensity. It is acknowledged that each expression may be specific to the sound or 
photograph presented (such specificity is likely to be very subtle however as 
spontaneous expressions tend to be readily identifiable regardless of context, 
Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; Frank et aI., 1993), but this is true for any emotional 
experience, whether elicited in the laboratory, or occurring during actual interaction. 
In line with the ecological approach to psychology, cognition always has a referent. 
For instance, in the present case, individuals expressing a genuine smile must be 
considered to be 'happy about' something, rather than simply 'happy'. In this sense, 
such contextual specificity is therefore unavoidable, although the effects of the 
'communication setting' of the laboratory are unlikely to be large if truly 
spontaneous, genuine facial expressions of emotion are obtained. 
The procedure consisted of five phases which elicited: (I) neutral expressions; (II) 
posed smiles; (III) positive mood; (IV) genuine smiles (from sounds); and (V) 
genuine smiles (from photographs), during which the participant's face was 
continually videotaped' Participants made ratings of their mood prior to each phase of 
the procedure. The video recordings were subsequently examined for evidence of the 
requisite facial expressions and coded according to F ACS criteria. It was intended that 
by including various methods of expression elicitation and a number of individuals, a 
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range of ecologically valid posed and genuine smiles of varying intensities from 
various individuals would be produced. These could then form a pool of expressions 
to be selected from for use in subsequent experimental procedures. 
Method 
Participants. 
Thirteen participants (8 female33) were recruited to take part in what was described as 
a pilot study to determine the effects of various modes of presentation of information 
on mood. Only individuals who complied with the requirements for generating posed 
and genuine smile displays as outlined above (no facial hair, no spectacles etc.) were 
recruited. All participants wore a standard, white laboratory coat for the duration of 
the procedure. 
Apparatus. 
Instructions and materials were presented via a standard l7inch colour computer 
monitor using Microsoft PowerPoint software on a PIn 750Mhz personal computer 
running Windows XP. Participants were seated approximately lOOcm from the screen, 
in front of a blank, neutral coloured, background. Video recordings were made using a 
Canon XM2 3CCD digital video camera mounted above the computer monitor. The 
recordings were subsequently captured and converted to computer files using Adobe 
Premier software for editing and coding. Each recording was captured in PAL format 
at 25 frames per second, standardised for brightness and contrast, and compressed 
using a Microsoft MPEG4v2 codec. 
33 Both male and female participants were recruited for the facial expression generation procedure in 
order to provide the potential to examine sex differences in the subsequent experiments. 
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Materials. 
Prior to each phase of the procedure, participants made ratings of their mood on an 
analogue scale (see Appendix B). Each scale consisted of a 200-mm vertical line 
anchored at the top by the label "Very positive" and a positive expression emoticon 
(e.g. ©), and at the bottom with the label "Very negative" and a negative expression 
emoticon (e.g. ®). The mid-point of the scale was labelled "Neutral". Participants 
were simply required to indicate their current mood with a horizontal line on the 
scale. Mood was scored by measuring the distance (in mm) from the centre point of 
the scale marked "Neutral" to the line made by the participant. Thus, mood scores 
could potentially range from -100 (very negative) to 100 (very positive). 
During the positive mood induction phase (Phase III) of the procedure participants 
were played a 4-minute 5-second recording of classical music. This clip consisted of 
portions of three allegro movements, two composed by Mozart (Divertimento in D 
Major 136 and Eine Kleine Nacht Musik), and one by Vivaldi (Concerto for 
Mandolin, Strings and Harpsichord), which have previously been shown to induce a 
positive emotional state (Halberstadt & Niedenthal, 1997). 
During the first genuine smile elicitation phase (Phase IV) of the procedure 
participants were played a series of sound clips sourced from the International 
Affective Digitized Sounds (lADS) database (Bradley & Lang, 1999b). lADS is a set 
of 120 emotionally evocative sound clips that have established norms for ratings of 
valence, arousal, and dominance associated with each clip. Normative ratings have 
been established independently for males and females. For the purposes of the present 
study, clips were selected separately for male and female participants based on ratings 
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of valence and arousal. Twenty clips with the highest normative valence ratings (i.e. 
those clips that were rated as the most positive) were selected for male and f?r female 
participants respectively. From each set of 20 clips, 11 were selected to play to the 
participants, on the basis of adequate arousa11evel (>5 on a 9-point scale) and with a 
view to ensuring a mixture of content types (e.g. music, crowd noise, laughing, 
eroticism) while avoiding too much repetition. A complete list of the lADS materials 
used is presented in Appendix C. 
During the second genuine smile elicitation phase (Phase V) of the procedure 
participants were shown a series of static images sourced from the International 
Affective Picture System (lAPS) database (Lang et aI., 2001). lAPS is a set of 
approximately 700 emotionally evocative photographs that have established norms for 
ratings of valence, arousal, and dominance associated with each image. Normative 
ratings have been established independently for males and females. For the purposes 
of the present study, images were selected separately for male and female participants 
based on ratings of valence and arousal. Thirty images with the highest normative 
valence ratings were selected for male and for female participants respectively. From 
each set of 30 images, 20 were selected to show to participants on the basis of 
adequate arousal level (>5 on a 9-point scale) and with a view to ensuring a mixture 
of content types (e.g. babies and baby animals, sports, nature scenes, eroticism). A 
complete list of the lAPS materials used is presented in Appendix C. 
Procedure. 
Initially, the participants were welcomed to the laboratory and briefed as to the 
purposes of the procedure. They were informed that the study was a pilot test intended 
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to assess various modes of presentation of emotional information on mood and 
emotional state. Furthermore, they were told that their faces would be video-taped for 
the duration of the procedure, but the experimenter had no prior expectations of how 
the participant would behave as this was a pilot study intended to pre-test a range of 
materials, some of which would be selected for use in subsequent research. It was 
stressed to participants that they should tty to relax and behave as naturally as 
possible so as not to unduly influence their responses. After agreeing to take part, 
participants were seated approximately 100 cm in front of the computer screen and 
asked if they had any questions about the procedure. After any questions had been 
resolved, the experimenter informed participants that all instructions would be 
presented via the computer screen, and then left the room. The timing of the 
instructions presented on the screen was controlled by the participants who were 
prompted to click the mouse when ready to continue. 
Phase 1 - Neutral Expression. 
During the first phase, participants were instructed to complete a mood scale, 
followed by instructions to relax and look into the camera with a neutral facial 
expression. They were asked to hold their gaze and the facial expression for 
approximately 10 seconds. 
Phase 2 - Posed Smile. 
Participants were then instructed to complete a second mood scale followed by a 
request to look into the camera and smile for approximately 10 seconds. This 
instruction was repeated a further 5 times, and each time was accompanied by a 
contextual description of a reasonably common situation where a posed smile may be 
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expected (e.g. "Please smile as you would for your passport photo"). A list of all the 
contextual descriptions is presented in Appendix C. 
Phase 3 - Positive Mood Induction. 
Participants next completed a third mood scale and were then informed they would be 
hearing a few minutes of classical music (see Materials for more detail). They were 
invited to take this time to relax, to concentrate on the music, and to think about any 
positive events that had happened to them recently. Once the music had finished, the 
procedure automatically continued to the next phase. 
Phase 4 - Genuine Smile [lADS] 
Participants then completed a fourth mood scale and were subsequently informed that 
they would be hearing a series of short clips of sounds they might encounter in 
everyday life. They were instructed to concentrate on the sounds and try to imagine a 
situation in which that sound might occur, but to remain looking into the camera 
while each sound was playing. Each of the lADS clips lasted approximately 10 
seconds and was followed by a 5-second pause before the procedure automatically 
continued to the next sound. A complete list of the lADS sounds used is presented in 
Appendix C. 
Phase 5 - Genuine Smile [lAPS] 
In the final phase, participants completed a fifth mood scale, after which they were 
informed that they would be presented with a series of photographs on the computer 
screen. They were instructed to look at each photograph and then look into the camera 
while thinking about the photograph and how it made them feel. Each of the lAPS 
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images remained on the screen for 15 seconds, after which it was immediately 
replaced by the next image in the series. A complete list of the lAPS photographs 
used is presented in Appendix C. Once the participant had viewed all 20 photographs 
they completed a sixth mood scale. 
The entire procedure lasted approximately 45 minutes for each participant, after 
which they were debriefed as to the purpose of the procedure, thanked for their time 
and paid $10. All participants provided consent for their images to be used for the 
present and future research. 
Coding. 
The video recording for each participant was edited into discrete segments 
corresponding to each individual stage of the procedure (i.e. posed smile instruction, 
lADS sound or lAPS photograph). Each segment lasted for the duration of the 
lADS/lAPS material presented or the behaviour requested in the case of neutral 
expressions and posed smiles. Care was taken to ensure smiles were not split across 
more than one segment, that is both the onset and offset of each smile observed were 
included in the same segment. Segments were then visually inspected for the presence 
of any form of smiling. Segments which featured smiling were subsequently coded 
for evidence of zygomatic major and/or orbicularis oculi contraction according to the 
FACS criteria for AU12 and AU6 respectively. Other features related to each 
expression, in particular any other muscle activity, were noted. An overview of the 
results of the coding procedure is presented for each participant in Appendix D. 
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Results 
Emotional state. 
The ratings of mood provided by participants on the analogue scale were intended as 
self-reported approximations of mood or emotional state. Although there are a number 
of problems with measuring mood by relying on self-report (see Plutchik, 2003), 
physiological and neurological means for assessing emotional state are simply too 
invasive to be of practical use in the current procedure. Furthermore, referencing 
emotional state in terms of behavioural outcomes, in this case a smile, fails to fulfil 
the requirements of both a physiognomic and emotional distinction between posed 
and genuine smiles. Hence, self-report of mood state, although not ideal, was the best 
available option for the current procedure. The use of an analogue scale also helps 
overcome some of the difficulties associated with the use of ordinal scales such as 
Likert scales or other such categorical approximations to continuous measurement 
(Ferrando, 1999). 
Given the mood scale ratings were self-reported approximations to emotional state, it 
is only appropriate to analyse these responses in terms of a visual inspection by 
individual participant. A graph of each participant's ratings of their mood is provided 
in Appendix E. Only expressions from those participants who reported feeling more 
positive at some stage between the beginning of the mood induction phase (phase III) 
and the end of the procedure were considered potentially genuine smiles. Only two 
participants (F3 and F4, see Appendix E, Figures E3 and E4) failed to meet these 
criteria. As such, only posed smiles were subsequently identified and coded from 
these participants. 
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FA CS criteria. 
As described, each segment from each participant's video was examined for the 
presence of signs of smiling. Each smile identified was then subsequently coded for 
the presence ofFACS AU6 and AU12 with the limitation that only smiles occurring 
during the mood induction or genuine smile phases of the procedure (phase III -V) 
could be considered genuine smiles. Neutral expressions and posed smiles were 
obtained from all participants, while genuine smiles were obtained from 9 participants 
only.34 In total, 165 posed smiles and 40 genuine smiles were generated that met the 
requirements for ecological validity outlined above (see Appendix D, Table D14 for a 
summary for each participant). 
Summmy 
This section summarises the procedure used for the generation of facial displays for 
the subsequent research, in relation to the 6 requirements for ecologically valid posed 
and genuine smile displays, outlined earlier in this chapter. 
1. Emotion distinction: Of the 13 participants who took part in the facial display 
generation procedure, 11 reported discernable increases in mood between the 
begilming of the mood induction (Phase III) and the genuine smile (Phases IV 
and V) stages of the procedure. Thus, only the 11 participants who exhibited a 
positive change in mood were considered when examining the video-clips for 
evidence of ecologically valid genuine smiles. One potential problem 
associated with this approach35 concerns the emotional state of participants 
34 As described above, two participants (F3 and F4) did not meet the criteria for an increase in positive 
affect. Two additional participants (F2 and M l) did not genuinely smile at all during the procedure. 
35 In addition to the potential methodological short-comings associated with self-report measures of 
emotion discussed, see Plutchik (2003) for an overview. 
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during the posed smile (Phase II) stage of the procedure. Technically, it is 
preferable' for participants to be in a neutral emotional state when posing 
smiles, as there is a potential risk of morphological confounding due to 
unintended emotional expressions. However, this may be indeed difficult to 
achieve. The nature of the procedure (i.e. knowingly being filmed) may leave 
some participants feeling, for instance, anxious, while others appeared to 
enjoy the experience. Self-report of emotion, in this case, fails to provide a 
suitable baseline for neutral mood, rather only a reference point for 
comparison with subsequent reported emotional experience can be established. 
Only careful scrutiny of the facial expressions sourced from the posed smile 
(Phase II) stage of the procedure to reveal evidence of other emotional 
experience can help overcome, or at least minimise this problem in the context 
of the present research. 
2. Physiognomic distinction: As discussed, only smiles which met F ACS criteria 
for evidence of recruitment of zygomatic major (F ACS AU12) either with (i.e. 
genuine smiles) or without (i.e. posed smiles) contractions of orbicularis oculi 
(F ACS AU6) were considered as candidates for ecologically valid 
expressIons. 
3. Individual differences: Both male and female participants were recruited for 
this procedure to allow for inclusion of sex as a factor in the planned research. 
Furthermore, all required facial expressions (i.e. neutral expression, posed 
smile and genuine smile) were successfully obtained from 9 participants. 
4. Gaze direction: Participants were required, and reminded throughout the 
procedure, to look directly into the camera. Only expressions for which direct 
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eye contact was maintained for the majority of the duration of the expression 
were considered valid for use in the planned research. 
5. Static and dynamic expressions: The initial recording of the participants' 
facial expressions using digital video allows for static images to be 
subsequently developed from this source. Thus, both dynamic and static 
representations of the required facial expressions were obtained from the 
present procedure. The video clips were edited so that both the onset and 
offset of each expression were included in each clip. The static expressions 
were obtained by identifying the apex of each expression and capturing a still 
image from the video clip at this point. 
6. Extraneous factors: All attempts were made to control for the effects or 
factors thought to impact social perception but not pertinent to the present 
research. Only participants with no facial hair or spectacles were recruited, 
and those who took part were required to remove any excess make-up or 
jewellery, and to wear a standard white laboratory coat. Despite these efforts, 
one participant's hair occluded parts of her face and, therefore, no valid 
genuine smiles were obtained from her?6 Furthermore, the use of standard 
lighting, background and camera position ensured a regular appearance in all 
the resulting video clips and photographs. 
In summary, it appears the facial displays generated for the present research 
adequately fulfilled the criteria outlined for ecologically valid posed and genuine 
smiles. Importantly, each form of smile was distinct (from the other) in terms of both 
emotional state and physiognomic appearance. All required expressions were obtained 
36 This participant (F3) also failed to meet the criteria for an increase in positive mood during the 
genuine smile generation phase. 
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from 9 participants in both dynamic and static modes, and efforts were made to 
control gaze direction and extraneous factors such as clothing, lighting, and the 
general appearance of the resulting .materials. Thus, it is suggested that the facial 
expressions generated using this procedure are suitable for use as ecologically valid 
facial displays in the present research. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Detectability of Emotional State Specified by Posed and Genuine Smiles 
As discussed in previous chapters, the ecological approach to psychology requires the 
researcher to consider the animal-environment interaction as a singular unit for 
analysis (Gibson, 1979; McArthur & Baron, 1983; Reed, 1996). That is, a coherent 
explanation of a psychological phenomenon requires that the properties of the animal, 
in concert with properties of its environment, be taken into account. Before examining 
the nature of the animal-environment relationship more closely the researcher must, at 
the outset, understand what is available for perception (i.e. the informational 
properties of the environment), in combination with the sensitivity of the animal to 
such properties. Only in this maimer can the mutual, reciprocal relationship between 
the animal and its environment be properly understood in terms of a genuinely 
monistic ecological approach. 
In regard to the present research, the literature reviewed in Chapter 1 pertaining to the 
ontological distinction between posed and genuine smiles provides an account of the 
structural qualities available for perception that specify the distinction between these 
facial expressions (for an overview see Ekman, 2003; Ekman, Friesen, & O'Sullivan 
1997; Frank, 2002; Frank, Ekman, & Friesen, 1993). In brief, genuine smiles involve 
contraction of the orbicularis oculi (i.e. show evidence of the Duchenne marker), tend 
to be facially symmetrical, show a smooth, temporally consistent transition between 
onset, apex, and offset, and have a uniform temporal duration. By comparison, posed 
smiles do not involve orbicularis oculi contraction, tend to be asymmetrical, show 
little regularity between onset, apex, and offset, and occur over variable durations. In 
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terms of social significance, only smiles that involve orbicularis oculi contraction 
spontaneously occur in the presence of a positive affective experience. All other smile 
varieties can be considered volitional communicative mechanisms, ontologically 
distinct from a genuine expression of happiness. Thus, there appears to be a basis for 
the perceiver to distinguish between posed and genuine smiles in terms of the 
information available for perception. Systematic, lawful constraints on the social 
environment (i.e. the relationship between emotional experience and facial efference) 
structure optical information such that there is potential for the attuned perceiver to 
detect the veracity of a smile. Smile veracity in and of itself, however, does not 
sufficiently describe that which is specified by the distinct morphologies of posed and 
genuine smiles. In theory, what the perceiver needs to be sensitive to is information 
relevant to the affordances of their environment. As aforementioned, the emotional 
state of conspecifics has bearing on opportunities for interaction. Smile veracity, in 
this sense, provides the social perceiver with an avenue to detect happiness, and 
therefore, to inform interaction. What remains to be investigated is the propensity of 
perceivers to be sensitive to this emotion-specific information. In order for posed and 
genuine smiles to be considered as candidates for ecological referents of emotional 
state, and in tum the associated social affordances, perceivers must be able to reliably 
distinguish between these facial expressions, or more appropriately, between 
expressions that specify happiness and those that do not. This chapter reviews 
previous research that has directly examined the sensitivity of perceivers to the 
distinction between posed and genuine smiles. Following this review the first study in 
the present research, which was intended to replicate and extend the literature 
reviewed, is reported. 
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Previous Research Investigating the Detectability of Smile Veracity 
As discussed in Chapter l,in contrast to the research conducted on the nature of the 
differences between posed and genuine smiles, there is a relative dearth of enquiry 
regarding the sensitivity of perceivers to such differences. Although Darwin 
(1872/1998) remarked on how well observers could distinguish between photographs 
of posed and genuine smiles, since then only a handful of studies are lmown to have 
addressed this issue with any rigour (e.g. Frank et aI., 1993; Scherer & Ceschi, 2000; 
Williams, Senior, David, Loughlan, & Gordon, 2001).37 Of these, only Frank et aI. 
have directly compared perceptions of posed and genuine smiles. In the second of 
three studies reported by these authors, participants were required to judge, from 
video, whether a particular smile: 
is a true, genuine expression of enjoyment (i.e. she is truly happy or 
enjoying herself) or if in fact this smile is a false or social expression (i.e. 
she is smiling because it is socially appropriate but is not necessarily 
happy herself). (p.88) 
The results revealed that participants were significantly more accurate than chance 
(i.e. 50% correct) at distinguishing posed from genuine smiles both when viewing 
smiles individually (M = 56% correct), and in pairs where both posed and genuine 
smiles from one individual were seen simultaneously (M = 73% correct). These 
results suggest that when making explicit judgements of smile veracity, observers 
were able to accurately detect the difference between posed and genuine smiles. 
Furthermore, Frank et al. (1993) reported that factors associated with increasing the 
salience of orbicularis oculi action resulted in greater accuracy in distinguishing 
37 With the exception of Frank et al. these studies will be reviewed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
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between posed and genuine smiles. Salience was influenced by characteristics of the 
perceivers' viewing strategies, characteristics of the facial expressions, or a 
combination of both. Participants who reported focussing on the area surrounding the 
eyes when making smile veracity judgements were more accurate than those who did 
not report using this strategy. Viewing smiles in pairs, which allowed for a direct 
visual comparison between smiles, was also associated with an increased ability to 
identify smile type. Additionally, low intensity genuine smiles, that is, genuine smiles 
in which zygomatic major contraction does not change the appearance of the face 
beyond changes to the mouth, were more distinguishable from posed smiles and 
moderately intense genuine smiles. Frank et al. reasoned that as moderately intense 
contraction of zygomatic major can result in the bagging of skin below the eyes, these 
morphological changes are potentially confused with changes in appearance due to 
orbicularis oculi contraction. Furthermore, the latter two factors interacted such that 
the increased ability to accurately identify low intensity genuine smiles was only 
manifest in the paired smile condition. Considering these three factors in 
combination, the ideal observers (i.e. those that reported adopting the 'eye-checking' 
strategy) viewing smiles under optimal conditions (i.e. low intensity smiles in pairs) 
were reported to show the highest accuracy rates (M = 81 %) in this study. Frank et al. 
suggested that by making the action of orbicularis oculi more conspicuous, the 
'signal strength' of this marker is amplified, and therefore, made more detectable to 
the social perceiver. 
However, while the conclusions drawn by Frank et al., (1993) appear reasonable in 
light of the results reported, a number of methodological issues preclude the 
elimination of alternative explanations. First, the smiles employed by Frank et al. 
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were sourced from two previous studies, (Davidson, Ekman, Saron, Senulis, & 
Friesen, 1990; Ekman & Friesen, 1974). Both of these studies elicited spontaneous 
genuine smiles by showing participants positively valenced video clips, but in line 
with the specific aims of each study, the respective methodologies varied in a manner 
that potentially influenced factors associated with person perception. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, in the former study Davidson et a1. measured brain activity using 
electroencephalogram (EEG). This technique is somewhat obtrusive because to 
support the EEG electrodes participants must wear a lycra skull cap. This is 
potentially problematic in that the skull cap is very apparent in the subsequent images 
of smiles, giving a very Ulmatural appearance to the individual expressing the smile. 
In the latter study Ekman et a1. asked the participants (nursing students) to describe 
what they saw on the video. In addition to a pleasant nature scene, participants in this 
study also saw unpleasant medical training footage showing amputations and the 
treatment of severe bums, but were required to conceal any negative feelings they 
may have had while describing the medical scenes. In effect, the posed smiles sourced 
from this study were, in fact, masking smiles, intended to conceal negative emotions 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Ekman et a1., 1997; Frank et a1.). As a consequence, these 
expressions are likely to contain leaked evidence of the concealed negative emotions 
in the form of microexpressions, brief traces of facial expressions of emotion 
generally associated with negative emotional experience and often occurring when 
attempts are made to suppress expression (Ekman, 2001, 2003). It is clear that neither 
of these sets of smiles fully meet the criteria for ecologically valid displays of facial 
affect outlined in the previous chapter. Therefore, these findings may suffer from a 
lack of generalisability from the research setting to the real world. 
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Second, Frank et al. (1993) explicitly provided participants with an a priori 
expectation of the proportion (50%) of posed and genuine smiles they would.be 
viewing. This knowledge potentially assisted participants in the individual 
presentation condition when making judgements of smile type. Specifically, there 
may have been a tendency to use the base-rate information provided to adjust 
response strategy in order to ensure approximately half of the smiles viewed were 
categorised as 'social' and half as 'enjoyment'. Such an effect is likely to occur in the 
latter parts of the procedure whereby a bias toward the least frequently chosen smile 
type may become evident. Systematically varying the order of smile presentation, or 
randomly varying presentation order for each participant would help overcome this 
potential confound. However Frank et al. reported using a fixed order when smiles 
were presented individually, and they did not report their data in sufficient detail to 
enable consideration of such order effects. Furthermore, given the instructions they 
received, participants knew that all expressions presented would be smiles of some 
description. Hence, even if a participant believed that a particular expression they saw 
was not a smile or was in fact a different emotional expression, they knew that was 
supposed to be a smile as they were told at the beginning of the procedure that they 
would only be seeing smiles. Such a hypothetical participant would then be required 
to choose their response from two alternatives (social or enjoyment smile) they had 
already deemed to be incorrect. This situation may lead to decisions being made based 
on criteria other than physiognomy due to the participant's belief the expression they 
were seeing was not a smile38 . In this sense, the forced-choice response format 
employed by Frank et al. constrained participant responses to a binary 'social' or 
'enjoyment' smile distinction, thereby removing any potential for the participant to be 
38 Although such data may well be informative, it should not be conflated with that of participants who 
do use physiognomic characteristics to judge smile type. 
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uncertain or to make a spontaneous attribution to any other emotional state. This may 
be particularly important when participants were viewing the smiles sourced from 
Ekman and Friesen (1974) which may have contained traces of suppressed negative 
emotion. In this case, the forced-choice response format employed by Frank et aI. 
simply does not allow for accurate identification of the perceived emotional state. 
These problems were exacerbated in the paired smile condition, whereby participants 
knew that one of each pair of expressions presented was a genuine smile, and one was 
not. Even if they failed to distinguish between the two smiles presented (i.e. they 
thought both smiles were either posed or genuine, or could not tell), the forced-choice 
response employed, does not allow any scope for judgements beyond the binary 
options of 'social smile' or 'enjoyment smile' required by the experimental procedure. 
It has been suggested that the use of a forced-choice response format in this manner 
may produce artificially high consensus rates amongst participants (Russell, 1994). 
Interestingly, in a later paper concerning methodological requirements for research on 
perception of facial expressions of emotion, Frank and Stennett (2001) argue that in 
order to overcome the tendency for forced-choice paradigms to enhance artifactual 
agreement rates, a 'none of these terms are correct' option should be included. While 
it is impossible to draw any conclusions regarding the impact of either the use of a 
forced-choice response format without a 'none correct' option, or of the a priori 
provision of base-rate information, on the results reported by Frank et aI., it is clear 
these factors provide potential for methodological confounds. 
Finally, Frank et aI., (1993) measured the ability of perceivers to distinguish between 
posed and genuine smiles using accuracy rates; specifically, the proportion of smiles 
correctly identified. To be deemed correct, a genuine smile needed to be classified as 
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an 'enj oyment smile' , and a posed smile as a 'social smile'. The observed proportion 
of COlTect identifications was then compared with the proportion expected if responses 
were random (i.e. at a chance level of success) to determine if perceivers were able to 
reliably determine which smiles were posed and which were genuine. Although this 
approach is common in studies of emotion recognition accuracy (e.g. Ekman, 
Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969; Esteves & Ohman, 1993), the rate of COlTect 
identifications does not provide sufficient detail for an unambiguous interpretation of 
perceivers' abilities to discriminate between the different types of smiles presented. 
While a significantly higher-than-chance accuracy rate may indicate a sensitivity to 
the distinction between posed and genuine smiles, it does not rule out a competing 
explanation of bias. It may be that participants simply favoured one response over the 
other. Hypothetically, if participants were more willing to identify any given 
expression as an 'enjoyment smile', perhaps, for example, due to some form of 
response bias (Miller & Felicio, 1990), then it is likely that only smiles that clearly 
did not resemble a genuine smile (e.g. a low intensity, highly asymmetric posed 
smile) would not be classified as an 'enjoyment smile'. If it is assumed that such a 
response bias was not so extreme that all smiles were considered 'enjoyment 
smiles' ,39 a participant exhibiting this bias would have produced a high (if not perfect) 
accuracy rate when viewing genuine smiles. Although tempered by a relatively lower 
level of accuracy when viewing posed smiles, this bias could quite feasibly have 
resulted in an overall accuracy rate significantly greater than chance. Thus, from the 
data reported by Frank et al. (1993) it is impossible to determine whether the observed 
ability of participants to distinguish posed from genuine smiles was indeed due to a 
39 This assumption appears reasonable in light of the a priori base-rate information provided by Frank 
et al. (1993). In this sense, however, it is acknowledged that the provision of base-rate information may 
limit the overall potential for impact of response bias on decision making. A participant may feasibly 
identifY all smiling people as happy, however this is unlikely to occur if one knows, as was the case for 
Frank et al.' s participants, that only half of the smiling people they will see are actually happy. 
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perceptual sensitivity to this difference, or was in fact the result of a response bias. 
This issue warrants particular attention in that the potential role of response bias as 
described here is likely to be solely an artefact of methodology. Without base-rate 
information, as is the case in real-world interactions, participants are unlikely to 
attempt to conform to any expectations regarding the frequency with which they will 
encounter genuinely smiling individuals. 
To summarise, while the research reported by Frank et al. (1993) provides a 
controlled laboratory demonstration of the ability of perceivers to distinguish posed 
from genuine smiles, it appears that aspects of the experimental procedure employed 
undermine the ecological validity, and therefore subsequent generalis ability, of their 
findings from the laboratory to actual social interactions. The facial displays used by 
Frank et al. were not uniform with respect to the information available to perceivers. 
In half of the displays, the individual expressing the smile was wearing a lycra EEG 
skull cap, thereby creating a somewhat unusual appearance for the subsequent 
observers. In the other half, the individuals exhibiting the expressions had been 
instructed to suppress any evidence of negative emotion. These videos are likely to 
contain some evidence of the suppressed emotion, which was not accounted for by 
Frank et al. Furthermore, participants were informed prior to the procedure that half 
of the smiles they would see were posed and half were genuine. Obviously such base-
rate information is not present in real-world interactions. This problem was 
exacerbated in the paired smile condition whereby participants saw the same person 
exhibiting one posed and one genuine smile. Although we may see a range of 
configurations of facial expressions from a given individual during actual interactions, 
it is simply never the case that we see any two expressions simultaneously, and 
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therefore, are never presented with the opportunity to make direct comparisons as 
participants in Frank et al. 's research were asked to do. Finally, the results as reported 
by Frank et al. do not provide sufficient information to determine whether the 
observed ability of participants to determine which smiles were posed versus which 
were genuine, reflects an actual sensitivity to the differences between these 
expressions, or in fact, was the result of some form of bias. If claims regarding 
perceivers' sensitivity to the difference between posed and genuine smiles are to be 
considered tenable, then the role of bias must be considered. The remainder of this 
chapter will outline the first study in the present research, which was intended to 
replicate and extend the work of Frank et al. by addressing the methodological 
problems discussed. 
The Present Research 
To recap, the objective of the first study in this thesis is to investigate the ability of 
perceivers to detect emotional state, specifically happiness, by means of 
distinguishing between posed and genuine smiles. The research reviewed in previous 
chapters suggests that there are systematic physiognomic differences between smiles 
that are spontaneous expressions of positive affect and smiles that are posed, 
intentional communicative mechanisms, not necessarily related to any affective state. 
It has been argued that it is important for the social perceiver to be sensitive to the 
differences in emotional state specified by these two expressions or risk 
misperceiving the social affordances available in a given interaction. However, 
relatively little is known about whether perceivers are in fact sensitive to the 
differences between posed and genuine smiles. The only study known to have 
addressed this question directly did not report results in sufficient detail to rule out 
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alternative explanations for the greater-than-chance accuracy rate found when 
participants were asked to distinguish posed from genuine smiles (Frank et al., 1993). 
Therefore, the present study is intended to partially replicate the research reported by 
Frank et al. with modifications to the procedure and analysis. The following section 
outlines the background for the chosen method of analysis of the present study, that is, 
Signal Detection Theory. 
Signal Detection The01Y 
The challenge to the social perceiver when detecting happiness from facial 
expressions is in many ways a problem consistent with that when confronted with a 
wide variety of other real-world decision-making tasks. Regardless of whether one is 
waiting for a telephone to ring, examining an x-ray for indications of disease, or 
judging smile veracity, to perform these tasks successfully the perceiver must 
discriminate events that contain the information of interest from those that do not. In 
fact, this general class of decision problems has been more formally expressed in 
terms of signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966; Tanner & Swets, 1954). 
Signal detection theory originated from a postgraduate course taught by H. Richard 
Blackwell at the University of Michigan during the 1940s. Soon after the theory was 
applied as an approach to study the behaviour of radar operators during the Second 
World War. At this time radar was a relatively new technology and the fidelity and 
specificity of the equipment, including the display, was low compared to modem 
standards. The function of radar was to provide early detection of approaching threats, 
particularly enemy aircraft, by using high frequency radio waves to determine the 
position and velocity of objects in the environment. Detected objects would be 
indicated on the radar display as dots or 'blips'. The task for the radar operator was to 
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decide whether an event on the radar screen indicated an approaching enemy aircraft, 
or alternatively, was due to some other non-threatening cause such as friendly aircraft, 
flocks of birds, fishing vessels, or even disturbances in the weather. However, the 
characteristics of each class of objects (e.g. friendly versus enemy aircraft) were often 
very similar when represented on a radar screen. The costs of either a false alarm (e.g. 
scrambling defensive forces upon detection of a fishing boat) or missing approaching 
enemy craft were high, hence accuracy in reading the radar display was required. The 
operator needed to be able to reliably distinguish threats from other events based on 
the limited information available via radar. Statistical decision theory, in the form of 
Signal Detection Theory was applied by researchers investigating this problem. 
Signal Detection Theory, in its traditional form, characterises the task for the 
perceiver as one that requires differentiation between events containing only 'noise', 
from events containing a 'signal' embedded in 'noise'. For the purposes of signal 
detection theory, noise may be defined as information "not designated as a signal, but 
which may be confused with it" (McNicol, 1972, p.I2). Thus, in these terms, a 
perceiver is confronted with an environmental event with a binary status (i.e. signal or 
noise) and must make a similarly binary choice regarding this event (i.e. signal is 
present or not). As displayed in Table 1, there are four possible response-consequence 
combinations in this scenario: (i) the event contains a signal and is correctly identified 
as such (a 'hit'), (ii) the event contains a signal, but is not correctly identified (a 
'miss'), (iii) the event does not contain a signal and is correctly identified (a 'correct 
rejection'), and (iv) the event does not contain a signal, but is identified as containing 
a signal (a 'false alarm'). 
Table l: Traditional signal detection matrix 
Event 
Signal 
Noise 
Yes 
Hit 
False Alarm 
Response 
No 
Miss 
Correct Rejection 
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For example, someone expecting a telephone call must be able to distinguish the 
sound of their phone ringing (the signal) from any background commotion (the noise). 
This task may be relatively simple when in quiet surroundings, but becomes 
substantially more difficult in a busy office environment where there may be many 
phones ringing. Indeed, there are four possible outcomes here: (i) the worker's phone 
rings and they answer it (a 'hit'), (ii) the worker's phone rings and they do not answer 
it (a 'miss'), (iii) another phone rings and the worker does not answer it (a 'correct 
rejection') and (iv) another phone rings and the worker answers it (a 'false alarm'). 
However, as traditionally described, the constructs of signal and noise are somewhat 
antithetical to a functional ecological approach to psychology. In general, ecological 
psychologists view all structure in an ambient array as potentially informative to a 
suitably attuned perceiver. What is critical here, is what such structure is informative 
about, or more specifically what the information specified in the array is relevant to 
(Flach & Warren, 1995; Owen, 1990). Information specified in the ambient array is 
either relevant to, or not relevant to, a particular affordance property of the 
environment. Hence, in this sense there is no 'noise' as such, rather, information is 
deemed to be irrelevant or non-specific to the task at hand. Concomitantly, perceivers 
can be either attuned or not attuned to this information. Owen has reformulated the 
traditional signal detection matrix to more accurately reflect the theoretical 
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underpinnings of the ecological approach. As displayed in Table 2, Owen replaced the 
constructs of 'signal' and 'noise' with the notion ofinfonnation that is either 
'relevant' or 'irrelevant' to the task at hand, while the perceiver is simultaneously 
represented as either 'attuned' or 'unattuned' to this information. 
Table 2: Infonnation specificity matrix (adapted from Owen, 1990) 
Infonnation 
Perceiver 
Specific 
Attuned 
Functional 
(infonnative) 
Nonspecific Dysfunctional 
(misinfonnative) 
Nonattuned 
Nonfunctional 
(noninformative) 
Afunctional 
(uninfonnative) 
Together, these constructs again provide four possible outcomes of the decision task: 
(i) the perceiver is attuned to task-relevant infonnation such that the actor-
environment relationship is deemed functional and informative, (ii) the perceiver is 
attuned to infonnation irrelevant to the task at hand such that the actor-environment 
relationship is deemed dysfimctional and misinjormative, (iii) the perceiver is not 
attuned to task-relevant information such that the actor-environment relationship is 
deemed nonfunctional and noninjormative and, (iv) the perceiver is not attuned to (or 
ignores) infonnation irrelevant to the task such that the actor-environment relationship 
is deemed afill1ctional and uninformative. Clearly this approach provides a more 
theoretically coherent description of the actor-environment relationship when the 
assumptions of a functional ecological approach are considered. However, as noted by 
Flach and Warren, this approach is similar in structure to the general signal detection 
approach described above, in that the possible states of the environment and those of 
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the perceiver, can be represented as a two-dimensional table. Hence, while the 
conceptual description provided by Owen is adopted for the present research, the 
more conventional signal detection approach to calculating sensitivity and bias 
remains a valid means to estimate these parameters in the present study. This 
computational approach is described in the following section. 
Measuring Sensitivity and Bias 
A standard approach to the signal detection task is the yes-no procedure,40 whereby 
the participant is presented with information that is either task-relevant or task-
irrelevant and must report to which category this information belongs. As applied to 
the present research, the task for paIiicipants is to detect facial expressions of 
happiness, that is, to distinguish genuine smiles (i.e. task-relevant information) from 
posed smile and neutral expressions (i.e. task-irrelevant information). This requires 
that examples of these expressions be presented to participants who must then decide 
which category they belong to (i.e. an expression of happiness or not). Hence, as 
described above, there are four possible response-consequence outcomes here: (i) a 
genuine smile is presented which the perceiver identifies as an expression of 
happiness (i.e. functional perception or a 'hit'), (ii) a genuine smile is presented which 
the perceiver does not identify as an expression of happiness (i.e. non-functional 
perception or a 'miss'), (iii) a posed smile or neutral expression is presented which the 
perceiver identifies as an expression of happiness (i.e. dysfunctional perception or a 
'false alarm'), and (iv) a posed smile or neutral expression is presented which the 
perceiver does not identify as an expression of happiness (i.e. afunctional perception 
40 Other common fonus of the SDT procedure are the forced-choice task and the rating-scale task (for 
details see (Green & Swets, 1966). 
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or a 'correct rejection'). From the resultant data, estimates of the hit41 (H) and false-
alarm (F) rates42 can be obtained, and once standardised, used to calculate 
independent measures of both sensitivity (d') and bias (c). In regard to sensitivity, if, 
hypothetically, observers show no ability to discriminate relevant from irrelevant 
information, then H::::: F and d' will approach 0, while total accuracy (evidenced by a 
perfect hit rate, and no false alarms) implies an infinite d,.43 Bias statistics, on the 
other hand, measure the extent to which observers are simply more willing to choose 
one option over the other (regardless of the nature of the information being judged), 
by combining the false alarm and miss rates (essentially the hit rate, as miss rate = 1-
hit rate). If no bias is evident c = 0, when c < ° a negative bias (tendency to choose 
'no' in a yes-no task) is present, and when c > ° a positive bias (tendency to choose 
'yes' in a yes-no task) is present. The absolute value of c provides an indication of the 
magnitude ofbias.44 
Researchers will often manipulate bias by instructing participants to adopt a more (or 
less) stringent decision criterion.45 For instance, a participant may be instructed to 
identify relevant information whenever they suspected such information was present, 
only when they were certain the information was present, or at some intermediate 
level of certainty. Adoption of a less stringent decision criterion will essentially lead a 
participant to be more likely to identify any information as relevant (e.g. respond 
41 Although the terms 'hit' and 'false alarm' are not used by Owen (1990), they are retained for the 
purposes of the present analyses as they provide a more intuitive description of participants' 
judgements of the target facial displays. 
42 Estimates of miss rate and correct rejection rate are redundant: miss rate= I-hit rate; correction 
rejection rate= I-false alarm rate. 
43 In this fashion, sensitivity (d') can be expressed as a value ranging from 0 to infinity, although many 
researchers consider d' to have an effective ceiling value of 4.65, corresponding to H=0.99 and F=O.OI 
(Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). 
44 Again, although the range of response bias (c) is theoretically bounded by -infinity to infinity, in 
practice -2.33 and 2.33 represent the effective lower and upper limits. 
45 Alternatively, it is also common practice to manipulate bias by adjusting the costlbenefit matrix for 
incorrect and correct decisions respectively. 
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'yes' in a 'yes-no' procedure) than they might be when using a more stringent 
decision criterion. Sensitivity should not change under such a manipulation as neither 
the perceiver's ability to discern relevant from irrelevant information, nor the 
specificity of the information have changed, only the manner in which the decision is 
made has been impacted. Varying the decision criterion (in effect bias) will, in theory, 
impact on both the hit and false alarm rates so that sensitivity remains relatively 
constant. For instance, a lax criterion may result in a high hit rate, but at the expense 
of a high false alarm rate, while with a more conservative criterion the opposite would 
be expected, that is, a lower hit rate, but also fewer false alarms. Thus, by varying the 
nature of the decision criterion, researchers are able to generate more accurate 
estimates of sensitivity over a range oflevels of bias. 
In general, the signal detection theory approach to perceptual decision making has the 
advantage of providing standardised estimates of both the sensitivity and bias of 
observers when attempting to discriminate between task relevant and task irrelevant 
information. By varying the decision criteria employed by participants from more to 
less conservative (or vice-versa) an accurate assessment of the ability of the observer 
to determine the relevance of information, or in this case, to determine whether a 
given facial expression specifies happiness, can be obtained. Thus, this approach will 
be adopted within the present research to investigate the ability of perceivers to 
distinguish posed from genuine smiles. In remaining consistent with the notion that 
perceivers should be sensitive to underlying emotional state specified by 
physiognomy, participants will be required to identify facial displays specifying 
happiness using two separate decision criteria: specifically whether the individual is 
showing happiness, a relatively lax criterion, or whether the individual is feeling 
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happiness, a relatively conservative criterion. Although only genuine smiles specify 
happiness regardless of whether the emotion shown, or the emotion felt, is being 
judged, it is expected that participants will exhibit a greater degree of bias, that is, to 
be more likely to classify a posed smile as reflecting happiness when judging the 
emotion shown compared to the emotion felt. It is suggested that the morphological 
similarities between posed and genuine smiles may lead perceivers to be more likely 
to consider any smile to be indicative of an individual showing happiness, in 
comparison to judgments of the emotion felt, whereby, only genuine smiles·would be 
likely to be equated with feeling happy. 
Thus, the present research was intended to examine the sensitivity of perceivers to the 
presence of positive affect as specified by the physiognomic differences between 
posed and genuine smiles using a signal detection procedure. Two experiments are 
reported, the first uses static photographs of facial displays, and the second employs 
dynamic displays presented via video. 
Experiment 1 a 
This experiment involved showing participants photographs of a variety of individuals 
exhibiting a range of facial expressions (neutral expressions, posed smiles and 
genuine smiles) and asking them to simply judge whether the individual in the 
photograph was happy or not. The approach of requiring participants to judge 
emotional state directly, as opposed to identifying 'social' and 'enjoyment' smiles as 
required by Frank et al. (1993), or any other descriptor of smile veracity such as posed 
and genuine, fake and authentic, intentional and spontaneous, was adopted for a 
number of reasons. First, emotional state was the phenomenon of interest. As has been 
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suggested, it is the underlying emotional state that structures the information available 
to perceivers, and'in tum provides consequences for action. The morphology of the 
facial expressions in question is potentially arbitrary until consideration is given to the 
ontology of the expression, that is, whether a given smile occurs in the presence or 
absence of a positive emotional state. In short, it is the underlying emotional state 
accompanying a smile, not the structural qualities of the facial expression, that the 
perceiver needs to be sensitive to, as it is this same emotional state that has 
consequences for the perceiver. Second, a direct description of the variable to be 
judged (i.e. positive emotional state) minimises the potential for misunderstanding 
and misinterpretation by participants that may occur with less direct accounts. 
Describing an individual's smile as a genuine smile or an enjoyment smile, for 
instance, may not necessarily reflect perceived smile veracity, but instead may 
describe perceived characteristics of the individual being judged (e.g. a 'genuine-
looking' person may be expected to exhibit a genuine smile). Even careful briefing of 
participants as to the definitions of the smile types to be judged provides no guarantee 
these will be adhered to. Third, judging smiles as posed or genuine may be influenced 
by a social-desirability response bias. Describing another person as being deceptive or 
faking involves a negative evaluation of that person, an activity that is counter to the 
generally positive biases reported to accompany the formation of initial interpersonal 
impressions (Miller & Felicio, 1990). As such, judges may simply be less likely to 
identify a given smile as fake or posed, than the less socially-valued distinction of that 
individual not experiencing or exhibiting happiness, that is, the affordance-relevant 
property that is of interest here. Although signal detection analysis provides a measure 
of bias, it is preferable not to introduce such artefacts by means of the experimental 
procedure employed. Finally, the use of the binary distinction, happy versus not 
132 
happy, allows for the use of a forced-choice response fonnat, without requiring a 
'none of these is correct' option. In regard to emotional state, an individual is. either 
happy or not happy, there is no sensible intennediate category or alternative. 
In addition to requiring participants to judge emotional state directly, in the present 
study separate judgements were required with regard to the emotion the target 
individual was showing (happy or not happy), and the emotion they were feeling 
(happy or not happy). As described, this manipulation was, in effect, an attempt to 
vary the decision criterion used by participants. In the context of the present study, 
judging whether an emotion is shown on an individual's face is likely to lead to a less 
conservative decision strategy compared to judging whether that individual is actually 
feeling an emotion. While both decisions are explicitly about the presence or absence 
of emotional state, the morphology of a posed smile, and its resemblance to that of a 
genuine smile, may lead to these expressions being more readily classified as an 
individual showing happiness than that individual feeling happy. However, happiness, 
whether shown or felt, does not accompany posed smiles. Hence the hypothesised 
adoption of a relatively lax decision criterion when judging the emotion shown is 
likely to be reflected in estimates of bias rather than a categorical change in the 
perception of what is being judged. 
In keeping with the adaptive, functional nature of social perception advocated by 
proponents of the ecological approach to psychology (e.g. Gibson, 1979; McArthur & 
Baron, 1983) a number of specific predictions can be made in regard to the present 
experiment. Firstly, as has been outlined in previous chapters, it appears that it is 
important for the social perceiver to be sensitive to the emotional state of others. 
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Accordingly, it is predicted that participants will display sensitivity to the presence of 
happiness as specified by facial expression. Furthermore, it is potentially 
disadvantageous to exhibit a bias toward identifying any given smile as indicating 
happiness, because errors are likely to lead to an individual misperceiving 
opportunities for action and interaction. Therefore, it is predicted that the overall level 
of response bias will be low (i.e. will not differ from 0). However, in accordance with 
the manipulation of the decision criterion, the level of bias is predicted to differ 
between the showing and feeling judgement conditions, such that less bias will be 
evident when making judgements of the emotion felt by the target individual. 
Method 
Participants. 
Participants in Experiment la were 17 female46 students recruited from the University 
of Canterbury. They ranged in age from 17 years to 45 years (M = 21.7 years, SD = 
6.1). Each participant was given a $2 scratch-and-win lottery ticket upon completion 
of the procedure. 
Facial displays. 
Three facial expressions (a neutral expression and two smiles) were selected from 
1247 of the 13 individuals who participated in the facial display generation procedure 
described in the previous chapter. Both male (n = 4) and female (n = 8) facial 
displays were included to enable comparison of sensitivity to emotional state between 
46 Ambady, Hallahan and Rosenthal (Ambady, Hallahan, & Rosenthal, 1995) reported that females 
were more accurate judges of nonverbal behaviour in strangers than males. Hence, only female 
participants were included in the present study in order to maximise the power of the current design 
without needing to include participant sex as a factor thereby increasing the required sample size. 
47 One participant's facial displays were not included in the current experiments as no complete set of 
expressions required for this task (i.e. one posed and one genuine smile, or one closed mouth and one 
open mouth smile) was available. 
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male and female targets, and to ensure that all facial displays available were employed 
in the present procedure.48 An attempt was made to ensure that both smiles from each 
individual were matched for intensity in terms of F ACS criteria for expression 
intensity49. For each of the 9 individuals from whom a full set of smiles was available, 
a genuine smile was selected. A posed smile from the same individual was then 
selected to match their genuine smile in terms of expression intensity. Four of the 
genuine smiles consisted simply of AU6 (contraction of orbicularis oculi) and AU12 
(contraction of zygomatic major), and hence were considered prototypical genuine 
smiles respectively. For the 5 remaining genuine smiles the front teeth of the 
respective individual were visible during the smile. Depending on individual 
differences of facial physiognomy, exposure of the teeth may simply be the result of 
AUl2 contraction or alternatively may be due to the additional action units (e.g. 
AU25 - contraction of the lip separator muscle) involved in widening and separating 
the lips during the smile and exposing the teeth50 . One study is known to have 
investigated the influence of the exposure of the teeth during a smile on perceptions of 
happiness. Otta, Abrsio and Hoshino (1996) reported that perceivers rated smiles 
where the teeth were exposed as reflecting a greater level of happiness than smiles 
that did not expose the teeth.51 Thus, this factor needs to be taken into account in the 
present study. Therefore, genuine smiles with teeth exposed were matched with posed 
48 Unfortunately, there were not sufficient male facial displays to have an equal number of male and 
female targets in the present study. 
49 FACS provides conventions for scoring the intensity of each action unit ranging from' A' indicating 
a trace of the action is present to 'E' indicating the maximum level of contraction is evident. Where 
expressions were matched for intensity, both expressions were rated at the same level of intensity using 
the F ACS criteria. 
50 Ekman, in a commentary on Darwin (1872/1998), noted that "the zygomatic major muscle stretches 
the upper lip and in most people this also raises the lip" (p. 201). 
51 Additionally, Owen (1988) reported that participants who exposed their teeth while smiling in 
response to a cartoon, rated these cartoons as more funny than those to which they smiled at but did not 
expose their teeth. This indicates that the exposure of the teeth during a smile may actually be related to 
intensity of experienced positive emotion, as well as being perceived in this manner (e.g. Otta et aI., 
1996). 
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smiles also exposing the teeth. These groups of 4 (2 males) and 5 (l male) individuals 
respectively are referred to as the 'closed mouth smile' and 'open mouth smile' 
groups. For the remaining 3 individuals (1 male) for whom no genuine smiles were 
obtained, two posed smiles were selected, one with the teeth exposed and one without. 
By including these smiles, as well as the neutral expressions, essentially increases the 
number of judgement trials, thereby increasing the precision of the resultant estimates 
of sensitivity and bias. Furthermore, the inclusion of neutral expressions and 
additional posed smiles served to enhance the ecological validity of the procedure by 
introducing a distribution of genuine smiles to other expressions that did not conform 
to a general 50/50 split that may be expected in such judgement studies, but is 
unlikely to be encountered during ordinary social interaction. 
To ensure that the facial displays selected for use in the present study were reliably 
coded as posed or genuine smiles, each expression was coded by another individual 
familiar with F ACS coding. This revealed an agreement rate between coders of 100%. 
All facial displays were digitally standardised for brightness and contrast using Adobe 
Photoshop, and presented as full colour, 640x480-pixel, bitmap images. 
Design. 
A 3 (Facial expression: Neutral/Posed smile / Genuine smile) x 2 (Smile type: 
Closed mouth / Open mouth) x 2 (Judgement type: Show / Feel) within-participants 
design was employed for Experiment 1 a. Order of presentation of facial expression 
and facial expression sex was randomised for each participant while order of 
judgement type was counterbalanced. Facial expression sex was not included in the 
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current design as only 1 set of male open mouth smile facial displays were available 
and therefore there was insufficient data in this cell to enable a valid comparison. 
Apparatus. 
Facial displays were presented on a 17-inch colour computer monitor using custom 
written software (Walton, 2003a) and a PIlI 650mhz personal computer running 
Windows XP Professional. 
Procedure. 
Participants were invited to take part in an experiment that was described as 
investigating factors related to the way people form impressions from faces. They 
were provided with an information sheet (see Appendix F) that outlined their rights 
and obligations as a participant, and provided a brief description of the research. In 
this description, attention was drawn to notions of both the experience and expression 
of emotion. Each participant then signed a consent form (see Appendix G), was 
ushered into a separate testing room and seated approximately 60cm from a computer 
monitor. They were told they would be seeing a series of photographs of different 
individuals on a computer screen and that their task was simply to judge whether the 
person in the photograph was happy or not. It was explained that they would be 
performing the procedure twice; once judging what emotion the person was showing, 
and once jUdging what emotion the person was feeling. The experimenter queried the 
participant as to their understanding of the instructions and clarified any matters that 
arose. If the participant sought clarification regarding the distinction between showing 
and feeling judgements, the experimenter referred to the concepts of the experience 
and expression of emotion described in the information sheet. The order of judgement 
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type was counterbalanced across participants. The instructions for the task were 
presented again on the computer screen along with information regarding which key 
to press to indicate 'happy' or 'not happy' respectively. The word 'showing' (or 
'feeling' depending on condition) was emphasised in capitals throughout these 
instructions. 
The task began with a practice judgement trial observed by the experimenter. A 
photograph52 was presented on the screen until the participant responded (happy or 
not happy) with a key press.53 If the experimenter was satisfied that the participant 
was familiar with the judgement task, the procedure was advanced to the actual 
judgement trials using the facial displays described above. During these trials the 
participant was left alone in the testing room and photograph presentation order was 
randomised. On each trial, once the participant had responded, the photograph was 
immediately replaced by the next in the sequence. After the participant had made 
judgements of all 36 facial displays the judgement condition (i.e. showing or feeling) 
was changed by the experimenter and the procedure repeated. Finally, participants 
were debriefed as to the purpose of the experiment and thanked. The entire procedure 
lasted approximately 15-20 minutes. 
Data analysis. 
As described earlier in this chapter, sensitivity to the difference between posed and 
genuine smiles, and any associated response bias, was assessed by means of a signal 
detection analysis. Specifically, a non-parametric approach to computing sensitivity 
and bias was adopted for the present analysis (see Appendix H for formulae). This 
52 A photograph of a posed smile from the individual who was not included in the facial display set 
used for this study served as the practice trial facial display. 
53 The present design therefore is equivalent to a standard yes-no signal detection task. 
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approach provides the researcher with accurate estimates of sensitivity (A ') and 
response bias (B") for tasks where there is little basis for expecting any particular 
pattem of responses (Green & Swets, 1966). A distribution-free approach, such as this 
one, does not require any assumptions regarding the nature of the underlying decision 
process (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). Given that the altemative approaches to the 
calculation of sensitivity and bias involve assumptions pertinent to the dominant 
cognitive models of detection and recognition, most of which are not conducive to the 
/ 
ecological approach to perception, it is preferable to adopt an approach that does not 
commit to these assumptions. In this sense, the dearth of empirical literature relevant 
to the detectability of posed and genuine smiles further precludes any a priori 
theorising as to the nature of the process underlying the decision to classify a given 
facial expression as a posed or genuine smile. Although the non-parametric approach 
to measuring sensitivity and bias has been shown to asymptote at very high levels of 
performance54 (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988), at intermediate performance levels A' 
and B" provide an acceptable altemative to d' and c (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). 
Considering that emotion recognition studies in general very rarely report levels of 
performance that approach complete accuracy (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002), let alone 
when distinguishing between veridical and non-veridical versions of the same 
expression, this limitation of the non-parametric approach to signal detection appears 
reasonable in light of the nature of the present research. 
Results 
Data from each participant were collated into hits and false alarms separately for each 
facial expression and judgement condition. A hit was defined as correctly identifying 
54 In practice, if the hit rate = 0.99 and the false alarm rate = 0.01, A ' asymptotes at approximately 1.00 
hence this value should be considered the effective ceiling for A'. 
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a genuine smile as 'happy', while a false alarm was defined as identifying either a 
neutral expression or a posed smile as 'happy'. The percentage of expression~ 
categorised as 'happy' as a function of expression type and judgement condition are 
displayed in Table 3. A visual inspection of these data suggest that smiles were more 
likely to have been classified as 'happy' when jUdging the emotion shown compared 
with the emotion felt as the majority of posed smiles were judged as reflecting 
happiness when judging the emotion shown, but not when judging the emotion felt. 
However, the majority of genuine smiles were classified as reflecting happiness 
regardless of presentation or judgment condition. Smiles with the teeth exposed (i.e. 
open mouth smiles) were more likely to have been classified as reflecting happiness 
than those without the teeth exposed, independent of smile veracity or judgment 
condition. Thus, at a descriptive level, there is some preliminary support for the 
hypothesised effects. It appears that participants were able to correctly attribute 
genuine, but not posed, smiles as reflecting happiness when jUdging the emotion felt 
by the target individual. 
Table 3: 
Percentage facial displays categorised as HAPPY by judgment condition and facial 
expression for Experiment 1 a. 
Judgement Condition 
SHOW FEEL TOTAL 
Facial expression (%happy) (%happy) (%happy) 
Neutral expression 1% 6% 4% 
Posed smile (closed mouth) 80% 47% 63% 
Posed smile (open mouth) 97% 62% 79% 
Genuine smile (closed mouth) 96% 81% 88% 
Genuine smile (open mouth) 100% 98% 99% 
Total 62%' 48% 55% 
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The frequency of hits and false alanns were converted to the associated rates of hits 
and false alarms by applying a correction recommended by Snodgrass and Corwin 
(1988).55 The resulting hit and false. alann rates were used to calculate measures of 
sensitivity (A ') and bias (B") by judgement condition for each participant using a non-
parametric approach (see Appendix H). The hit and false alann rates as well as the 
estimates of A' and B" are displayed in Table 4. 
Table 4: 
Mean hit (HIT) and false alann (FA) rates, and estimates of sensitivity (A') and bias 
(B") by judgment condition and smile type for Experiment 1a. 
HIT FA A' B" 
Judgement condition 
'Show' judgements 
Closed mouth smiles 0.86 0.30 0.86 -0.33 
Open mouth smiles 0.91 0040 0.86 -0.52 
'F eel' judgements 
Closed mouth smiles 0.75 0.19 0.86 0.06* 
Open mouth smiles 0.90 0.30 0.88 -0.32 
Note: Means with a * do not significantly differ from 0 (p > 0.05) using a single sample t-test. 
Sensitivity 
Mean estimates of A' were computed separately for the 'showing' and the 'feeling' 
judgement conditions and compared using repeated measures analysis of variance. As 
can be seen in Table 4, the level of sensitivity observed across all judgement 
conditions and target types was consistently in the range of 0.86-0.88, indicating that 
55 When the hit rate = I or the false alarm rate = 0, SDT analysis is not possible (values approach (0), 
hence Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) suggest routinely applying a correction formula to all data of this 
nature to permit calculation, e.g. hit rate = (#hits + 0.5) / (# relevant trials + 1). 
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p~rticipants could reliably detect happiness from facial expression.56 A 2 (smile type: 
closed mouth / open mouth) x 2 (judgement condition: show / feel) repeated measures 
ANOV A was conducted to assess the impact of the smile type and judgement 
condition (i.e. showing or feeling) on participant sensitivity to happiness as specified 
by facial expression. This revealed no significant effects indicating that sensitivity 
was consistent across all conditions. 
Bias 
The mean estimates of B" are shown in Table 4 by smile type and judgement 
condition.57 As can be seen, the level of bias exhibited by participants appears to vary 
between judgement conditions, with a tendency toward a greater likelihood to 
responding 'happy' when judging the emotion shown, compared to the emotion felt. 58 
To examine this effect more closely, a 2 (smile type: closed mouth / open mouth) x 2 
(judgement condition: show / feel) repeated measures ANOV A was conducted. This 
revealed that judgments of closed mouth smiles (MB" = -0.14) were less biased than 
judgments of open mouth smiles (MB" = -0.42), F(1,16) = 40.68,p < 0.01. 
Examination of the percentage of expressions classified as 'happy' shown in Table 3 
suggests that participants were more likely to classify an open mouth smile as happy 
than a closed mouth smile regardless of smile veracity or judgment condition. 
Furthermore, judgments of the emotion shown (MB" = -0.42) were more biased than 
56 For each condition, a single sample one-tailed t-test was used to compare the obtained value of A' 
with 0 (representing no sensitivity). All the t-tests revealed that the obtained A' was significantly 
different from 0, thereby indicating participants were indeed sensitive to happiness as specified by 
facial expression across all conditions. 
57 As stated above, the absolute value of B" indicates the magnitude of bias observed. Hence, bias 
scores can be interpreted in the same manner as correlation coefficients: the distance from 0 indicates 
the degree of bias, while the direction from 0 (i.e. a negative or positive value) indicates the direction 
of the bias. 
58 For each condition, a single sample one-tailed t-test was used to compare the obtained value of B" 
with 0 (representing no response bias). Only 'feel' judgments of closed mouth smiles did not exhibit 
any significant response bias. 
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judgments of the emotion felt (ME" = -0.13), F(1,16) = 14.21,p < 0.01. An 
examination of Table 3 suggests that participants were more likely to categorise any 
expression as 'happy' when judging the emotion shown compared with the emotion 
felt. 
These effects were qualified by a significant interaction between smile type and 
judgment condition, F(1,16) = 6.50,p < 0.05. As can be seen in Figure 2, judgments 
of the emotion felt when viewing closed mouth smiles were the least biased (ME" = 
0.06). When viewing open mouth smiles and judging the emotion felt (ME" = -0.32), 
or judging the emotion shown by either closed mouth smile displays (ME" -0.33) or 
open mouth smile displays (ME" = -0.52), significantly more bias was exhibited by 
participants, (Tukey a, p < 0.05). 
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Figure 2: Line graph of interaction between smile type and judgment condition for 
mean estimates of bias (B") for Experiment la. 
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No difference in bias was revealed between judgments of the emotion shown when 
viewing closed mouth smiles and the emotion felt when viewing open mouth smiles 
(Tukey a, n.s.), while judgments of the emotion shown when viewing open mouth 
smiles were accompanied by significantly more bias than any of the other conditions 
(Tukey a, p < 0.05). 
Discussion 
As predicted, the participants in Experiment 1 a revealed a very consistent level of 
sensitivity to happiness as specified by facial expression. Regardless of whether 
judgements were made on the basis of whether closed or open mouth smiles were 
being judged, or whether the emotion the target was showing or feeling was being 
judged, participants were able to detect information specifying positive affect from 
facial expressions. Also as anticipated, underlying these judgements were clear shifts 
in bias related to the nature of the judgement undertaken as well as the nature of the 
facial expression being judged. When judging the emotion shown, participants simply 
tended to be more likely to respond 'happy'. Furthermore, judgments of closed mouth 
smiles were accompanied by less bias than those of open mouth smiles. 
Thus, the data from Experiment 1 a appear to support the prediction that perceivers 
would be able to reliably detect the presence or absence of a positive emotional state 
from judgments of facial expressions. The level of sensitivity displayed by 
participants to information specifying happiness was consistent across all conditions 
indicating that the participants in this study were identifying emotional state in a 
systematic manner. Regardless of decision strategy or the nature of the facial displays 
being judged, participants demonstrated a propensity to associate happiness with 
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genuine smiles. The nature of the bias observed did, however, vary across judgement 
condition (i.e. show / feel) and target group (i.e. closed mouth / open mouth smiles). 
The differences in bias between the showing and feeling judgement conditions were 
in line with the intended shift in decision criterion. When judging the emotion shown, 
participants adopted a more lax decision criterion than when judging the emotion felt, 
resulting in a tendency to more readily identify expressions not specifying positive 
affect as 'happy'. It is likely that this effect was due to a trend to consider any smile, 
regardless of veracity, a display of happiness when considering the emotion shown by 
an individual. Furthermore, open mouth smiles where the teeth were visible tended to 
be categorised as 'happy' more frequently than closed mouth smiles regardless of 
smile veracity or judgement condition. This suggests that exposure of the teeth in the 
context of a smile-like expression resembles an expression of happiness more so than 
an equivalent closed mouth smile. In other words, in open mouth smiles, there is a 
less clear distinction between relevant and irrelevant information such that there is a 
greater tendency for false alarms when viewing open mouth posed smiles. On the 
other hand, for closed mouth smiles, the information relevant to a specification of 
happiness is somewhat amplified in the absence of the irrelevant information 
specified by the exposed teeth. Consistent with the suggestion posited by Frank et aI., 
(1993) that in terms of smile veracity, judgment accuracy can be enhanced under ideal 
conditions, the present data suggest that the emotional state of targets exhibiting 
closed mouth smiles is judged more accurately. 
The theoretical underpinnings for the levels of bias observed in the present study 
warrant further attention here. Broadly speaking, it appears as though the effects 
revealed with regard to bias are the result of two quite distinct sources of influence. 
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The effect of the smile type (i.e. closed or open mouth) judgment condition is clearly 
linked to the nature of the facial displays employed, that is, this is an information-
based influence. Alternatively, the effect for judgment condition derives from the 
instructions provided to participants. Tentatively, it is suggested that this effect 
appears to be due to different motivational bases for deciding which expressions 
reflect happiness and which do not. Kahneman (1973) has differentiated between 
different sources of bias likely to influence decision-making tasks such as that 
required in the present research. More specifically, Kahneman suggested that 
perceptual readiness and response readiness can be considered to be distinct, but 
related, sources of bias when performing judgment tasks. Perceptual readiness refers 
to the likelihood that a perceiver will select a specific interpretation of the information 
they are presented with. For instance, Kahneman provides an illustration of perceptual 
readiness with regard to the Ames distorted room,59 an environment constructed such 
that from a perceiver's viewpoint it appears rectangular (as a normal room would 
appear), but in fact is distorted. The issue here is that, from the specified viewpoint of 
the perceiver, there is no information that differentiates the distorted room from a 
regular room, yet perceivers unanimously see it as rectangular, not distorted. In this 
sense, perceivers are simply more likely to provide an interpretation of the 
information they are presented that is consistent with a prior expectation or experience 
(after all, environments such as the Ames distorted room are rarely encountered in 
normal day-to-day activity). That is, they are 'ready' to interpret ambiguous 
information in a manner consistent with the meaning given to similar, but 
unambiguous, information. Applied to the present research, it is suggested that the 
tendency of participants to be more likely to identify open mouth in comparison to 
59 Named after its inventor, Adelbert Ames. 
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closed mouth smiles as reflecting happiness, regardless of veracity, reflects an 
influence of perceptual readiness on bias in that the variability of judgments ~as 
directly related to the information available for acquisition rather than any 
motivational factors. The exposure of the teeth in the context of a smile, although 
ambiguous with regard to the veracity of the smile, was readily interpreted to reflect a 
positive emotional state. When this information was present, participants adopted a 
more lax criterion for identifying happiness resulting in posed smiles (with the teeth 
exposed) being incorrectly classified as 'happy'. 
Alternatively, response readiness reflects the likelihood of participants to select a 
particular response, again independent of the information present. Kahneman (1973) 
provides the example of a participant in a tachistoscope procedure who, although 
correctly identifies the word 'whore' when presented very briefly, reports seeing 
'whole', "lest his mind be thought dirty" (p.94). It is proposed that in the present 
research, the difference in bias revealed between judgments of the emotion shown and 
the emotion felt, was due to an effect of response readiness. Participants, potentially 
due to motivational factors associated with the judgment condition, were more willing 
to identify any facial expression, regardless of veracity, as reflecting happiness when 
judging the emotion shown compared to the emotion felt. Thus, it is assumed that in 
the present study, participants adopted a more lax criterion when judging the emotion 
shown. As a result, more posed smiles were identified as 'happy' than when the 
emotion felt was being judged. 
Finally, it should be noted that judgements made in this experiment were of static 
photographs while which, although having the ability to present clearly prototypic 
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facial displays, may suffer from a lack of generalis ability from the experimental 
procedure to actual social interaction, where we ordinarily see dynamically changing 
facial expressions. Therefore, the next experiment in this study was intended as a 
means to enhance the ecological validity of the present research by introducing 
dynamically presented facial displays. 
Experiment 1 b 
This experiment was essentially a replication of Experiment la, but with the facial 
displays presented dynamically using video rather than the static photographs, which 
were used in the previous experiment. The incorporation of dynamic facial 
expressions of emotion is an important addition to the current research. As discussed, 
proponents of the ecological approach to psychology advocate that information is best 
revealed in events; dynamic, temporally distributed transformations of objects in the 
environment. In regard to facial expressions of emotion, this view has received some 
support in the literature with Fridja (1953) and Harwood, Hall and Shinkfield (1999) 
reporting evidence for superior recognition of emotional state when viewing dynamic, 
as opposed to static facial expressions. The use of dynamic facial displays also offers 
a greater level of ecological validity to the present research. In general, facial 
expressions of emotion encountered during actual social interactions are dynamic, a 
property that needs to be preserved in laboratory-based research if the generalisability 
of results from the laboratory to the real world, is a desirable outcome. Thus, in light 
of the results of past research and the previous experiment, it is predicted that 
perceivers will be more sensitive to expressions of happiness when viewing dynamic 
compared to static representations of these facial displays. Further, it is also predicted 
that with the exception of overall sensitivity, the pattern of results obtained for 
Experiment 1 a will be consistent with that of the present experiment. 
Method 
Participants. 
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Participants in Experiment 1 b were 20 female students recruited from the University 
of Canterbury who had not participated in Experiment I a. They ranged in age from 17 
to 39 years (M = 22.4 years, SD = 5.6). Upon completion of the procedure each 
participant was given a $5 voucher redeemable at campus stores. 
Facial displays. 
The static facial displays employed in Experiment 1a were sourced from the video-
clips produced from the facial display generation procedure described in the previous 
chapter. To ensure consistency and comparability between Experiments 1a and 1b, the 
source video clips were used as the facial displays judged in the present experiment. 
The clips varied in duration between 9 and 10.5 seconds and were edited to include 
the onset, apex, and offset of the facial expression in question. The neutral facial 
expression clips did not include a beginning or end to the expression, but instead 
simply featured a relatively constant, expressionless face. In all other respects, 
including the groupings of closed and open mouth smiles, the facial displays used in 
the present experiment were identical to those employed in Experiment 1 a. 
To ensure that the facial displays selected for use in the present study were reliably 
coded as posed or genuine smiles, each expression was coded by another individual 
familiar with F ACS coding. Initially this revealed an agreement rate of 87.2%, 
however, after discussion, agreement was reached on all expressions. 
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All facial displays were digitally standardised for brightness and contrast using Adobe 
Premier software, compressed using a Microsoft MPEG4 V2 codec, and presented as 
full colour, 720x576 pixel, PAL video images displayed at 25 frames per second. 
Procedure. 
The procedure employed for the present experiment was identical to that of 
Experiment 1 a with one exception. Participants were instructed to wait until each 
video clip had finished (i.e. when the screen went blank) before they made their 
judgement. The entire procedure took approximately 30 minutes due to viewing time 
of the facial display videos being longer that that required for the static photograph 
displays employed in Experiment la. 
The experimental design, apparatus, and data analysis employed for the present 
experiment were identical to those employed in Experiment I a. 
Results 
As for Experiment 1 a, data from each participant were collated into hits and false 
alarms separately for each judgement condition. Table 5 displays the percentage of 
expressions categorised as 'happy' as a function of expression type and judgment 
condition. Inspection of these data suggest that, consistent with Experiment 1 a, smiles 
with the teeth exposed were more likely to be classified as 'happy' regardless of 
veracity, as were judgments of all expressions when the emotion shown, rather than 
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the emotion felt, was being judged. Again, at this descriptive level, there appears to be 
support for the prediction that when viewing videos of facial expressions, participants 
were able to accurately identify happiness, particularly when judging the emotion felt 
by the target individual. 
Table 5: 
Percentage facial displays categorised as HAPPY by judgment condition and facial 
expression for Experiment 1 b. 
Judgement Condition 
SHOW FEEL TOTAL 
Facial expression (%happy) (%happy) (%happy) 
Neutral expression 5% 7% 6% 
Posed smile (closed mouth) 86% 39% 63% 
Posed smile (open mouth) 81% 39% 60% 
Genuine smile (closed mouth) 89% 80% 84% 
Genuine smile (open mouth) 94% 88% 91% 
Total 59% 40% 50% 
The frequency of hits and false alarms were again converted to the associated rates of 
hits and false alarms by applying a correction recommended by Snodgrass and 
Corwin (1988). The resulting hit and false alarm rates were used to calculate measures 
of sensitivity (A ') and bias (B") by judgement condition for each participant using a 
non-parametric approach (see Appendix H). The hit and false alarm rates as well as 
the estimates of A ' and B " for Experiment 1 b are displayed in Table 6. 
Sensitivity 
Mean estimates of A' were computed separately for the 'showing' and the 'feeling' 
judgement conditions and compared using repeated measures analysis of variance. As 
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can be seen inTable 6, the level of sensitivity observed across all judgement 
conditions and target types was consistently in the range 0.83-0.856°, indicating that 
participants could reliably detect happiness when the facial displays were presented 
dynamically. A 2 (smile type: closed mouth / open mouth) x 2 (judgement condition: 
show / feel) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to assess the impact of the 
smile type and judgement condition on participant sensitivity to happiness as 
specified by facial expression. When judging from video, participants were more 
sensitive to happiness specified by facial expression when judging the emotion felt 
(MA' = 0.87) than when judging the emotion shown (MA' = 0.84), F(1,19) = 7.60,p < 
0.01. No significant effect was revealed for smile type (i.e. closed versus open 
mouth), nor was there any interaction between judgment condition and smile type. 
Table 6: 
Mean hit (HIT) and false alarm (FA) rates, and estimates of sensitivity (A') and bias 
(B") by judgment condition and smile type for Experiment 1 b. 
HIT FA A' B" 
Judgement condition 
'Show' judgements 
Closed mouth smiles 0.81 0.33 0.83 -0.24 
Open mouth smiles 0.88 0.37 0.85 -0.44 
'F eel' judgements 
Closed mouth smiles 0.74 0.16 0.87 0.11* 
Open mouth smiles 0.82 0.22 0.87 -0.12* 
Note: Means with a * do not significantly differ from 0 (p > 0.05) using a single sample one-tailed t-
test. 
60 For each condition, a single sample t-test was used to compare the obtained value of A' with 0 
(representing no sensitivity). All the t-tests revealed that the obtained A' was significantly different 
from 0, thereby indicating participants were indeed sensitive to happiness as specified by facial 
expression across all conditions. 
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Bias 
The mean estimates of B " for judgements of the dynamically presented facial displays 
are shown in Table 6 by smile type and judgement condition. As can be seen, again 
the level of response bias exhibited by participants appears to vary between 
judgement condition, with a tendency toward a greater likelihood to responding 
'happy' when judging the emotion shown, compared to the emotion felt. 61 To 
examine this effect more closely, a 2 (smile type: closed mouth / open mouth) x 2 
Gudgement condition: show / feel) repeated measures ANOV A was conducted. 
Judgments of closed mouth smiles (MB" = -0.07) were less biased that judgments of 
open mouth smiles (MB" = -0.26), F(1,19) = 22.55,p < 0.01. Furthermore, judgments 
ofthe emotion shown (MB" = -0.33) were accompanied by more bias than judgments 
ofthe emotion felt (MB" = 0.00), F(1,19) = 21.03,p < 0.01. No significant interaction 
effect was revealed. 
Discussion 
The pattern of results revealed in the present study closely resembled that found in 
Experiment 1 a. Participants consistently demonstrated an ability to detect the 
presence of positive affect from dynamic facial expressions. In addition, in the present 
experiment, when participants were judging the emotion felt from dynamically 
presented facial displays they exhibited more sensitivity to information specifying 
positive affect than when jUdging the emotion shown. Again, as found for the 
previous experiment, underlying these judgements were systematic changes in bias. 
Specifically, in the present study participants demonstrated a tendency to be more 
likely to identify any given expression as 'happy' when judging the emotion shown 
61 For each condition, a single sample t-test was used to compare the obtained value of B" with 0 
(representing no response bias). For 'feel' judgments of both closed and open mouth smiles no 
significant response bias was exhibited. 
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compared to the emotion felt. Furthermore, judgements of targets displaying closed 
mouth smiles were less biased than jUdgements of open mouth smiles. These .results 
mirror closely those reported for Experiment 1 a. 
Overall, Experiment 1 b can be seen to replicate the findings of the previous 
experiment in that participants demonstrated a consistent ability to identify the 
presence or absence of positive emotional state from facial expressions. The 
additional finding that when judging the emotion felt participants were more sensitive 
to information specifying happiness than when judging the emotion shown reflects the 
lower rate of false alarms for the feeling (F Aleel = 0.19) compared to the showing 
(FAsholl' = 0.35) judgment condition (see Table 6). Participants were more likely to 
correctly categorise a posed smile as 'not happy' when judging the emotion felt. 
Furthermore, the effects of smile type and judgment condition on bias were also 
consistent between Experiments la and lb. Specifically, consistent with Kahneman's 
(1973) notion of perceptual readiness, participants were more willing to categorise a 
smile that exposed the teeth as happy than a smile that did not expose the teeth. 
Participants were also more likely to consider any expression as reflecting happiness 
when judging the emotion shown compared with the emotion felt. Hence, overall the 
results of Experiments 1 a and 1 b suggest that perceivers can distinguish between 
facial expressions that do and do not specify happiness. 
Comparison Between Experiments 1 a and 1 b 
Additional analyses were conducted to compare the observed levels of sensitivity and 
response bias between the static and dynamic modes of facial display presentation 
(i.e. Experiments la and Ib). Although these experiments were conducted separately, 
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efforts were made to ensure that they were identical in respect to method and 
procedure, with the exception of mode of presentation, to permit direct statistical 
comparison. Importantly, as described above, the static facial displays used in 
Experiment la were sourced from the dynamic displays used in Experiment Ib as the 
use of distinct facial displays would limit the comparability between the two studies. 
Sensitivity. 
A 2 (presentation mode: static / dynamic) x 2 (smile type: closed mouth / open mouth) 
x 2 (judgement condition: show / feel) ANOV A with repeated measures on the second 
and third factors was conducted to compare sensitivity across presentation modes. No 
significant effect was revealed for presentation mode, F (1,35) = 1.19,p = 0.28, 
indicating that overall, there was no difference in sensitivity to information specifying 
happiness when the facial displays were presented as static photographs compared to 
when the same facial displays were presented dynamically using video. Furthermore, 
there were no significant interactions between presentation mode and smile type or 
judgment condition. 
Bias. 
A 2 (presentation mode: static / dynamic) x 2 (smile type: closed mouth / open mouth) 
x 2 (judgement condition: show / feel) ANOV A with repeated measures on the second 
and third factors was conducted to compare bias across presentation modes. This 
revealed a main effect for presentation mode, F (1,35) = 5.46,p < 0.05. A comparison 
of the mean level of bias for each respective presentation condition (see Tables 4 and 
6) revealed that judgments made from photographs (MB" = -0.28) were accompanied 
by more bias than judgments made from videos (MB" = -0.17). No interactions 
between presentation mode and smile type or judgment condition were revealed. 
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In regard to the comparison between Experiments 1a and 1 b, that is statically and 
dynamically presented facial displays, the prediction that dynamic presentation would 
result in an enhanced ability to distinguish posed from genuine smiles was not 
supported. No difference in sensitivity was observed between Experiments 1a and lb. 
However, response bias was shown to differ between the two experiments. 
Participants judging happiness from dynamically presented facial expressions 
exhibited less response bias than those viewing the expressions presented as static 
photographs. 
General Discussion 
The present study was intended to replicate and extend the research reported by Frank 
et al. (1993) concerning perceiver sensitivity to the presence of positive affect as 
specified by facial expression. A number of methodological improvements were made 
compared to the experimental procedure employed by Frank et al., including using a 
specially constructed set of ecologically valid facial displays (see Chapter 3 for 
details), adapting the testing conditions to more closely resemble actual social 
interactions by requiring participants to detect emotional state rather than judge smile 
veracity, and adopting a signal-detection approach to the experimental design and 
analysis of results. 
The results from the present study suggest that perceivers were able to reliably detect 
the presence or absence of a positive emotional state when viewing both static and 
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dynamic facial expressions. This effect is in line with the theoretical arguments for the 
functionality of such sensitivity for the social perceiver as outlined in earlier chapters, 
and with the results reported by Frank et al. (1993). The informational content of the 
three facial expressions employed in the present research (i.e. neutral expressions, 
posed smiles and genuine smiles) was sufficient for perceivers to be able to reliably 
determine the presence or absence of a positive emotional state. Although such 
sensitivity was generally accompanied by some degree of response bias, this was not 
completely unexpected. Given that two-thirds of the facial displays participants saw 
were smiles of some form, and, consistent with a positivity bias (Miller & Felicio, 
1990) smiles of any description may tend to be commonly associated with happiness 
generically (Abel, 2002), it is not unexpected that a bias in the form of a greater 
willingness for participants to respond 'happy' would be shown. 
Of note, however, is that under some circumstances, sensitivity to positive affect was 
observed in the absence of any appreciable bias. When judging the emotion felt, 
judgments of closed mouth smiles were shown to be accurate and unbiased. A lack of 
information irrelevant to the specification of happiness (such as the exposure of the 
teeth during a smile), and an instruction to judge the emotion felt led participants to be 
able to correctly identify posed smiles (and neutral expressions) as not reflecting 
happiness, but genuine smiles as reflecting this emotion. It is suggested that these 
findings can be considered consistent with the claim by Frank et al. that amplification 
of the 'signal' strength of a genuine smile facilitates identification of smile veracity, 
or in the case of the present research, the detection of happiness. Allowing 
participants to view the full duration of each expression using video appeared to 
provide additional information pertinent to the jUdgment task at hand so that less 
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biased judgments were observed for this condition. Indeed, of the morphological 
differences between posed and genuine smiles (see Chapter 1 for details), only the 
Duchenne marker (i.e. contraction of orbicularis oculi) and indications of symmetry 
are available for perception from static photographs, while by comparison dynamic 
displays additionally include information regarding the duration and ballistic course 
of the expression (i.e. transition from onset to apex to offset). Therefore, it appears 
that the additional information specifying emotional state made available when facial 
expressions were presented dynamically was used by participants to facilitate 
detection of positive affect. This finding is clearly in line with predictions derived 
from an ecological approach to psychology whereby it is advocated that information 
is best revealed in events, in this case expressions, that unfold over time rather than 
represented as static, albeit prototypic, facial configurations. 
In summary, the findings ofthe present research provide evidence that the social 
perceiver is able to accurately detect positive affect as specified by facial expression. 
Information specific to positive affect was discriminable from that not specific to this 
emotional state, but morphologically similar. That is, the characteristics of a genuine 
smile provided sufficient task-relevant information for perceivers to be able to 
reliably identify positive emotional state. Significantly, this study provides the first 
rigorous account of the sensitivity of the perceiver to the properties that structure 
information to specify the presence or absence of positive emotional experience by 
means of facial expression. 
However, participants in this study were directly instructed to judge emotional state, 
an activity that is not particularly representative of a normal social interaction. By 
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drawing attention specifically to emotional state, participants may have been led to 
attend to aspects of the target's behaviour and appearance in a different, perhaps more 
thorough, mamler than they otherwise might when engaging in an actual interaction. 
Indeed, this task essentially implies a tacit knowledge of positive emotional states 
(and how these may be specified physiognomically) that is called on by participants 
when making the judgments required. Therefore, it is difficult to be confident in 
generalising from the sensitivity to indications of emotional state shown in the present 
study, to real-world interactions when individuals are unlikely to be judging 
expression veracity or emotional state as explicitly or carefully. The next study in the 
present research is intended therefore to assess perceivers sensitivity to the difference 
between posed and genuine smiles in a manner that does not draw attention 
specifically to the nature of the judgement required. 
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CHAPTERS 
Sensitivity to Emotional State Specified by Posed and Genuine Smiles 
In the previous chapter evidence was presented to support the notion that the social 
perceiver is sensitive to the differences between posed and genuine smiles. 
Specifically, it was shown that perceivers can reliably detect the presence or absence 
of positive affect when viewing photographs or video-clips of individuals displaying 
posed smiles, genuine smiles, or not showing any facial expression of emotion. 
However, the conditions under which participants made their emotion judgements 
were somewhat conducive to accuracy and removed from the reference situation of an 
actual interaction. Participants were explicitly instructed to judge emotional state in a 
tightly controlled laboratory context under optimal viewing conditions and without 
any particular time pressures or distractions. While it is not suggested that the results 
of Experiments 1 a and I b were artefacts of any of these factors, the nature of the 
procedures employed prevents any firm conclusions being drawn regarding perceiver 
sensitivity to smile veracity during actual social interaction. In particular, the 
requirement to overtly judge emotional state, albeit the basis for these studies, is not 
representative of real-world interactions where such explicit judgements are unlikely 
due to the complex, often multimodal nature of social exchange. During interaction, 
the social perceiver is not ordinarily in the practice of making overt, distinct 
judgments of facial expression, emotional state or any other such qualities. Rather, 
consistent with an ecological approach to psychology, the social perceiver is assumed 
to be attuned to the affordances of their environment. In this sense, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, facial expressions themselves are not affordances, they merely structure 
the ambient array in a manner that specifies an affordance to an attuned observer. 
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Hence, drawing participants' attention directly to judgements of emotional state may 
lead to different perceptual outcomes than would occur without such directio~1, or 
more generally, during actual social interactions. Thus, although Experiments 1a and 
I b provided clear evidence that the social perceiver can be sensitive to positive affect 
as specified by facial expression, it remains to be seen whether such sensitivity is 
manifest without explicit instruction to judge emotional state. This chapter will report 
a study that investigated whether perceivers were sensitive to the difference in 
emotional state as specified by posed and genuine smiles when they were not 
specifically instructed to make judgements of emotional state. 
Previous Research Investigating Sensitivity to Smile Veracity 
In a follow-up to the study reviewed in the previous chapter, Frank, Ekman and 
Friesen (1993, study 3) investigated the nature of impressions formed of individuals 
displaying posed or genuine smiles. Participants viewed videos of 20 individuals 
displaying either posed or genuine smiles62 and subsequently made ratings of each 
individual on fifteen 7-point rating scales, each anchored by a bipolar personality-
emotion adjective pair63. Frank et al. reasoned that this approach more closely 
resembled an interaction situation compared to when participants were required to 
make explicit judgments of smile type. Their results revealed that impressions of 
individuals expressing genuine smiles were generally more positive compared with 
impressions of those expressing posed smiles. Furthermore, in regard to the individual 
facial displays, the more accurately a given individual's posed and genuine smiles 
62 Two versions of the video were employed so that each participant saw only one smile (either posed 
or genuine) from each individual. The facial displays were identical to those used in the second study 
reported by Frank et al. (1993) and described in detail in Chapter 4. 
63 Specifically, ratings were made along the dimensions: outgoing-inhibited, expressive-unexpressive, 
sociable-withdrawn, calm-agitated, natural-awkward, stable-unstable, relaxed-tense, honest-dishonest, 
sincere-insincere, trustworthy-untrustworthy, dominant-submissive, likable-unlikable, felt pleasant-felt 
unpleasant, act pleasant-act unpleasant and genuine-sarcastic. 
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were identified in the explicit judgment task (i.e. Frank et al. study 2), the more 
positive their genuine smile was rated compared to their posed smile in the impression 
formation study (i.e. Frank et al. study 3). The authors suggested that the same factors 
that contributed to the identifiability of posed and genuine smiles when making 
explicit judgments (i.e. salience of orbicularis oculi) were also associated with more 
positive impressions of an individual displaying a genuine smile compared to a posed 
smile. Therefore, they concluded, the signal value of the markers of a genuine smile 
extends beyond explicit judgements of smile veracity to also impact on impressions 
formed of individuals on the basis of their facial expressions. 
While the approach adopted by Frank et al. (1993) of attempting to enhance the 
ecological validity of their findings by employing an experimental procedure intended 
to more closely resemble an actual interpersonal interaction is to be applauded, a 
number of factors remain which threaten such validity. As described, explicitly 
instructing participants to judge smile veracity does not approximate well to the 
general nature of social interaction and engagement. Under normal circumstances the 
social perceiver will not make such deliberate and constrained discriminations. Thus, 
a methodological concern with regard to the research reported by Frank et al. remains, 
namely the explicit instruction to judge various personality traits. In the same manner 
that the perceiver is unlikely to make considered judgements of smile veracity when 
interacting with others, explicit judgements of personality traits are also somewhat 
unrealistic (Baron & Boudreau, 1987; Baron & Misovich, 1993; McArthur & Baron, 
1983). In short, the method employed by Frank et al. retains the demand of 
participants to make evaluations of others that are unlikely to occur during normal 
social interaction. 
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Although social perceivers are attuned to information specifying relevant 
dispositional qualities of conspecifics in terms of social affordances, overt judgements 
of personality traits do not adequately simulate the nature of this relationship between 
the perceiver and their environment. As discussed in Chapter 2, affordances and traits 
are not interchangeable terms (Baron & Misovich, 1993; McArthur & Baron, 1983). 
Traits are abstract properties that must be inferred from appearance, behaviour or 
even other traits (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), whereas social affordances can be perceived 
directly in that they present as real, tangible opportunities for interaction. Baron and 
Misovich (1993) express this distinction in terms of traits being "thingless properties 
that must be inferred" (p. 541), compared with affordances being "propertied things 
that can be perceived directly" (p. 541). Affordances, in this sense, are lawfully linked 
to disposition (e.g. affective state) in a manner that systematically structures the 
ambient array (e.g. smile type) such that information is available for perception. By 
comparison, traits rely on the constructive process of the perceiver to interpret such 
characteristics based on their existing knowledge and beliefs. In addition, in contrast 
to social affordances, traits fail to capture the individualised nature of the actor-
environment system (McArthur & Baron, 1983). Presumably, the degree to which one 
is perceived, for example, as outgoing64 is dependent on a multitude of factors, some 
of which pertain to the perceiver. In a trait sense therefore, an extreme introvert is not 
likely to perceive the outgoingness of a given individual in the same manner as an 
extreme extrovert. Social affordances, on the other hand, are inherent to the perceiver 
because, by definition, an affordance is specified by properties of the environment 
relative to the properties of the individual. That is, affordances are individualised. 
Characterising social perception as a global phenomenon, bereft of individual 
64 Or more correctly, whether one is perceived as affording the opportunities for interaction that an out-
going person has. 
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differences, as implied when using traits to approximate the dispositional properties of 
interaction partners, does not adequately reflect the reciprocal, mutualistic nature of 
psychological activity advanced by proponents of the ecological approach. Therefore, 
in line with the present commitment to a realist account of social perception, 
evaluating personality traits by using predetermined adjective-pairs, appears to be 
fundamentally distinct from the general activity of spontaneously forming 
impressions, or more specifically, detecting the social affordances of a particular 
social interaction. Thus, with regard to the impression formation study reported by 
Frank et al. (1993, study 3), it is questionable whether the procedure employed 
(making explicit ratings of personality traits) adequately represents the nature of real-
world interactions. 
A handful of other studies investigating aspects of perceiver sensitivity to the 
differences between posed and genuine smiles have also been reported in the 
literature. Among these, Surakka and Hietanen (1998) examined, what they termed, 
facial and emotional responses to posed and genuine smiles. Participants were 
required to report their emotional and empathic experiences after viewing static 
photographs of neutral expressions, posed smiles, and genuine smiles. Muscular 
contractions of the face were also measured using facial EMG as a means to explore 
the nature of any mimicry by participants of the facial displays observed. Specifically, 
contractions of orbicularis oculi (FACS AU6) and zygomatic major (FACS AU12) 
were monitored while the participant viewed the smiles. Surakka and Hietanen 
reported that facial EMG recordings in both the eye and cheek regions were 
significantly stronger (i.e. greater intensity of muscle contraction) when viewing 
genuine smiles compared to neutral expressions, but no such difference was found 
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when comparing posed smiles and neutral expressions. Furthermore, participants 
reported feeling more positive after viewing genuine smiles, which in tum, was 
positively correlated with ratings of empathy. Overall, it appears that participants in 
this study mimicked genuine smiles with genuine smiles,65 but did not mimic posed 
smiles any differently to neutral expressions. Moreover, participants reported feeling 
more positive and empathic toward an individual expressing a genuine smile 
compared to those displaying either posed smiles or neutral expressions. However, 
these findings should be interpreted with caution as the facial displays employed by 
Suraldm and Hietanen contained a methodological flaw. To generate the facial 
displays, "a male and a female actor were guided to produce three static facial 
expressions" (p.25), thereby essentially producing a simulated genuine smile, an 
approach, as described in Chapter 3, that falls somewhat short of the criteria required 
for adequate ecologically valid facial displays. Furthermore, visual inspection of these 
facial expressions suggests noticeable differences in the relative intensities of the 
posed and genuine smiles. For the female actor the intensity of zygomatic major 
contraction was slightly greater for the genuine smile compared to the posed smile, 
while this difference was more pronounced for the male actor.66 As a result, it is 
unclear whether the differences in participant responses were due to smile veracity, 
smile intensity, or some artefact of employing simulated genuine smiles as facial 
displays. 
65 Or, at least, the muscles involved with genuinely smiling were recruited when viewing genuine 
smiles. 
66 FACS ratings of intensity of AU 12 taken from a reproduction of Surakka & Hietenan's original 
facial displays (fidelity of these photographs was low, hence intensity ratings were approximations 
only) indicate that for the female actor, posed smile = AU l2C, genuine smile = AU 12D, while for the 
male actor, posed smile = AU l2B, genuine smile = AU l2D. FACS intensity ratings range from A 
(trace) to E (maximum). 
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In contrast to the laboratory studies reviewed to this point, Scherer and Ceschi (2000) 
provided support for the notion that perceivers are sensitive to the meaningful 
differences between posed and genuine smiles using evidence derived from a 
naturalistic setting. These authors conducted an observational study at a major 
international airport study whereby they sUlTeptitiously identified and subsequently 
videotaped airline passengers whose luggage had failed to alTive. The authors 
reasoned that this situation is likely to induce a spontaneous emotional reaction in 
most people, and thus has high ecological validity for studying the expression and 
recognition of everyday emotional responses. One of the key factors investigated in 
this study was the impressions of the passengers formed by the airline staff who 
assisted them with the lost baggage claims. After dealing with each passenger, the 
staff member, who was blind to the purposes of the study, was asked to rate that 
passenger's emotional state. The video tapes of each passenger were also examined 
for the OCCUlTence and frequency of posed and genuine smiles. The authors reported a 
positive relationship between the incidence of genuine smiles exhibited by passengers 
with lost luggage and ratings of their mood made by the airline agents. Importantly, 
the frequency of posed smiles exhibited was not related to the perceptions of 
passenger's mood. In effect, this finding partially replicates the results from Frank et 
al. 's impression formation study, as well as the findings from Experiments 1 a and 1 b 
in the present research, as the airline agents displayed sensitivity to the difference 
between posed and genuine smiles when making explicit ratings of emotional state. 
Passengers who exhibited more genuine smiles were perceived to be in better moods 
than those who expressed fewer genuine smiles, while the expression of posed smiles 
was not related to perceived emotional state. 
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In many important ways, these findings provide some of the most convincing 
evidence to date to indicate that social perceivers are in fact sensitive to the 
meaningful differences between posed and genuine smiles. The smiles were expressed 
spontaneously during the course of actual social interaction, without the knowledge 
that video recordings, or other observations, were being made. The airline staff were 
permitted to perceive actively (compared with the imposition of tightly controlled 
visual information common to many laboratory-based procedures), while engaging in 
their general day-to-day workplace activities unaware of the purposes of the study. A 
naturalistic setting for both the production and perception of facial displays of 
emotion such as this provides high levels of ecological validity and, hence, strong 
grounds to generalise the findings from the research context to social interactions 
more generally. However, as mentioned previously, the requirement for the airline 
staff to make explicit ratings of emotional state of the passengers may not resemble 
the more spontaneous detection of social affordances advocated here. In addition, the 
general nature of correlational studies precludes the drawing of firm conclusions due 
to the inability to control for the effects of extraneous variables.67 While Scherer and 
Ceschi's study represents many of the factors required for a valid demonstration of 
the sensitivity of the social perceiver to the meaningful differences between posed and 
genuine smiles, the lack of experimental control combined with the requirement to 
explicitly judge emotional state, suggests that any definitive conclusions regarding 
this sensitivity remain elusive. 
67 Perhaps, for example, an alternative explanation for these findings could be the following. A halo 
effect moderated the interaction between the staff and the passengers such that more attractive 
passengers received better treatment from the airline staff which in turn helped relieve the stress and 
anxiety of losing their luggage, induce positive mood and thereby lead to a greater incidence of genuine 
smiles. In this hypothetical case, general attractiveness, rather than facial expression may have been 
driving any effects observed. Of course, attractiveness and genuine smiling may be strongly related, in 
which case the interaction between passengers and staff becomes more complex again. Overall, it may 
have been better for Scherer and Ceschi (2000) to also examine more behavioural measures such as the 
spontaneous expressions of the staff, or the time spent attending to each passenger as more infonnative 
indices of their impressions. 
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Finally, Williams, Senior, David, Loughland and Gordon (2001) reported res.earch 
that, while not examining the nature of perceiver sensitivity to posed and genuine 
smiles directly, provided further evidence that such a phenomenon may exist. These 
authors investigated the visuo-cognitive strategies underlying the perception of facial 
expressions. By tracking eye-fixations of participants viewing photographs of neutral, 
sad, and happl8 facial expressions these authors were able to determine whether 
perceivers attend differently to each expression. Williams et al. reported that, 
compared to neutral and sad facial expressions, perceivers made proportionately more 
and longer fixations to the outer comers of the eye when viewing happy faces. Given 
that this is the specific location on the face where indicators of genuine smiling occur 
(i.e. the Duchenne marker), it appears that when a generic smile is detected (most 
probably by the presence of zygomatic major contraction), attention is shifted 
specifically to the area around the eyes where the contraction of orbicularis oculi is 
most visible, potentially as a means of establishing the veracity of the expression. No 
parallel 'eye-checking' strategy was found for either neutral or sad facial expressions. 
The ocular dynamics examined in the Williams et al. study are unlikely to be the 
product of deliberate eye movements, rather, as the authors suggest, the fixation 
pattems reported provide preliminary evidence for an evolved perceptual strategy to 
specifically distinguish between posed and genuine smiles. Although aspects of this 
research (e.g. static facial displays, eye-tracking equipment etc.) do not approximate 
the context of real-world interactions well, the fact that participants were not provided 
with any explicit instructions, rating tasks or other goals, and yet showed pattems of 
ocular behaviour conducive to a perceptual sensitivity to the differences between 
68 It is unclear what type of smiles (e.g. posed or genuine) were employed by Williams et al. (2001), 
however, the nature of the results suggest that such a pattern of eye-fixations will pertain to any smile, 
regardless of veracity. 
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posed and genuine smiles, offers support for the claim that the perceiver will exhibit 
such sensitivity during social interaction. 
To summarise, the research reviewed to this point provides further support for the 
claim that social perceivers can be sensitive to the meaningful differences between 
posed and genuine smiles. Impressions of individuals expressing genuine smiles 
appear to be more positive relative to those expressing posed smiles (Frank et al. 
1993; Scherer & Ceschi, 2000), while perceivers also reported feeling more empathic 
towards an individual exhibiting a genuine smile compared to a posed smile (Surakka 
& Hietanen, 1998) and show patterns of ocular dynamics advantageous to such 
sensitivity to smile veracity (Williams et al. 2001). However, although these studies 
offer greater ecological validity than the research reported in the previous chapter, 
whereby participants were required to explicitly judge smile type, factors inherent to 
each study that do not approximate well to actual social interactions, remain. In 
particular, it is suggested that requiring participants to make explicit ratings of 
personality traits does not map well to the spontaneous detection of social affordances 
advocated within the ecological approach to psychology. In this sense, it is important 
that any laboratory demonstration of sensitivity to the differences between posed and 
genuine smiles be carried out under conditions that pertain to the task-relevant context 
in which such sensitivity would normally be manifest. Importantly, any input from the 
researcher that is not a corollary to the reference situation (e.g. a real-world social 
interaction) jeopardises the extent to which findings can be applied and generalised 
beyond the laboratory. The remainder of this chapter reports the second study in the 
present program of research, which was intended to examine sensitivity to the 
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differences between posed and genuine smiles, when the participants are not provided 
with an explicit task, goal, or judgement criteria. 
The Present Research 
Evidence was presented in the previous chapter to suggest that the social perceiver 
can, when directed to make explicit judgments, reliably detect the presence or absence 
of positive emotional state as specified by facial expression. Although these findings 
represent the first systematic account of such sensitivity, the methods employed 
preclude generalisation to actual social interactions where this form of explicit 
decision making is not likely to occur. Furthermore, in the present chapter a number 
of studies were reviewed that examined factors relevant to the sensitivity of perceivers 
to differences between posed and genuine smiles without drawing participants' 
attention toward concepts of smile type or veracity. However, as discussed, these 
studies also tended to suffer from procedures that do not approximate well to the 
reference situation of an actual social interaction. Most notably, employing concepts 
of personality traits as a means of knowing disposition, and again requiring 
participants to make considered, overt judgments does not approximate well to social 
interaction in a natural setting. As a result, although the research discussed to this 
point indicates, without exception, that perceivers are sensitive to smile veracity, no 
single study has been undertaken without experimenter-imposed constraints that do 
not pertain to normal interaction. Consequently, there is insufficient evidence to 
assume that when engaging in actual social interactions perceivers can reliably detect 
the presence or absence of a positive emotional state by means of distinguishing 
posed from genuine smiles. To reiterate, it is important that the researcher understands 
the properties of the environment available for perception in concert with the 
170 
sensitivity of the perceiver to such properties before the relationship between the 
individual and their environment can be studied in a more ecological manner. While 
there are clear morphological distinctions available to the perceiver to specify smile 
veracity, the existing evidence regarding perceiver sensitivity to these distinctions, 
lacks applicability. The present study is intended to examine the sensitivity of 
perceivers to the distinction between posed and genuine smiles when not constrained 
by experimental requirements to view the facial expressions with any particular 
purpose or goal. To this end, a priming methodology was employed for the present 
study. The next section of this chapter outlines the theoretical background for these 
methods and provides a critique of the priming literature from a functional ecological 
perspective. 
Priming, Automaticity, and Affect 
A topic that has received considerable attention within the contemporary social 
perception literature is the study of automaticity and priming effects. Principally, this 
area of research is concerned "with the ways that internal mental states mediate, in a 
passive and hidden manner, the effects of the social environment on psychological 
processes and responses" (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000, p.254). The emphasis here is on 
the supposedly passive nature of the perceiver, whereby features of the environment 
are involuntarily processed by the cognitive system "without any mediation by 
conscious choice or reflection" (Bargh, 1997, p.2). Typically, researchers in this field 
study the elicitation of responses (e.g. attitudes, affect, goals, and behaviours) to 
stimuli presented either outside of conscious awareness (e.g. subliminal/suboptimal 
priming) or surreptitiously (e.g. tasks completed, ostensibly, as part of another 
experiment). Claims are then made regarding the seemingly 'automatic', 'non-
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conscious' impact the priming stimuli had on the outcome variable(s) of interest, of 
which, importantly, the participant had no knowledge. 
The literature contains an abundance of examples of primed automatic behaviour, a 
number of which have investigated the perception of emotion, and specifically, the 
influence of affective primes on behaviour. For example, Murphy and Zajonc (1993) 
asked participants to make valence ratings of various novel Chinese ideographs, each 
of which was preceded by a photograph, presented extremely briefly (4 ms), of an 
individual either smiling69 or frowning. Ideographs that had been preceded by a smile 
were rated more positively than those that had been preceded by a frown. Participants 
did not report noticing the presence of the facial expression and, in fact, were unable 
to accurately distinguish the faces used as primes from other faces not used in the 
experimental procedure, indicating that their evaluations were not deliberate or 
conscious responses to the presented primes. Dimberg, Thunberg and Elmehed (2000) 
also exposed participants very briefly (30 ms) to photographs of facial expressions 
while recording the activity of muscles in the face using EMG. Consistent with the 
results reported by Surakka and Hietanen (1998) discussed above, Dimberg et al. 
found that participants spontaneously contracted facial muscles specific to the 
expression they had been exposed to,1° even though they were unable to explicitly 
report the nature of the expression. Finally, in a recent study Ravaja, Kallinen, Saari 
and Keltikangas-larvinen (2004) embedded photographs of happy, angry, or neutral 
facial expressions into video clips of news items. Each news clip (mean duration 51 s) 
contained a photograph inserted at 6 different points (at 2 s, 11 s, 19 s, 31 s, 40 sand 
69 Although it is unclear from the details provided, it appears as though Murphy and Zajonc (1993) 
employed photographs of posed smiles in this study. 
70 Specifically, greater activity of the zygomatic major was observed when exposed to a happy face, 
while greater activity of the corrugator supercilii (a muscle involved with frowning), was observed 
when exposed to an angry face. 
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50 s). The photograph was substituted for one frame of the news clip at each point 
such that when the clip was played at normal speed (50 frames per second), the 
photograph remained on the screen for approximately 20 ms. Participants viewing the 
news clips did not notice the embedded photographs, but did show evidence that these 
photographs had influenced their perceptions of the clips. News clips that contained 
happy face photographs were accompanied by a higher level of activity of both the 
zygomatic major and orbicularis oculi muscles of the perceivers, and were rated as 
more positive, trustworthy, and interesting than those containing neutral faces. 
In a sense, priming studies provide an index for determining the sensitivity of the 
perceiver to specific environmental properties. The empirical effects derived from the 
experimental methodologies collectively considered to be studies of priming and 
automaticity such as those described above, tend to show a coherency between the 
objects of perception and the performance of the perceiver. Individuals tailor their 
actions to meet the requirements and opportunities of their environment, even when, 
as demonstrated by priming and automaticity research, no deliberate strategies to do 
so can be observed. For instance, given the adaptive benefit, it is hardly surprising 
that detection of an emotional expression is accompanied by action related to the 
meaning of that expression, regardless of whether the perceiver can subsequently 
describe, or even recognise the expression. On the other hand, it would be surprising 
if such effects were found when presented with a less meaningful display, perhaps, for 
example, an arbitrary shape or pattern. It is suggested that within the context of 
priming methodologies, sensitivity to particular environmental properties may 
potentially be indexed by systematically varying the nature of the referent for 
perception, while measuring performance relevant to the referent using a common 
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metric. An immediate advantage of employing a methodology of this type is that 
sensitivity can potentially be measured without drawing the participants' attention to 
certain features of the world to be examined, thereby preserving an important feature 
of actual social interaction. 
Thus, employing a priming methodology may be a suitable approach to meet the 
requirements of the present study, that is, to examine the sensitivity of perceivers to 
the distinction between posed and genuine smiles without an explicit requirement to 
judge emotional state. Given that robust effects relevant to the perception of smiles 
have been reported within the priming literature (e.g. Dimberg et aI., 2000; Murphy & 
Zajonc, 1993; Ravaja et aI., 2004), it is suggested that if perceivers are in fact 
sensitive to the meaningful differences between posed and genuine smiles, when 
primed with these expressions, such sensitivity may be manifest in terms of distinct 
outcomes relevant to the meaning of each expression. However, it is clear from the 
outset that priming and automaticity research, particularly in terms of the inherent 
explanatory focus on the automated, mediational role of cognition, may not be 
conducive to an ecological account of psychology. Hence, further consideration of 
priming and automaticity effects in terms of the ecological approach is warranted 
prior to employing such procedures. 
Priming, Automaticity, and Ecological Psychology 
Typically, the explanations offered for priming effects call into play cognitive-
mediational notions regarding, for instance, the automatic activation of mental 
representations (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998), attitudes (Fazio, 
Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986), affective reactions (Murphy & Zajonc, 
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1993), stereotypes (Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby, 2002), trait constructs (Bargh, Chen, 
& Burrows, 1996) and thoughts (Anderson, Benjamin, & Bartholow, 1998) t? explain 
the hidden mental operations that take place to produce the apparently unintended 
outcomes observed. Within this literature, it is typically suggested that primed mental 
processes are activated without any conscious intervention from the individual. That 
is, they result from the mere presence of relevant environmental stimuli (i.e. priming 
stimuli). In tum these mental processes are manifest in terms of similarly relevant 
responses (i.e. the primed behaviour or response), again without any intentional action 
on the part of the individual. Obviously, such mechanistic theorising is antithetical to 
the ecological approach to psychology (see Chapter 2). Not only do these 
explanations rest on the constructivist mentalism inherent to the dominant, 
information processing approach to social perception, but they also characterise the 
perceptual system as a linear stimulus-response mechanism, (potentially) 
'programmed' to respond to various environmental cues or stimuli.7l 
Furthermore, a unifying feature of the experimental effects collectively considered to 
be demonstrations of automaticity (see Bargh, 1997) is the claim that, in these 
settings, perception occurs without awareness.72 To proponents of an ecological 
approach to psychology, this claim is a clear misnomer. From the ecological 
perspective, to perceive, that is to detect or acquire information, is to be aware. 
According to Gibson (1979, p. 250) "the term awareness is used to imply a direct 
71 In fact, as discussed in Chapter 2, these are some of the very theoretical inadequacies that initially 
motivated Gibson to propose an alternative approach to psychology (see Gibson (1966; 1979), and 
indeed led to the related theories pertaining to the ,direct perception of affordances specified by the 
infonnation available. 
72 Many terms are used in the existing, cognitivist literature to describe 'perception without awareness' . 
Bornstein and Pittman (1992), for example, suggest the terms: subliminal perception, unconscious 
perception, nonconscious perception, subception and implicit perception, as an incomplete list of 
alternatives. 
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pickup of information, not necessarily to imply consciousness".73 Reed (1996) 
elaborates this important distinction, suggesting that awareness "is not necessarily to 
be conscious or self-conscious - it is just to show perceptually based capacities for 
meaningful discrimination and actions organized by those discriminations" (p. 24). 
Reed went on to explain that awareness requires no particular explicit knowledge on 
the part of the perceiver, only sufficient sensitivity to detect information specifying 
the relevant affordances of their environment. In this sense, awareness functions to 
regulate the relationship between the individual and their environment such that the 
affordances of the environment can be achieved or avoided as warranted. Clearly 
then, the distinction between the respective ecological and information processing 
approaches to the phenomenon of awareness and the implications for the study of 
perception, and psychology in general, extend well beyond differences in semantics or 
terminology. Requiring the referent of awareness (that is, what the perceiver is aware 
of), to be present in, as Gibson described, the 'theatre of consciousness' , requires not 
only firm commitment to a Cartesian dualism (presumably the body can be aware of 
what the mind is not, if explanations of priming are to be accepted), but also 
acceptance of a number of other dualistic divisions including that between the 
conscious and the non-conscious, the automatic and the intentional, and most 
importantly between the individual and their environment. Such theoretical duality is 
contrary to the monistic commitments of Gibsonian ecological psychology as 
presented in Chapter 2 and which is adopted as the theoretical framework for the 
present research. 
73 In other words, for Gibson, 'aware of meant 'sensitive to' rather than 'conscious of information. 
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What then, should be made of the abundance of experimental effects claimed to be 
demonstrative of the automaticity of human cognition? It is clear than any researcher 
approaching the study of psychology from an ecological perspective would be well 
served by disregarding the overtly constructive, inference-based accounts of the 
mechanisms allegedly responsible for the empirical observations described as priming 
or automaticity effects. Ought the effects in isolation, that is the empirical 
observations themselves, be disregarded too? Perhaps not, after all many of the 
studies ostensibly concerned with priming and automaticity produce well controlled 
laboratory demonstrations of robust, replicable effects, which illustrate a coherent 
relationship between the individual and their environment. It makes good adaptive 
sense that accompanying the detection of, for instance, an affective facial expression 
is behaviour conducive to interaction with an individual experiencing the affective 
state specified by that expression. To illustrate: smiling and feeling positive toward a 
happy person, and conversely, frowning and feeling negative toward an angry person, 
may be a reasonably successful, albeit grossly over-simplistic, hypothetical heuristic 
for social interaction. The fact that such effects can be reliably produced in laboratory 
experiments reveals not what may occur 'in the brain', but that perception has, as 
Reed (1996) explained, a regulatory function which tailors or coordinates the 
perceiver's actions to their environment in an adaptive manner (Michaels & Carello, 
1981). 
Indeed, Gibson (1967, cited in E. J. Gibson, 2002, p.14) further considered awareness 
to be "an activity ... a form of adjustment that enhances the pickup of information" (p. 
129). Presumably here, Gibson was referring to an adjustment in the relationship 
between the individual and their environment to, or toward, some form of referent, 
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possibly detected information. Given that information, in an ecological sense, can be 
anticipatory or predictive in nature (Lee, 1980), that is, it can specify what will occur, 
it seems reasonable that the detection of such information is manifest in terms of an 
adjustment, or attunement, toward what that information specifies. In fact one of the 
five hallmarks of human behaviour proposed by E. 1. Gibson74 (1994) was that of 
prospectivity, the "forward-looking character of behaviour" (p. 72), whereby the 
activity of the individual is preparatory for realising forthcoming affordances. 
"Information about the environment, the actor's bodily effectiveness, and the fit 
between the two is constantly coming in; as changes in the information are observed, 
better and earlier detection of affordances is possible" (E. 1. Gibson, p. 72). Thus, the 
prospective individuae5 is able to use the information that specifies the affordances of 
their environment to direct activity and attention toward the emerging features of a 
situation in a functionally specific manner (Reed, 1996). 
Perhaps then, it is the characteristics of the prospective nature of the relationship 
between the individual and his or her environment that are observed when priming 
and automaticity are studied experimentally. As suggested, many such effects show 
potential for adaptive function of the kind expected of a prospective organism. 
Furthermore, if awareness of meaningful features of the relationship between the 
individual and their environment is not channelled usefully toward the constantly 
emerging features ofthat relationship, such awareness has little purpose. In a similar 
sense Michaels and Carello (1981) asserted that "for perception to be valuable, it must 
74 The other four hallmarks of human behaviour proposed by E. J. Gibson (1994) were: agency (the self 
in control); flexibility (the transfer of means); communicative creativity (multiplication of means of 
communication) and, retrospectivity (the backward-looking character of behaviour). 
75 Prospectivity, in fact, is characteristic of animate creatures. For instance, the locomotion of a human 
to catch a ball is a demonstration of the same type as that of a paramecium locomoting toward a source 
offood (Reed, 1996). 
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be manifest in appropriate and effective actions on the environment" (p. 47). There is 
no reason why the very function of perception should not be observed in laboratory 
experiments purporting to be investigating priming and automaticity76. This is not a 
claim of validity, ecological or otherwise, for priming methodologies since the 
majority of these procedures bear little relevance outside of the laboratory context, but 
rather a reassertion of the position that for psychology, the only appropriate unit of 
analysis is the relationship between the individual and their environment. Participants 
in psychology experiments are still individuals in environments, albeit often 
environments consisting of experimenter-constructed constraints. Hence the 'same 
rules' still apply, that is, psychology still occurs and the individual continues to detect 
information specifying the affordances of the environment and to act accordingly. 
Animate organisms simply have to act on this information to survive. However, one 
critical issue here is the degree of correspondence between the constraints of the 
experimental context and those of the reference context, which ought to be some real-
world situation or phenomenon. As discussed in previous chapters, the extent to 
which the constraints imposed in a laboratory experiment are not present in the 
reference situation determines the meaningfulness with which the findings may be 
applied and generalised. If the constraints of the laboratory do not match those of the 
reference situation, the ecological validity of the procedure suffers, whereby any 
knowledge gained may only apply to the context of the experiment, and not beyond. 
Typically, the laboratory procedures employed when studying phenomena described 
as priming and automaticity (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) suffer from very low levels of 
ecological validity, and therefore, may have little applicability to behaviour outside of 
76 In fact it would be peculiar indeed if such functions were somehow temporarily suspended when 
participating in psychology experiments. 
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the laboratory context. For example, many of the priming techniques employed (e.g. 
scrambled sentence task, Srull & Wyer, 1979) are not representative of the means by 
which individuals ordinarily acquire information about their environment, yet are 
shown to consistently produce experimental effects. In keeping with the current 
approach, these effects may not be applicable outside the experimental context, yet 
are consistent with what might be expected of a prospective agent given the 
constraints and circumstances imposed. Other methods of priming, such as the brief 
presentation of visual information, particularly facial expressions of emotion, may, 
arguably, be more appropriate to generalisation beyond the laboratory. There are 
occasions when only a glimpse of another person's face is available or very rapid 
perception and action is desirable. For instance, there may literally only be a fraction 
of a second between detecting a facial expression specifying anger and being 
assaulted. Numerous studies have shown such efficiency to be within the capacity of 
the human perceiver in that relevant actions, such as frowning at an angry face or 
smiling at a happy one, accompany detection of an affective facial display, even when 
the presentation time is very brief (e.g. Dimberg & Ohman, 1996; Livingston & 
Brewer, 2002; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Ravaja et aI., 2004; Stapel, Koomen, & Ruys, 
2002). However, on the whole, these studies also remain limited in generalis ability 
beyond the sort of reference situation where the availability of information is so 
tightly and temporally bound. Normally, of course, perceivers are able to actively 
explore the events of their environment rather than be passively exposed to the 
constrained information supplied by the experimenter. 
However, effects conceptually very similar to those found in priming and automaticity 
studies are occasionally reported from studies conducted outside of the laboratory. In 
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a naturalistic setting Gueguen and De Gail (2003) demonstrated the impact of 
detection of a smile on subsequent behaviour. In this study, a confederate made eye 
contact with pedestrians in a busy inner city supermarket. Once eye contact was 
established, the confederate then smiled77 at half of the pedestrians, and maintained a 
neutral expression toward the other half. A second confederate, who was instructed 
not to make eye contact, then dropped a package of computer disks while an observer 
recorded whether or not the pedestrian offered assistance to pick up the disks. It was 
reported that pedestrians who had been smiled at were significantly more likely to 
help than those who had not. In many ways, the Gueguen and De Gail study parallels 
a basic priming procedure. Participants were exposed to a meaningful event (i.e. eye 
contact and subsequent expression), in this case in a very naturalistic setting, and 
performance on a subsequent, conceptually relevant task was measured. Importantly, 
no instructions, warning or other information was provided to participants, only the 
initial facial expression and subsequent opportunity to lend assistance were 
experimental contrivances; in all other respects, therefore, the participants were 
engaging in their regular daily activity. While this study may suffer from the 
traditional trade-off between experimental controf8 and mundane realism generally 
present in any comparison between laboratory and field settings, it provides an 
important empirical link between experimental studies of priming, and illustrates how 
these effects may be applied to a real world scenario. Without confirmation that 
priming can exist outside of the laboratory, the general lack of ecological validity and 
potential for generalisability inherent to many laboratory-based priming procedures, 
means that even the most well developed theoretical account of such effects needs to 
be treated with scepticism. Demonstrations such as that reported by Gueguen and De 
77 Presumably a posed smile on most occasions. 
78 Smile veracity, for instance, could not be controlled in this research. 
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Gail, establish a reasonable foundation for suggesting that the social perceiver may in 
fact, on the basis of being a prospective agent, exhibit characteristics similar ~n 
concept to the empirical observations frequently reported in priming studies. 
Turning attention back to the present research, it is suggested that the methods 
employed to study priming effects may, in an adapted form, be useful for assessing 
the sensitivity of perceivers to the meaningful differences between posed and genuine 
smiles. The adaptive benefits of such sensitivity are clearly prospective in nature. 
Knowing the veracity of an interaction partner's smile (i.e. whether they are 
experiencing positive affect or simulating that experience) is helpful for guiding 
subsequent interaction. Given there is evidence that seeing a static photograph of an 
individual smiling, even only very briefly, can have consequences for subsequent 
behaviour (e.g. Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Ravaja et aI., 2004), it seems reasonable to 
question whether such an effect may be moderated by the veracity of the smile itself. 
Thus, in line with the purposes of this stage of the present research; to assess 
perceiver sensitivity to the differences between posed and genuine smiles, the second 
study in this thesis will utilise a priming methodology. 
Experiment 2 
It is important to note at the outset that the present study is not intended to be 
representative of real-world social interaction, and hence lacks the degree of 
ecological validity championed earlier in this and previous chapters. This study is 
intended, however, to further test the hypothesis that perceivers are sensitive to the 
differences between posed and genuine smiles. Experimental evidence was presented 
in the previous chapter to suggest that when required to make explicit decisions 
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regarding the presence of positive emotional state, perceivers were able to use the 
information specified in both photographs and video of facial expressions to 
accurately detect emotional state. The present study is intended to provide an 
additional assessment of such sensitivity without providing participants with any 
explicit goals or instructions to evaluate smile veracity by employing a priming 
methodology. 
Experiment 2 in the present research involved briefly displaying static photographs of 
various facial expressions to participants who were ostensibly engaged in a separate 
task in which they were required to judge the valence (i.e. positive or negative) of a 
series of English words. It has been previously demonstrated that less time is required 
to categorise the valence of a word when it has been preceded by a prime of the same 
valence as the target (Fazio et aI., 1986). Thus, it is predicted that participants will 
exhibit different response latencies when identifying the valence of positive words, 
depending on whether the word had been preceded by a conceptually related display 
of positive emotion (i.e. a genuine smile) or an irrelevant, simulated display of 
happiness (i.e. a posed smile). In other words, detection of the positive emotional state 
specified by genuine smiles is predicted to influence the categorisation of words, 
while posed smiles, as expressions not specific to any emotional state, are not 
predicted to have this effect. Specifically, it is hypothesised that the time taken to 
identify positive words will be facilitated by prior exposure to a static photograph of a 
genuine smile, but not a static photograph of a posed smile.79 
79 No predictions are made in regard to the effect of exposure to the facial displays on time taken to 
identify negative words. The claim in the present study is one regarding the prospective nature of 
perception which is predicted to be evidenced in the facilitation of categorising positive words, rather 
than any inhibitory effect regarding identification of negative words. In this sense, for this study, 
negative words were essentially 'fillers', to allow judgments of word valence to be possible. 
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Method 
Participants. 
Participants in Experiment 2 were 14 students (7 female) recruited from the 
University of Canterbury. They ranged in age from 18 years to 31 years (M= 22.6 
years, SD = 5.2). Each participant was given a $2 scratch-and-win lottery ticket upon 
completion of the procedure. 
Facial displays. 
Three facial displays (a neutral expression, a posed smile, and a genuine smile) were 
selected from each of two of the thirteen individuals who participated in the facial 
display generation procedure described in the Chapter 3 to meet the criteria described 
below. 
The within-participants design of the present study requires that all participants are 
exposed to all combinations of facial displays and target words, making for a 
relatively large number of trials. Hence, the facial displays from only two individuals 
were included in the present study in order to avoid extremely long testing sessions 
and the possibility of fatigue and boredom on the part of the participants influencing 
the results. Facial displays of smiles of moderate intensity were selected to ensure any 
effects were not the result of the extremes of a very low or high intensity expression. 
Very low intensity smiles are likely to be difficult to detect regardless of veracity and 
therefore mask potential effects due to low signal strength. Very high intensity smiles 
may pose a similar problem as described by Frank et al. (1993) who reported that 
perceivers were not as accurate distinguishing posed from genuine smiles when the 
expressions were of a high intensity. As described in Chapter 3, these authors argued 
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that intense contraction of zygomatic major produces a bagging of skin below the eyes 
that may be mistaken for orbicularis oculi contraction. In a similar sense, the results 
of Experiments 1 a and 1 b reported in Chapter 4 suggested that smiles with the teeth 
exposed were more likely to be classified as expressions of happiness regardless of 
veracity, when compared with closed mouth smiles. Therefore, all smile displays 
included in the present study were of closed mouth smiles. Expressions from both a 
male and a female were included to allow for differential effects of facial display sex 
to be observed. While any generalisations regarding the effect of target sex on 
perceptions of posed and genuine smiles are not able to be drawn, as only one 
example of displays from each sex has been included, the inclusion of both male and 
female facial expressions may provide an initial indication as to any potential role of 
sex differences in terms of the current investigation. 
In addition to the neutral expression, posed smile, and genuine smile selected from 
each individual's facial displays, two additional displays were constructed. For each 
face, a composite smile was constructed whereby the eye area from the individual's 
posed smile was digitally cropped and superimposed onto the genuine smile display. 
This manipulation was intended to create, artificially, a smile that contained 
indications of a genuine smile, but in the absence of contraction of orbicularis oculi. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, in addition to the Duchenne marker (contraction of 
orbicularis oculi) genuine smiles are comparatively more bilaterally symmetrical than 
posed smiles. By superimposing the eye region from a posed smile (which does not 
feature contraction of orbicularis oculi), onto a genuine smile (which does feature the 
marker of symmetry), a preliminary assessment of the relative contribution of each 
respective marker (i.e. Duchenne and symmetry) to the identification of smile veracity 
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can be made. 8o A fifth facial display was constructed by digitally inverting the mouth 
and eyes of the neutral expression of each individual. In effect, this facial display 
acted as a baseline by which the effects of the facial expressions could be compared. 
This 'scrambled' face contained the same features as the natural faces, but was 
arranged in an unstructured, socially meaningless manner, such that these 'faces' 
should not influence word identification in the same prospective manner as the natural 
facial displays. Although the neutral facial displays could serve this purpose, factors 
associated with the specific configurations of individual faces (e.g. facial 
attractiveness) may playa role in the word evaluation task. Furthermore, due to the 
artificial nature of both the composite and scrambled facial displays, analyses were 
performed separately. The initial analyses including all five facial display conditions, 
while the subsequent analysis included only the natural faces. 81 
Target words. 
Thirty target words (15 positive, 15 negative) were selected from the Affective Norms 
for English Words (ANEW) database (Bradley & Lang, 1999a). ANEW is a set of 
1034 commonly used English words that have established norms for ratings of 
valence, arousal, and dominance as well estimates for frequency of use. Words were 
selected on the basis of valence ratings and balanced for frequency of use. Positive 
words were selected from those rated >7.5 on a 9-point scale, while negative words 
were selected from those rated <2.5 on the same scale. Selection of words with very 
80 Specifically, for both the male and female facial displays, AUl2 (zygomatic major) contraction was 
bilaterally asymmetrical for the posed smile (left side: F ACS intensity C, right side F ACS intensity B 
for both male and female), but bilaterally symmetrical for the genuine smile (left side: FACS intensity 
C, right side F ACS intensity C for both male and female). Hence the constructed composite smiles 
were indeed bilaterally symmetrical. 
81 The constructed composite and scrambled facial displays are not valid referents of social interaction, 
and while their inclusion may be informative in the context of the current investigation, given the 
emphasis placed on maintaining a high level of ecological validity in the present research, it is 
important to include analyses that consider only the effects of the natural facial displays on word 
identification. 
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clear meanings was intended to ensure that any deliberation due to uncertainty when 
interpreting the words was minimised, thereby providing for more accurate reaction 
time measurements. Word frequency estimates were provided with ANEW, although 
it is unclear the unit of measurement employed. Using the measures supplied there 
was no difference between the frequency of use of the positive and negative words 
lists, t(28) = 0.16,p = 0.87, (Mpositive = 66.8, Mnegative = 61.8). The complete word lists 
with valence ratings are provided in Appendix I. 
Design. 
A 5 (Facial expression: Scrambled / Neutral/Composite smile / Posed smile / 
Genuine smile) x 2 (Participant sex: Male / Female) x 2 (Facial expression sex: Male / 
Female) x 2 (Word valence: Positive / Negative) mixed model design with repeated 
measures on the first and last 2 factors was employed. Orders of facial expression and 
word presentation were randomised so that all participants sawall combinations of 
expressions and words. 
Apparatus. 
Facial displays and words were presented on a 17" colour computer monitor using 
software specifically programmed for the task (Walton, 2003a) and a PIlI 650mhz 
personal computer running Windows XP Professional. 
Procedure. 
Participants were invited to take part in an experiment that was described as 
investigating mood and word recognition. Upon arrival to the laboratory each 
participant was given an information sheet (see Appendix J) that provided a brief 
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description of the research. In this description, it was explained that the experiment 
was concerned with the impact of mood on performance in a word categorisation task. 
After agreeing to take part each participant signed a consent form (see Appendix K) 
and was ushered into a separate testing room and seated approximately 60cm from a 
computer monitor. Instructions for the task were presented on the computer screen. 
Specifically, participants were informed that they would be seeing a series of words 
presented individually on the computer screen and their task was to decide, as quickly 
and accurately as possible, whether each word was positive or negative in meaning, 
which they should indicate with a key press. They were told that they may see a face 
appear on the screen, but to ignore the face and concentrate on the word judgment 
task. The experimenter then checked that the participant understood the instructions. 
In order to help maintain the cover story of the experiment, participants were also 
required to complete an analogue mood scale (see Appendix B) once prior to the 
computer task. 
The task began with a practice session consisting of 8 word jUdgment trials. Eight 
words and one facial photograph not used in the experiment itself were used for the 
practice session. On each trial a fixation cross first appeared in the middle of the 
screen. After a period, which was varied randomly from 1 second to 3 seconds to 
avoid anticipatory responses, the cross was replaced by a facial display that remained 
on the screen for 50 msecs. This period is sufficient for accurate detection of 
emotional state (Dimberg et aI., 2000; Stapel et aI., 2002), but does not allow time for 
any detailed examination.82 The facial display was immediately replaced by a target 
82 Williams et al. (2001) for instance suggest that 100-200 msecs is the minimum period required for a 
eye fixation. 
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word that remained on the screen until the participant responded. All 30083 facial 
display and word combinations were presented and order of word and facial ~isplay 
presentation was randomised. A 30-second pause in the procedure was introduced 
after every 50th trial to minimise the effects of fatigue and boredom. After completion 
of the procedure participants were debriefed and thanked for their time. The entire 
procedure lasted approximately 20 minutes. 
Data analysis. 
The dependent measure in this study was response latency. Such data typically show a 
positively skewed distribution in that there is constraint at the lower end of the scale 
(i.e. fast reaction times), but not at the other extreme, where there is no real limit to 
how slowly a participant can respond. For this reason, transformations are often 
applied to meet the assumptions of normality required for analysis of variance (Bargh 
& Chartrand, 2000). Often, however, even after transformation, outliers remain, 
generally at the upper end of the distribution (i.e. very long latencies), usually due to 
lapses in attention and concentration by the participant. It is routine to trim such 
outliers from the data set if they clearly do not conform to the distribution expected 
for the experimental procedure employed (Ratcliff, 1993). For instance, especially 
long response latencies (e.g. > 2 sees) in experiments where participants are required 
to respond as quickly as possible to simple tasks such as word judgments, are more 
than likely to be the result of factors other than those under investigation. Given that 
meaningful differences in reaction time studies may be very small (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2000), these differences are likely to be obscured by outliers not related to 
the phenomena being studied. Hence, it is' common to remove outlying values in 
83 Thirty target words x 5 facial displays x 2 individuals = 300 presentations. 
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studies of this nature. Although there is controversy regarding how to unambiguously 
identify outliers from relevant data (Ratcliff, 1993; Ulrich & Miller, 1994), Uleman, 
Hon, Roman and Moskowitz (1996) suggest a conservative approach of removing 
values on a case-wise basis that lie beyond 3 standard deviations from the mean of 
that case. 
These approaches to the 'cleaning' of reaction time data were applied to the present 
analysis. Initially any incorrect responses (i.e. identifying a positive word as negative 
or vice-versa) were eliminated and the distributions of the remaining data were 
examined for each participant. As expected, a visual inspection suggested that these 
distributions were not normal, and therefore did not meet the assumptions of 
ANOY A. Hence a 10glO transformation was applied to each participant's data. After 
transformation, data outside the range: M ± 3.0 SD were removed for each participant. 
In total 245 (5.8%) incorrect responses, and 62 (1.5%) responses identified as outliers 
were removed from the data set prior to analysis. Full details of errors and outliers 
removed for each participant are provided in Appendix L. 
Results 
Median reaction times were calculated for each participant by condition and 
compared using a 5 (Facial expression: Scrambled / Neutral/Composite smile / 
Posed smile / Genuine smile) x 2 (Participant sex: Male / Female) x 2 (Facial 
expression sex: Male / Female) x 2 (Word valence: Positive / Negative) mixed model 
ANOY A with repeated measures on the first and last two factors. Analysis was 
performed on 10gIO transformed data, but is reported as raw reaction times (i.e. 
antilogs) to aid interpretation. 
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No main effects were revealed. Importantly, as predicted a significant interaction was 
revealed between word valence and facial expression, F(4,48) = 11.52,p < 0.01, and 
is displayed in Figure 3. A comparison between the mean reaction times for each 
facial expression revealed that the time to identify positive words differed as a 
function of the facial expression preceding the word. Specifically, positive words 
were categorised more slowly when preceded by a control shape (Mcontrol = 650 
msecs) than by a composite smile (Mcomposite = 610 msecs), posed smile (Mposcd = 619 
msecs), or genuine smile (Mgenuine 606 msecs). Furthermore, positive words 
preceded by a genuine smile (Mgenuine = 606 msecs) were categorised more rapidly 
than when preceded by a neutral expression (Mneutral = 635 msecs). 
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Figure 3: Line graph of time (msecs) take to categorise target words as a function of 
facial expression prime and word valence for Experiment 2. 
No significant differences were revealed between the time taken to categorise positive 
words that were preceded by neutral expressions and those preceded by either 
composite smiles or posed smiles (Tukey G,p < 0.05). 
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An interaction effect was also revealed between word valence and participant sex, 
F(1,12) = 7.11,p < 0.05. A comparison between the means for each condition 
indicated that female participants were faster to identify negative words than positive 
words (Mnegative = 591 msecs, Mpositive = 615 msecs, Tukey a,p < 0.05), while no 
difference was found for male participants (Mnegative = 633 msecs, Mpositive = 637 
msecs, Tukey a, n.s.). A further interaction was revealed between participant sex and 
faCial expression sex, F(1,12) = 6.37,p < 0.05, due to female participants being 
marginally faster to identify words preceded by a female facial expression than a male 
facial expression (Mjemale = 598 msecs, M,nale = 609 msecs, Tukey a, p < 0.08), while 
no difference was found for male participants (M(emale = 641 msecs, M,nale = 631 
msecs, Tukey a, n.s.). 
Planned comparisons were also performed to directly assess the hypothesised effects 
without inclusion ofthe artificial facial displays (i.e. control shape and composite 
smile). As such, the mean reaction time to identify positive words was compared 
between the neutral expression, posed smile, and genuine smile conditions. No 
significant difference was found between the time taken to identify positive words 
preceded by a neutral expression (A1neutral = 635 msecs) and those preceded by a posed 
smile (Mposed= 619 msecs). However, a significant difference was revealed between 
the time taken to identify positive words preceded by a neutral expression (Mneutral = 
635 msecs) and those preceded by a genuine smile (Mposed = 606 msecs). Specifically 
participants were faster to identify positive words after exposure to a genuine smile, 
thereby confirming the effect reported above on the basis of post-hoc testing. No 
difference was revealed when time to identify positive words was compared between 
the posed and genuine smile conditions. 
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Discussion 
As predicted, the time taken to identify positive words was facilitated by exposure to 
a static photograph of a genuine smile. Specifically, participants were faster to 
correctly categorise positive words preceded by a genuine smile, compared to the time 
taken to categorise positive words that were preceded by a neutral expression. 
Importantly, exposure to posed smiles had no such effect. The time taken to 
categorise positive words preceded by a posed smile was not significantly different 
from that for words preceded by a neutral expression. Thus, the data suggest that 
participants were indeed sensitive to the meaningful difference between posed and 
genuine smiles. Behaviour, in this case categorising the valence of a word, subsequent 
to the detection of a genuine smile was impacted in a manner consistent with the 
social significance of the expression. That is, genuine smiles, as facial expressions 
specifying positive emotional state, facilitated a conceptually related task (i.e. reading 
positive words). However, the simulated counterpart, posed smiles, which do not 
specify positive emotional state, did not impact on word categorisation any differently 
from an emotion-free, neutral expression. Thus, it appears that participants were 
sensitive to information specifying emotional state as indexed by the word 
categorisation task. Compared to the effect of neutral expressions, facial displays of 
happiness, but not simulated facial displays of happiness, influenced the efficiency of 
word valence categorisation. It is important to note however, that in contrast to 
Experiments la and 1 b, this effect was present without an explicit instruction to judge 
facial expressions or emotional state. In fact, in Experiment 2, participants were 
instructed to concentrate on a judgment task that appeared irrelevant to the facial 
displays presented and to ignore the facial displays. 
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The present study also included two artificial facial displays; control shapes, 
constructed by inverting the eyes and mouth of the neutral facial expressions; and 
composite smiles, constructed by superimposing the eye region of the posed smiles 
onto the genuine smiles. Created in this manner, the composite smiles essentially 
isolated the symmetry marker of genuine smiles in the absence of evidence for 
contraction of orbicularis oculi (i.e. the Duchenne marker).84 The composite smiles 
were shown to influence positive word identification in a manner similar to that of the 
posed smile in that no differences in response latency were found between these 
conditions and the neutral expression condition. Although this could be taken as an 
indication that the Duchenne marker (i.e. contraction of orbicularis oculi) is the only 
useful indicator of positive affect present in static photographs of facial displays, a 
closer examination of the results of post-hoc testing indicates a second viable 
explanation. While the difference in time taken to categorise positive words preceded 
by the posed smiles was clearly not significantly different from those preceded by the 
neutral expressions (Tukey a,p = 0.60), the difference between the neutral expression 
and composite smile conditions approached significance (Tukey a, p = 0.10). 
Tentatively, it is suggested, that as an approximation of a low intensity genuine smile, 
the composite smiles were influential in terms of facilitating positive word 
identification, but not to the extent of the actual genuine smiles. This explanation is 
consistent with the findings of Frank et al. (1993) who reported that increasing the 
salience of markers of a genuine smile, especially the Duchenne marker, make these 
expressions more readily identifiable as being distinct from posed smiles. In this 
84 Although created artificially, there is potential for such an expression to occur in the context of actual 
social interaction. For instance, very low intensity genuine smiles may not show clear evidence of 
orbicularis oculi contraction, particularly in those who typically show little defonnation of facial tissue 
and skin when facial muscles are contracted. In such cases, only the bilateral symmetry of the 
expression is available to infonn the perception of emotional state. However, the constructed nature of 
these displays in the present study means that they cannot be treated as actual expressions. 
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sense, the genuine smile facial displays employed in the present research contained 
information specifying emotional state that was substantially more salient (i.e. the 
Duchenne marker) than the composite smile displays. However, no firm conclusions 
can be drawn from the present data. Hence the comparative effects of the Duchenne 
marker and the bilateral symmetry of genuine smiles await further investigation. It is 
suggested, however, that any future investigation be performed using valid actual 
facial displays rather than the artificially constructed expressions used here. 
Furthermore, the control shape was intended as a baseline condition (as it contained 
the same features as the neutral expression, but arranged in a socially meaningless 
manner) to which the other conditions could be compared. As can be seen in Figure 3, 
the time taken to categorise positive words preceded by a control shape was the 
slowest of all conditions (M = 647 msecs), although not significantly different from 
that of positive words preceded by a neutral expression (M = 632 msecs). Positive 
words preceded by any of the three smile displays (composite smiles, posed smiles, or 
genuine smiles) were more rapidly identified in comparison to those preceded by the 
control shape. In the context of the present study this may be taken to suggest that all 
the smiles had a similar impact on word identification. However, the somewhat 
unusual nature of the control shape (the outline shape and general positioning of 
features were similar to a real face, only the internal detail was scrambled) may mean 
that the contrast between this display and the facial displays resembling positive 
expressions (i.e. the smiles) was simply enhanced, in that all the smiles were more 
similar to each other than any single smile was similar to the control shape. This 
explanation is supported by the comparison between the neutral expression condition 
and the smile conditions that exhibited the anticipated effects whereby the influence 
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of the composite and posed smiles were similar to that of the neutral expression, while 
that of genuine smiles was not. Thus, it is suggested that the neutral expressi~n 
condition is a more suitable basis to compare the impact of posed and genuine smiles 
than any artificially constructed control shapes that have no basis outside the 
laboratory context. 
The results of Experiment 2 also revealed two significant interaction effects not 
directly related to the present study. Female participants were faster to categorise 
negative words than positive words, and also faster to categorise words preceded by a 
female facial display (or control shape constructed from the female neutral 
expression) than words preceded by a male facial display. Male participants did not 
show either of these differences. Both effects are consistent with previous research 
suggesting that females are more socially sensitive, emotionally expressive and 
accurate at detecting emotion compared to males (Ambady, Hallahan, & Rosenthal, 
1995; Halberstadt, Hayes, & Pike, 1988; Kring & Gordon, 1998). In a survival sense, 
detection of negative events demands efficiency more than positive events, evidenced 
here by females' greater efficiency at identifying negative words than positive words. 
Males on the other hand, being generally less sensitive to such information, showed 
no such difference. Similarly, females are reported to be more emotionally expressive 
than males. Hence with female participants being both more sensitive to emotional 
expressions, and more expressive of emotion when compared to males, it would be 
expected, and indeed it was found, that female participants are more sensitive to 
female expressions of emotion than male expressions. Again, males, being less 
sensitive, did not display this difference. However, as noted earlier in this chapter, 
conclusions regarding any effects of sex pertaining to the facial displays need to be 
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treated with caution as only one example of each sex was employed in the present 
study. Therefore, it is unclear whether the effects observed are necessarily reflective 
of a sex difference pertaining to the facial displays, or alternatively, an effect of the 
different individual faces unrelated to sex. 
The present study provided novel empirical evidence to suggest that perceivers 
exhibit sensitivity toward the differences between posed and genuine smiles in a 
manner consistent with the ontological distinction between the expressions. Using a 
word categorisation task that had previously been shown to be influenced by affective 
facial expressions, it was demonstrated that posed and genuine smiles differentially 
impacted performance on this task. Furthermore, the nature of the effect of exposure 
to the facial expressions was consistent with that expected if perceivers do indeed 
have a tacit understanding of social significance of the difference between posed and 
genuine smiles. Positive words preceded by an expression of positive affect (i.e. a 
genuine smile) were identified more efficiently than when preceded by a neutral, 
emotionless expression. Importantly, simulated expressions of positive affect (i.e. 
posed smiles) did not have this effect, and in fact did not influence positive word 
identification any differently from the neutral expression. In this sense, it appears that 
posed smiles, in terms of underlying affect, were perceived in a manner consistent 
with the neutral expressions. 
In addition, Experiment 2 provided a means to assess sensitivity to emotional state 
specified by facial expression without requiring participants to directly judge 
emotional state or any other related construct. Instead, performance on the word 
categorisation task was the explicit focus of the procedure, and thereby served as a 
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performance index for measuring the effects of exposure to the facial expressions. 
Drawing from an ecological account of awareness (Gibson, 1979; Michaels & 
Carello, 1981; Reed, 1996) and E. 1. Gibson's (1994) notion of prospectivity, it was 
predicted, and subsequently observed, that performance on the word categorisation 
task would systematically vary as a function of the facial expression preceding the 
word to be judged. However, an important caveat to the present study concerns the 
questionable ecological validity of the priming procedure employed. Although this 
study represents a substantive improvement on similar previous studies (e.g.Surakka 
& Hietanen, 1998; Williams et aI. 2001) in that ecologically valid facial displays were 
employed (see Chapter 3), the laboratory context, including the distinct absence of an 
actual interaction, and the fact that static rather than dynamic facial displays were 
employed mean that the findings should not be directly generalised to interactive 
settings. Instead, the results of this study should be taken as a demonstration that 
social perceivers can be sensitive to smile veracity and the underlying ontological 
basis in emotional state, even in the absence of any direct instruction to judge, or 
attend to the nature of the facial expressions employed. 
Taken in context with the literature reviewed in this and previous chapters, the results 
of Experiment 2 support the general consensus within these studies in that perceivers 
were shown to exhibit sensitivity to the meaningful differences between posed and 
genuine smiles. Using procedures ranging from explicit detection tasks (e.g. 
Experiments 1a and 1b, present research; Frank et aI. 1993, study 1), to laboratory-
based (e.g. Frank et aI., study 2) and naturalistic impression formation studies (e.g. 
Scherer & Ceschi, 2000); mimicry studies (Surakka & Hietanen, 1998); eye-tracking 
studies (e.g. Williams et aI., 2001) and priming studies (e.g. Experiment 2, present 
research), it has been repeatedly demonstrated that the social perceiver typically 
differentiates posed and genuine smiles in a manner consistent with the distinct 
emotional bases of these expressions. 
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To this end, evidence was presented in Chapter 1 to suggest that ontological 
distinctions pertinent to social interaction exist between posed and genuine smiles and 
are manifest in the infonnation available for perception. Taken together, it is 
suggested that there are now grounds to consider smile veracity to be a potentially 
meaningful property of the social environment to which perceivers exhibit perceptual 
sensitivity consistent with such meaning. Thus, there appears to be sufficient evidence 
to enable consideration of the role of posed and genuine smiles in social interaction in 
tenns of the monistic actor-environment relationship advocated as the unit of analysis 
for psychology by proponents of the ecological approach. In short, meaningful 
infonnation, in the fonn of the invariant structure inherent to smile veracity is 
available to, and as demonstrated in Experiments 1 a, 1 band 2, detectable by social 
perceivers. It now remains to identify what role, if any, such infonnation plays in 
infonning social interaction. The next chapter will report the final study in the present 
thesis, which was intended to provide an initial assessment of the affordance 
properties relevant to, and specified by, posed and genuine smiles. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Affordances Specified by Posed and Genuine Smiles 
This chapter reports the third and final empirical component of the present research. 
Experiment 3 was designed to elaborate on the findings reported to this point by 
investigating the potential for posed and genuine smiles to playa functional role 
during social interaction. For proponents of the Gibsonian ecological approach to 
psychology, the detection of the dispositional properties of the creatures, objects, 
substances, places, and events of the environment is conceptualised in terms of the 
detection of the opportunities for acting or interacting relative to the individual 
perceiver, that is, the affordances of their environment (Gibson, 1979). Moreover, the 
affordances of other people, namely the social affordances of the environment, 
specify what can be done with, to, or by that person in relation to the perceiver. Thus, 
it was suggested in Chapter 2 that posed and genuine smiles, as information for social 
perception, specify categorically different sets of affordances. Genuine smiles specify 
the affordances of an individual experiencing a positive emotional state, while posed 
smiles, as facial expressions unrelated to emotional state, specify a distinctly different 
set of affordances that are likely to be related to the motivational intentions of the 
individual exhibiting the smile. The focus of the present research is on establishing 
whether social perceivers do in fact use the physiognomic information that 
differentiates posed from genuine smiles to guide their interactions with others. 
Consistent with the Gibsonian commitment to a monistic unit of analysis for 
psychology (i.e. the animal-environment interaction), it is important to understand the 
informational properties of the environment in concert with the sensitivity of the 
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perceiver to such properties before examining the reciprocal nature of these factors in 
regard to the detection of affordances. In this sense, Alley (1990) describes three 
fundamental questions intrinsic to a coherent ecological account of a psychological 
phenomenon, specifically: "1 What is the nature of the information available? 2 Do 
humans detect this information? 3 How is this information useful as a guide to 
behaviour?" (p.155). The previous chapters of this thesis have focussed on addressing 
these questions. With regard to the first question, in Chapter 1 literature was reviewed 
to suggest there are reliable and systematic physiognomic differences between posed 
and genuine smiles consistent with the ontological distinctions between these 
expressions. In brief, genuine smiles, that is smiles that occur in the context of a 
positive emotional experience, exhibit evidence of contraction of orbicularis oculi 
(i.e. the Duchenne marker), tend to be bilaterally symmetrical, and have a uniform 
duration. Posed smiles, on the other hand, do not occur in the context of happiness, do 
not involve contraction of orbicularis oculi, tend to be asymmetrical and occur over 
more variable durations. This suggests that posed and genuine smiles structure the 
optic array in distinctly different ways, specific to the ontological status of a given 
smile. Thus, it appears that there is information, structured by facial morphology, 
available to the perceiver that can specify psychodynamic properties, in this case 
whether a smiling individual is experiencing a positive emotional state or not. In 
addition, with respect to Alley's second question, the results of the empirical research 
reported in Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that social perceivers can in fact accurately 
distinguish posed from genuine smiles. When asked to judge whether a target 
individual was happy or not, perceivers reliably associated happiness with genuine but 
not posed smiles, regardless of whether judgments were made from photographs 
(Experiment 1 a) or videos (Experiment 1 b) of the target expressions. Furthermore, 
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even without any explicit instruction to judge emotional state, perceivers were still 
sensitive to the meaningful differences between posed and genuine smiles as indexed 
by a behavioural priming task (Experiment 2). When considered together with the 
small body of relevant empirical literature reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5, these 
findings suggest that perceivers can typically differentiate between posed and genuine 
smiles in a manner consistent with the ontological basis of each respective expression. 
Finally, in regard to the functionality of differentiating between posed and genuine 
smiles as a guide to behaviour, an argument was outlined in Chapter 1 that 
highlighted the importance of being sensitive to indicators of emotional state. To 
recap, it was posited that the social perceiver is well served by being able to 
accurately detect the emotional states of conspecifics. Emotions, when considered 
from a functional perspective, help individuals regulate their interaction with the 
environment in order to cope adaptively with the various contingencies they confront 
(Ekman, 2003; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Plutchik, 2003). Consequently, it may be 
advantageous for the social perceiver to be sensitive to information specifying the 
emotional state of an interaction partner as a means of knowing the dispositional 
properties of that individual. In regard to the present research, it has been argued that 
there is adaptive advantage for perceivers to be able to distinguish between posed and 
genuine smiles. While genuine smiles accurately specify disposition (i.e. a positive 
emotional state), posed smiles are unrelated to emotional experience and hence do not 
furnish perceivers with the same information regarding the dispositional properties of 
the smiling individual. Any failure to differentiate posed from genuine smiles may 
result in misperception of the emotional state of an interaction partner and, 
concomitantly, behaviour not appropriate to the situation. Sensitivity to the 
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meaningful differences between posed and genuine smiles is therefore likely to 
provide an adaptive function for the social perceiver in a manner consistent ,:"ith the 
general functionality provided by the accurate detection of the emotional states of 
others. 
Thus, in regard to Alley's (1990) three fundamental questions described above, at this 
point it appears reasonable to conclude that: 1 There is information that specifies the 
ontological distinction between posed and genuine smiles; 2 Perceivers can be 
sensitive to this information; and, 3 Such sensitivity holds adaptive function. Taken 
together, this suggests that there is a basis to consider smiles as information for the 
perception of social affordances in a manner consistent with the general principles of 
ecological psychology. However, a deeper analysis is required at this point. An 
argument has been presented to the effect that smiles are valid candidates for 
ecological referents of disposition, specifically a positive emotional state in the case 
of genuine smiles, or alternatively, some specification of motivation or intention in 
the case of posed smiles. Furthermore, building on previous suggestions in the 
literature, in particular the work of McArthur and Baron (1983), it has been proposed 
that information specifying emotional states can be equated to information specifying 
social affordances (see Chapter 2). In this sense, it follows that there are categorically 
distinct sets of social affordances relevant to the dispositional properties specified by 
posed and genuine smiles. 85 Beyond this claim, it is necessary to stipulate more 
explicitly what the affordances of a happy individual actually are. In line with the 
85 It is difficult to define precisely what set of affordances any given posed smile may specify in that 
posed smiles are likely to relate directly to the intentions of the smiling individual. As these may range 
widely (e.g. a smile intended as a nonverbal greeting or as an intentional attempt to deceive), it is very 
important to understand the context in which these expressions are exhibited in order to understand the 
social affordances specified. However, at this stage it is sufficient to recognise that posed smiles do not 
specify the affordances of an individual experiencing a positive emotional state and therefore must 
instead specify a categorically different set of affordances when compared to genuine smiles. 
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functional accounts of emotion presented in Chapter 1, it has been argued that in an 
adaptive sense, discrete emotional states operate to help the individual regulate their 
interaction with the environment. For instance, experiencing fear when confronted by 
some form of danger is beneficial to the individual in terms of the provision of 
information regarding the nature of the situation (e.g. negative feelings of anxiety) 
and the facilitation of behaviours likely to assist in dealing with the danger (e.g. 
increased levels of physiological activity). Furthermore, in social contexts, 
communicating fear has several potential advantages ranging from a warning of 
danger to others, to an indication of submission or trepidation toward another person. 
In fact, many accounts of the specific evolutionary functions of the various emotional 
states have been posited in the literature (e.g. Ekman, 2003; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; 
Keltner & Haidt, 2001; Lazarus, 1991; Levenson, 1999; Lewis & Haviland, 1993). 
The task for the present research is, therefore, to understand what the potential 
functions of positive emotional states are in order to describe the specific affordances 
of an individual experiencing such emotion, that is a genuinely smiling individual. 
Social Affordances and the Function of Positive Emotional States 
Within the literature that reports on the functional aspects of emotion, relatively little 
attention has been devoted to positive emotional states (Averill & More, 1993; 
Fredrickson & Branigan, 2001; Lazarus, 1991; Levenson, 1999). It is, perhaps, 
reasonably simple to conceive of some emotional states as having evolved in direct 
response to specific environmental contingencies or, as Lazarus has termed it, core 
relational themes. Fear, as mentioned above, helps mobilise the individual for escape, 
anger readies one to engage with a potential threat, disgust helps one avoid poisonous 
or other damaging objects and events, and so on. In tum, such explanations have 
204 
received reasonable empirical support (e.g. Abe & Izard, 1999; Dimberg & Ohman, 
1996; Lazarus, 1991; Plutchik, 2003). Happiness, on the other hand, has proven more 
difficult to conceptualise in terms of a specific adaptive benefit. There are few, if any, 
proximal threats to the survival of the individual that positive emotion may help 
overcome in the same direct manner as the other hypothesised primary emotional 
states (Fredrickson, 1998). Instead, functional theories of positive emotion have 
focussed on more general effects of such affective states on the well being of the 
individual. Commonly, positive emotion has been posited to facilitate approach 
behaviour and a general willingness to engage with the environment (e.g. Cacioppo, 
Klein, Berntson, & Hatfield, 1993; Davidson, 1993; Davidson, Ekman, Saron, 
Sehnulis, & Friesen, 1990; Ekman, 2003; Frijda, 1986). Lazarus (1991), for example, 
suggests that happiness occurs "when we think we are making reasonable progress 
towards the realisation of our goals" (p.267), and therefore results in continuation of 
the current activity (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Oatley & lohnson-Laird, 1987), or the 
facilitation of the exploration of novel aspects of their environment (Carver, 2003; 
Ekman, 2003). Presumably, these theorists would argue that in the absence of any 
particular threat, individuals without positive emotions would lack the motivation to 
spontaneously engage in novel or exploratory behaviour. 
Consistent with these ideas, Fredrickson (1998; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2001) has 
proposed the broaden-and-build model, whereby positive emotions are believed to 
provide opportunities for the individual to accumulate and build resources. 
Fredrickson argues that positive emotions occur when the individual perceives that 
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within their current circumstances they are safe and satiated.86 These emotions result 
in the temporary broadening of, what Fredrickson has termed, an individual's 
thought-action repertoire, that is, the scope of their attention, cognition, and action. In 
support of this idea, Fredrickson cites evidence to suggest that a positive emotional 
state is accompanied by a widened focus of attention (e.g. Derryberry & Tucker, 
1994), a heightened capacity for creativity (e.g. Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987), 
and more variation in the way familiar objects are used (e.g. Greene & Noice, 1988). 
In tum, this 'broadening' effect is said to serve the building of an individual's 
physical, intellectual, psychological, and social resources by facilitating activity 
conducive to developing such qualities. For instance, in many species including 
humans, play, an activity that often occurs in the context of a positive emotional state 
but rarely with negative emotions, has been shown to enhance predator avoidance and 
fighting ability (Boulton & Smith, 1992), which using Fredrickson's terminology is a 
physical resource. Similarly, positive emotion has been shown to facilitate mastery of 
tasks in 4-year-old children (Masters, Barden, & Ford, 1979), to enhance the strength 
of interpersonal relationships especially between caregivers and infants (Tomkins, 
1962), to decrease cardiovascular demands (Gendolla & Kruesken, 2002), and to 
strengthen the immune system (Stone, Cox, Valdimarsdottir, Jandorf, & et aI., 1987). 
These effects of positive emotion are said to contribute to the overall well being and 
general fitness of the individual. Thus, according to Fredrickson's broaden-and-build 
model, positive emotions serve adaptive function in that they provide opportunities to 
develop resources, in particular resources that are conducive to the achievement of 
goals and more generally survival, at times when such development is best achieved, 
that is when the individual is safe and satiated. 
86 This notion has obvious parallels with Lazarus' concept of goal realisation when safety and satiety 
are taken as generic goals. In this sense, perhaps happiness is best conceptualised as a consequence of 
perceived safety and satiety. 
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However, for the purposes of the present research, the function of positive emotion 
must be considered beyond the specific adaptive advantage provided to an individual. 
If, as suggested above, posed and genuine smiles specify different social affordances, 
the utility of positive emotion needs to be considered in terms of both the individual 
experiencing and expressing the emotion and the acquirer of information specifying 
this emotional state. What does the expression of a positive emotional state by an 
interaction partner offer to the perceiver of that state? In Chapter 1, a recent 
evolutionary theory put forward by Owren and Bachorowski (2001) regarding the 
functional origins of smiling in social interaction was reviewed. In brief, these authors 
proposed that smiling evolved in early hominids as a solution to a problem generic to 
group living: how to form and maintain reliable cooperative relationships without 
risking exploitation from others. Cooperation with conspecifics is a critical aspect of 
living in extended groups (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 
1992), yet in theory, cooperative behaviour appears distinctly irrational (Kollock, 
1998) or at least, somewhat risky (Colman, 2003). A willingness to cooperate may 
simultaneously serve as an opportunity for exploitation by non-cooperative others. To 
be successful, cooperation requires, by definition, reciprocity from an interaction 
partner. Thus, to ensure effective cooperation without exploitation, a reliable system 
of communicating cooperative intent must exist (Boone & Buck, 2003). Furthermore, 
this system must safe-guard against cheating, that is, not be susceptible to faked or 
false signalling of an intention to cooperate (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). 
Owren and Bachorowski (2001) proposed that smiling amongst humans has evolved 
to provide a mechanism to facilitate effective cooperation. Specifically, they 
suggested that the emergence of the smile as a reliable indicator of positive emotional 
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state created simultaneous selection pressure for the ability to detect this indicator. An 
individual who could detect that an interaction partner was happy thereby enjoyed 
adaptive advantage over other individuals oblivious to such information. Further, 
detection of happiness engenders happiness in the perceiver (Surald<:a & Hietanen, 
1998), which according to Fredrickson (1998; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2001), is 
adaptive in its own right. However, more importantly for interaction, this contagious 
nature of positive emotion fosters a feedback loop between interaction partners 
whereby detecting happiness leads to an individual experiencing and consequently 
expressing happiness, which, if in tum is also detected, elicits further happiness, and 
so on. Such feedback fosters positive affect between individuals, which according to 
Owren and Bachorowski's theory, sets the occasion for reciprocal cooperative 
behaviour. Indeed, as discussed above, positive emotion has been argued to foster 
general approach behaviour and engagement, activities conducive to interaction and 
cooperation. Importantly, this system of eliciting cooperation appears to incorporate a 
safe-guard against dishonesty or cheating. Simulations of happiness in the form of 
posed smiles are physiognomically distinct from spontaneous genuine smiles, 
providing a basis for the attuned perceiver to discriminate between legitimate 
cooperators and those attempting to elicit cooperation without intending to 
reciprocate. To this end, the results from Experiments la, 1b, and 2 from the present 
research suggest that perceivers can discriminate between posed and genuine smiles, 
while Suraldca and Hietanen (1998) reported that viewing posed smiles did not bring 
about a positive emotional state in the same manner as viewing genuine smiles. 
Therefore, if, in the context of an interaction, happiness is not detected, whether it is 
because there is no information specifying happiness (i.e. a posed smile, or at least no 
genuine smile is exhibited) or either party to an interaction does not detect 
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information that is present, then the feed-back loop is interrupted (or perhaps never 
begins) leading t6 a decrease in positive emotion and therefore a diminished 
likelihood of reciprocal cooperation. The propensity for social perceivers to mimic the 
facial expression and concomitantly the emotional state of conspecifics exhibiting 
genuine smiles, but not posed smiles (Surakka and Hietanen) provides a reliable 
means to identify, and be identified as a dependable cooperation partner. Thus, an 
interpretation of Owren and Bachorowski' s theory is that genuine smiles, as 
expressions of positive emotion both specify and elicit opportunities for reciprocal 
cooperation. In other words, genuine, but not posed, smiles specify the affordance of 
cooperability. 
Social dilemmas and the problem of reciprocal cooperation 
In effect, Owren and Bachorowski's (2001) theory of the evolutionary function of 
human smiling posits a novel approach to elucidate an apparent illogicality of mutual 
cooperation during social exchange. Many aspects of sociality present the individual 
with a dilemma inasmuch as self-interest frequently conflicts with the interests of 
others. It is often the case in situations where some form of social coordination is 
required that individuals are better off acting in their own self-interest, rather than in 
the interests of others. For instance, choosing not to give a voluntary contribution to a 
local hospital allows one to save money, but probably does not affect the likelihood of 
receiving treatment from that hospital in the future given that others are likely to 
contribute. However, if all parties choose to behave in their own self-interests, then all 
will be ultimately disadvantaged. Without any donations there will be no hospital, a 
clear cost to all individuals of the society. Such conflicts between individual and 
collective welfare have been termed social dilemmas, that is, situations "in 
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which .. .individually reasonable behaviour leads to a situation in which everyone is 
worse off than they might have been otherwise" (Kollock, 1998, p. 183) . M<?re 
formally, Weber, Kopelman and Messick (2004) define social dilemmas by two 
characteristics: 
(a) at any given decision point, individuals receive higher payoffs for making 
selfish choices than they do for making cooperative choices regardless of the 
choices made by those with whom they interact and 
(b) everyone involved receives lower payoffs if everyone makes selfish 
choices than if everyone makes cooperative choices (p. 281). 
Thus, social dilemmas present the individual with a literal conundrum: if they act in 
their own self-interests they risk foregoing any potential benefits accrued from acting 
cooperatively, however, if they act cooperatively they risk exploitation from others 
acting selfishly. If it is assumed that individuals generally act in rational, self-serving 
ways (Dawkins, 1989), it then presents as something of a puzzle as to how mutual 
cooperation in social dilemmas is ever achieved in light of the supposed individual 
irrationality required to forego the guaranteed gains of self-serving behaviour. Yet 
anecdotal evidence suggests that cooperative behaviour abounds. 
Not surprisingly, social dilemmas have attracted interest from researchers across a 
wide variety of disciplines. Several generic theoretical mechanisms have been 
proposed to explain the phenomenon of cooperation in mixed-motive interactions. 
These have included biological explanations of kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) and 
reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), economic approaches such as game theory (Luce 
& Raiffa, 1957) and the hypothesising of ' evolved, domain specific cognitive 
mechanisms for cooperating (Cosmides, 1989). Although a review of these theories is 
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beyond the scope of the present thesis, it is important to note that common to them all 
is the notion that cooperation can be advantageous for the individual engaged in a 
social interaction if there is motivation to cooperate and fellow cooperators can be 
identified. If the reciprocation of a willingness to cooperate can be assured, then 
cooperation can become an individually advantageous strategy for social exchange 
(Caporael, Dawes, Orbell, & Van de Kragt, 1989; Colman, 2003; Cosmides & Tooby, 
1992; Kiyonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi, 2000; Van Lange, Liebrand, Messick, & 
Wilke, 1992). In other words, to gain utility from cooperation, an individual must 
show a commitment to cooperate (Frank, 1988,2001) and possess an ability to detect 
other committed cooperators (Boone & Buck, 2003) or at least an ability to detect 
those not committed, that is, to detect cheats or deceptive competitors (Andrews, 
2002). Furthermore, it is suggested here that the hypothesised function of positive 
emotional states and smiling in social interaction proposed by Owren and 
Bachorowski (2001) serves as one (of a cluster) potential means for establishing 
reciprocal cooperation. The physiognomic distinctions between posed and genuine 
smiles provide information specific to cooperative intent inasmuch as a positive 
emotional state relates to a commitment to cooperate. Therefore, by attending to the 
facial expressions of interaction partners, social perceivers may gain insight as to who 
may make for reliable cooperators. 
In fact, two previous studies have examined aspects of the impact of facial 
expressions on cooperative behaviour in the context of social dilemmas. Scharlemann, 
Eckel, Kacelnik and Wilson (2001) had participants playa trust game (a version of a 
social dilemma) with 'partners' represented by facial photographs. Each photograph 
depicted an individual exhibiting either a neutral expression or a smile, although no 
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details regarding the veracity of the smile were available. These authors reported that 
compared to a neutral expression, smiling influenced trust in that cooperation rates 
were higher when interacting with a smiling 'partner'. They also reported that facial 
physiognomy affected cooperation independent of smiling. Some 'partners' were 
simply trusted more than others regardless of their facial expression. A second, 
conceptually similar, study on the effects of facial expression on cooperative 
behaviour was reported by Brown and Moore (2002). In this study participants took 
part in a resource allocation task (specifically a dictator game, another variation on the 
basic social dilemma theme), with interaction partners represented by cartoon icons 
depicting smiles. Importantly, the smiles were manipulated to resemble either a posed 
or a genuine smile by depicting the mouth as a symmetrical, upwardly curving line for 
the genuine smile, and an asymmetrical upwardly curving line for the posed smile. 
Brown and Moore reported that more resources were allocated when participants were 
interacting with partners represented by a symmetrically smiling icon, compared with 
those represented by an asymmetrically smiling icon. That is, greater cooperation was 
observed when interacting with a partner depicted as genuinely smiling. 
The results of the study by Scharlemann et al. (2001) and the study by Brown and 
Moore (2002) are consistent with the general claim that smiling facilitates 
cooperation. However, major reservations regarding the ecological validity of the 
operationalisation of smiling interaction partners suggest the results of both studies 
should be interpreted with caution. In regard to the Scharlemann et al. study, without 
information regarding whether the smiles employed were posed or genuine smiles, it 
is difficult to know whether any type of smile will be likely to produce these results, 
that is, facilitate cooperation. It could be that the smiles employed by Scharlemann et 
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al. were all posed, all genuine, or a mixture of both. In line with a main premise of the 
present research, that is posed and genuine smile specify categorically distinct sets of 
affordances, it is imperative that smile veracity be considered before claims regarding 
the role of smiles in social interactions can be verified. In addition, the smiles 
employed by Brown and Moore, while theoretically sound in regard to the nature of 
some of the information differentiating posed and genuine smiles, simply do not meet 
the criteria for ecologically valid facial displays (see Chapter 3). Line drawings do not 
sufficiently recreate the information available to the perceiver in the context of an 
actual interaction and therefore have little generalis ability beyond the experimental 
setting. Furthermore, facial symmetry has been shown to be related to perceptions of 
attractiveness (Zebrowitz, 1997), and attractiveness has been shown to influence 
cooperation in dilemma settings (Mulford, Orbell, Shatto, & Stockard, 1998). It could 
be that attractiveness rather than smile veracity was responsible for the results 
reported by Brown and Moore, although questions about whether faces represented by 
line drawings are perceived as attractive need to be considered before this conclusion 
can be drawn. 
To this end, the major objective for the present study is to provide a conceptual 
replication of the Scharlemann et al. and the Brown and Moore studies in order to 
further investigate the function of smiling in social dilemmas. In addition, an 
emphasis of the present research is on the ecological validity of the experimental 
procedure, and in particular, the facial displays employed. The remainder of this 
chapter reports the final study in the present research that was designed to provide an 
initial empirical evaluation regarding the function of smiles in social dilemma 
situations. 
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The Present Research 
The goal of the third and final study in the present research was to examine the 
potential functional role sensitivity to the meaningful differences between posed and 
genuine smiles plays in the context of social interaction. Evidence has been presented 
to suggest that posed and genuine smiles differ physiognomically in a manner 
consistent with the ontological basis of these expressions. Furthermore, experimental 
evidence from the present research has indicated that perceivers are in fact sensitive to 
this distinction. In regard to the present research, what remains is to illustrate the 
specific function such sensitivity offers to the perceiver. It has been suggested, based 
on a recent evolutionary account of smiling in social interaction (Owren & 
Bachorowski, 2001), that when confronted with a social dilemma, sensitivity to smile 
veracity provides a means to reliably distinguish between cooperative and non-
cooperative interaction partners. The present research was designed to test this claim 
by examining cooperative behaviour as a function of the facial expressions of 
interaction partners in the context of a social dilemma, specifically the Prisoners' 
Dilemma. 
The Prisoners' Dilemma 
Common to the voluminous body ofliterature that has examined various aspects of 
social dilemmas is a focus on one particular example of a dilemma, the Prisoners' 
Dilemma (see Table 7). The Prisoners' Dilemma was developed in the early 1950s by 
Merrill Flood, a social psychologist, and Melvin Dresher, an economist, to test 
predictions derived from game theory. It was later formalised by Albert W. Tucker, a 
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mathematician who constructed a description of the dilemma from which the name 
resulted (Luce & Raiffa, 1957). 
Table 7: Sample payoff matrix for the prisoners' dilemma showing the payoff (i.e. jail 
sentence) for Prisoner A. 
Prisoner B 
Prisoner A No confession Confession 
No Confession 1 year 10 years 
Confession None 9 years 
In short, Tucker described a situation in which two prisoners had been charged with a 
crime and were being held in separate cells while awaiting trial. Each prisoner is 
offered a choice to either confess or not confess to the crime; however no 
communication between the prisoners is possible. The prosecutor informs the 
prisoners that without a confession, there is only enough evidence to convict them of 
a lesser crime, which attracts a jail sentence of 1 year. However, each prisoner is also 
offered a deal whereby if they confess and their accomplice does not, they are able to 
go free, while the other prisoner will be convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison. 
However, if they were to both confess, then there would be no opportunity for a deal 
and both would go to jail for 9 years. Herein is the dilemma. Ifwe consider the 
situation from the point of one prisoner87 (called prisoner A), it is a logical fact that 
prisoner B will either confess or not, these are the only two options available. In fact, 
regardless of how prisoner B acts, prisoner A will always be better off, that is receive 
fewer years in jail, by confessing. Hence, if rational, prisoner A will minimise 
potential years in jail by confessing. Furthermore, the same reasoning applies equally 
87 The Prisoners' Dilemma features a symmetrical payoff structure hence the dilemma is identical 
regardless of which of the two prisoners is considered. 
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to prisoner B, who should, if also rational, also confess. Thus, rationality on the part 
of both parties leads to a mutually costly situation with both prisoners spending 9 
years in j ail. Compared to the alternative of neither prisoner confessing which results 
in only 1 year in jail each, the supposedly rational strategy of always confessing now 
appears distinctly irrational. In an identical manner to the more general description of 
social dilemmas given above, the Prisoners' Dilemma provides a context whereby 
behaviour that favours the individual leads to a less than optimal outcome for all 
parties involved (see Appendix M for a description of the general form of the 
Prisoners' Dilemma). 
The Prisoners' Dilemma has since been the subject of a great deal of research, 
resulting in several thousand studies (Kollock, 1998). Primarily, the Prisoners' 
Dilemma has been employed as a simulation of the generic social dilemma situation 
so as to attempt to understand how cooperation is achieved in light of the apparent 
costs associated with not acting selfishly. Although the ecological validity of using 
games such as the Prisoners' Dilemma to model social exchange has been questioned 
(e.g. Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 1992), a number of 'natural' situations have been 
identified that comply with the general form of the Prisoners' Dilemma (see Appendix 
M). For example, the practice of blood sharing among vampire bats (Desmondus 
rotundus) closely resembles a prisoners' dilemma situation. Among adults of this 
species, around 8% fail to find food on any given night of hunting (Wilkinson, 1984), 
a potentially costly failure in that food deprivation in this species leads to starvation 
within 48-72 hours (McNab, 1973). However, unsuccessful hunters are often fed 
regurgitated blood by successful roostmates, particularly when there is an opportunity 
for future reciprocation (i.e. the recipient has not refused to regurgitate in the past, 
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hence is likely to reciprocate in the future). Brembs (1996) suggests that this is a 
dilemma situation in that the successful hunter is faced with the options of n<?t feeding 
an unsuccessful conspecific and therefore conserving resources for itself to safeguard 
against future shortages of food (i.e. competitive behaviour), or feeding the 
unsuccessful individual thereby losing resources, but gaining the potential for future 
reciprocation (i.e. cooperative behaviour). Selfish behaviour advantages the 
individual, but if all individuals behave selfishly then the entire population is 
disadvantaged. Brembs also described parallel examples of dilemma situations 
applying to lycaenid-ant interactions, predator inspection in some fish species, egg-
sharing amongst hermaphroditic seabass, and coalition formation in several primate 
species. In short, the constraints inherent to the Prisoners' Dilemma match well the 
constraints that apply to general dilemma situations as they occur in the natural 
environment of social exchange. 
To this end, it is suggested that the Prisoners' Dilemma offers a suitable 
methodological tool for the present study in that it provides a structure for social 
exchange consistent with the conditions specific to social dilemmas. The binary 
options to either confess or not confess in the Prisoners' Dilemma equate to the more 
generic behavioural categories of cooperation and competition common to all social 
dilemmas. Hence, when playing the Prisoners' Dilemma, the behaviour of individuals 
is constrained to either competing or cooperating with their interaction partner. This 
constraint provides a means to examine the proposed affordances specified by posed 
and genuine smiles in that participants are required to choose their preferred form of 
interaction (e.g. either competition or cooperation) within a reasonably realistic social 
exchange scenario. Thus, by requiring participants to play the Prisoners' Dilemma 
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with a partner exhibiting either a posed or a genuine smile, the influence of these 
facial expressions on cooperative (and competitive) behaviour can be examined while 
maintaining an appropriate degree of experimental control that is not plausible if more 
naturalistic social interactions were observed. 
A further advantage of employing the Prisoners' Dilemma as a methodological tool 
for the present research relates to the large body of research that has been conducted 
in this area. A lot is already known about various factors that influence behaviour in 
laboratory-based Prisoners' Dilemma situations. Although a review of this literature is 
beyond the scope of the present thesis, it is necessary to briefly canvass those aspects 
of the past research that may be applicable to the present study. In particular, it is 
important to note factors relevant to the current research that have been shown to 
influence cooperation in dilemma situations. Overall, typical cooperation rates in 
experimental dilemma situations are between 30% and 40% (Komorita & Parks, 
1995; Samla, Parks, & Chang, 2003). These rates apply to dilemma situations 
whereby individuals have no opportunity to interact. However, once some form of 
interaction is available, cooperation is enhanced. Based on a meta-analysis of 130 
studies conducted between 1958 and 1992, Sally (1995) reported that when all other 
factors were controlled for, an opportunity to have a conversation with interaction 
partners prior to taking part in a dilemma situation increased the likelihood of 
cooperation by approximately 45%-50%, while eye-contact alone resulted in a 20% 
increase in cooperation rates. To illustrate, a study conducted by Wichman (1970) had 
participants playing dilemma games in one of four conditions: isolation (i.e. no 
contact at all with partner); visual contact (i.e. could see but not hear partner); aural 
contact (i.e. could hear but not see partner); and full contact (i.e. could see and hear 
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partner). The results revealed that the degree of contact was positively related to 
cooperation in that the median cooperation rates reported were 41 %, 48%, 72% and 
87% for each condition respectively. Thus, given that the present design requires face-
to-face contact between the participant and their interaction partner, it is expected that 
cooperation rates in the present study will exceed the typical rate of between 30-40% 
reported for dilemma situations where face-to-face interaction is not possible 
(Komorita & Parks, 1995; Sanna, Parks, & Chang, 2003). Furthermore, the structure 
of the payoff matrix has been found to influence cooperation such that in a prisoners' 
dilemma situation where 'A' represents a cooperative choice, and 'B' a competitive 
choice and K = (AA payoff - BB payoff) / (BA payoff - AB payoff), the value of K 
approximates typical cooperation rates (Rapaport, 1967). For example, a matrix with 
K = 0.5 predicts a cooperation rate of approximately 50%, all else being equa188 
(Sanna et aI., 2003). 
Additionally, individual differences in the personalities of the players has been shown 
to strongly influence cooperation rates in dilemma situations. The major dimension 
explored in this regard has been termed the social value orientation of an individual 
(Messick & McClintock, 1968), which can be defined as "stable preferences for 
certain patterns of outcome for oneself and others" (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & 
Joireman, 1997, p. 733). In other words, this dimension is assumed to reflect variation 
between individuals' predispositions to approach social dilemmas cooperatively or 
competitively (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). In this sense, Deutsch (1960) 
established a typology of social value orientation whereby individuals can be 
categorised into one of three orientations, namely: cooperators, individualists, and 
88 This applies to an anonymous dilemma situation where nothing about interactions partners is known. 
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competitors. Basically, cooperators89 prefer to maximise gain for both themselves and 
their partner, individualists prefer to maximise gain for themselves with no regard for 
their partner, and competitors prefer to maximise their relative gain compared to their 
partner. In the context of a social dilemma, social value orientation has been shown to 
influence cooperation rates. Cooperators exhibit more cooperative behaviour than do 
individualists, who in tum cooperate more than competitors (Kuhlman & Marshello, 
1975; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Sally, 2000; Van Lange et aI., 1992). The 
robustness of these findings (Van Lange, 1992) suggests that the social value 
orientation of the participants in the present study should be taken into account. 
Perceptions of interaction partners have also been shown to influence cooperative 
behaviour in dilemma situations. Cooperation rates have been demonstrated to be 
positively related to the perceived similarity of an interaction partner's attitudes (Van 
Lange, 1992), shared group identity with an interaction partner (Kramer & Brewer, 
1984), prior friendship or liking of an interaction partner (Swingle & Gillis, 1968), 
and perceived attractiveness of the interaction partner (Mulford et aI., 1998). Finally, 
mood (e.g. Sanna et aI., 2003) and sex (e.g. Orbell, Dawes, & Schwartz-Shea, 1994) 
have also been studied in relation to behaviour in dilemma situations, however any 
systematic pattern within these results is not clear and perhaps the outcome of 
complex interactions between relevant variables (Van Lange et aI., 1992). Overall, it 
has been demonstrated that many factors influence cooperative behaviour in 
Prisoners' Dilemma scenarios, which must in tum be considered and accounted for, in 
the design of the present study. 
89 Cooperators are also often referred to as prosocial individuals (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). 
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Experiment 3 
The purpose of the third experiment in the present research was to investigate the 
affordances specified by posed and genuine smiles in social interaction by using the 
Prisoners' Dilemma as a device to structure interactions. Based on the work of Owren 
and Bachorowski (200 I) it has been proposed that genuine smiles, as spontaneous 
expressions of a positive emotional state, specify an opportunity to cooperate, that is, 
the affordance of cooperability. In order to test this proposition, participants were 
required to playa number of dilemma games with 'partners'. These partners were 
ostensibly other participants although in reality were never actually present, but 
represented in a manner such that the participants themselves believed they were 
engaging in genuine interactions. The focus of these games was a series of Prisoners' 
Dilemma trials where the partner was represented using digital video clips of facial 
displays, specifically neutral expressions, posed smiles, and genuine smiles. This 
procedure provided the means to investigate whether cooperative behaviour varied as 
a function of smile veracity, and in effect, an initial assessment of the plausibility of 
the postulation that genuine, but not posed smiles, specify the affordance of 
cooperability. Specifically, following Owren and Bachorowski, it is suggested that if a 
participant is interacting with an individual exhibiting a genuine smile, they are 
exposed to information specifying a positive emotion state, which, if detected, 
facilitates positive emotion in the participant and leads to an increase in the likelihood 
of cooperation. However, if the interaction partner is expressing a posed smile, there 
is no information available specifying positive emotion, and therefore, if perceived 
accurately, no elicitation of positive emotion in the participant, and therefore no effect 
on the likelihood to cooperate. 
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Furthermore, a number of relevant factors identified from past research to influence 
cooperation in social dilemma situations were taken into account in the present study. 
Specifically, although factors related to the perception of interaction partner 
characteristics (e.g. perceived attractiveness, shared group identity, perceived 
similarity of attitudes) were not assessed directly, comparison between rates of 
cooperative behaviour for interactions with the same partner ensured that the 
influence of such perceptions was reasonably constant. In addition, the social value 
orientation of each participant was measured at the beginning of the procedure, while 
mood was measured by self-report throughout the procedure. The facial expressions 
of each participant were also recorded throughout the Prisoners' Dilemma portion of 
the procedure in order to provide an assessment of the relationship between 
participant genuine smiling and cooperative behaviour. According to Owren and 
Bachorowski (2001), the detection of positive emotion state in others facilitates the 
experience of positive emotion (which may be manifest as genuine smiling), and in 
tum the likelihood of cooperation. By recording participants' facial expressions in 
addition to their competitive and cooperative choices in the Prisoners' Dilemma 
scenario, a more comprehensive evaluation of Owren and Bachorwoski' s selfish gene 
theory of smiling in human interactions can be conducted. Finally, only female 
participants will be recruited in order to reduce the complexity of the experimental 
design. 
Thus, in line with the arguments developed to this point, it is predicted that the 
cooperation rate for interactions with a genuinely smiling partner will be significantly 
greater than for interactions with a partner exhibiting a posed smile. 
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Method 
Participants. 
Participants in Experiment 3 were 30 female students recruited from the University of 
Canterbury. Participants' ages ranged from 17 to 29 years with a mean age of 20.4 
years (SD = 3.5). Upon completion of the procedure each participant received a $15 
voucher redeemable at campus stores. One pmiicipant's data was not included in the 
present analysis due to an equipment failure that was not detected until after the 
completion of the procedure. 
Facial displays. 
Three facial displays were selected from 3 of the 13 individuals who participated in 
the facial display generation procedure described in Chapter 3. All three individuals 
whose facial displays were employed were female in order to reduce the complexity 
of the present design (i.e. sex differences were not investigated). For two individuals a 
neutral expression, a posed smile, and a genuine smile were selected. Of these two, 
one set of displays featured only closed mouth smiles, while the other featured only 
open mouth smiles (for each individual the intensity of their expressions was matched 
according to F ACS criteria, see Chapter 3). Given that the results of Experiments la 
and 1 b indicated that perceivers were inclined to judge open mouth smiles in a more 
biased fashion (i.e. were more likely to judge an open mouthed than a closed mouth 
posed smile as reflecting happiness), it is important to keep this variable constant 
within a given individual's facial displays. Furthermore, for the third set of facial 
displays a neutral expression and two posed smiles, one with the mouth open and the 
other with the mouth closed were selected (hence the intensity of these expressions 
were not equivalent, the closed mouth smile was a less intense expression than the 
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open mouth smile by one step on the F ACS criteria for intensity). This enables a 
direct comparison between cooperation rates for open and closed mouth pos~d smiles 
to be made and therefore provides the opportunity to determine whether exposure of 
the teeth influences the attainment of cooperation in dilemma situations. 
Materials. 
Social value orientation was measured using a series of decomposed games (Messick 
& McClintock, 1968) that were adapted from Van Lange et al. (1997). These games 
required participants to choose between three alternate options that involved dividing 
resources (i.e. 'points' that the participants were told equated to money) between 
themselves and an interaction partner (see Appendix N). Each of the three options 
corresponded to either a cooperative choice (i.e. maximal gain for both the participant 
and the partner), an individualistic choice (i.e. maximal gain for the participant 
independent of the outcome for the partner), or a competitive choice (i.e. maximal 
gain for the participant relative to the gain for the partner). For example, participants 
were shown a practice game whereby they were required to choose between 500 
points for both themselves and their partner, 550 points for themselves and 300 points 
for their partner or 500 points for themselves and 100 points for their partner. The first 
option was the cooperative choice (i.e. 500 + 500 = 1000, the greatest joint gain), the 
second the individualistic choice (i.e. 550 > 500, therefore the greatest individual 
gain), and the third the competitive choice (i.e. 500 - 100 = 400, the greatest relative 
gain). Each participant was categorised as cooperative, individualistic, or competitive 
if, of the nine decomposed games presented, they choose at least 6 options from the 
same category. Participants who did not meet this criterion were not categorised in 
regard to social value orientation. This approach to measuring social value orientation 
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has been reported to have adequate internal consistency (Liebrand & Van Run, 1985) 
and test-retest reliability (Kuhlman, Camac, & Cunha, 1986), and has been shown to 
be unrelated to mood or social desirability (Van Lange et aI., 1997). Furthermore, Van 
Lange, Agnew, Harinck and Steemers (1997) reported that social value orientation, 
when measured using decomposed games, has good predictive validity of behaviour 
across a range of real-world dilemma situations, and thereby claimed that both the 
construct and the measurement tool possess a reasonable level of ecological validity. 
Participants were also required to playa resource dilemma game (a form of the 
general social dilemma situation) adapted from Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, 
Barndollar and Trotsche1 (2001), which was administered using a computer program 
written specifically for this task (Walton, 2003b). In this task, the participant and a 
partner (simulated by the software) were able to gain resources from a common pool 
that was replenished periodically. The participant never knew how much resource the 
partner had taken, hence the dilemma was that if they took the maximum amount 
possible, the resource would be depleted more quickly than if they exhibited some 
restraint and harvested less than they were able to. Participants were supplied with 
written instructions (see Appendix 0) regarding this task including a table that 
outlined the effect of various sized harvests on the resource pool. Further details of 
this task are provided in the procedure section below. 
The Prisoners' Dilemma task was also administered by computer using software 
written for Experiments 1 and 2 and adapted for the present purpose (Walton, 2004). 
Participants were provided written instructions for this task (see Appendix P) that 
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included the payoff matrix and a brief description of the nature of the dilemma itself. 
Further details ofthis task are also provided in the procedure section below. 
At various stages during the procedure participants were also required to rate their 
mood on analogue mood scales (see Appendix B). Mood was scored by measuring the 
distance (in mm) from the centre point of the scale marked 'Neutral', to the line made 
by the participant. Thus, mood scores could potentially range from -100 (very 
negative) to 100 (very positive). 
Apparatus. 
The resource dilemma and Prisoners' Dilemma tasks were administered using a PIlI 
650 mHz personal computer running Windows XP Professional, a standard 17-inch 
colour computer monitor, and customised software (Walton, 2003b, 2004). During the 
Prisoners' Dilemma task, video-recordings of the participant's face were made using a 
Canon XM2 3CCD digital video camera mounted above the computer monitor. The 
recordings were subsequently converted to digital computer files using Adobe 
Premier software. Each recording was captured in PAL format at 25 frames per 
second, standardised for brightness and contrast, and compressed using a Microsoft 
MPEG4v2 codec. 
Design. 
This experiment employed an entirely within-participant design. All participants 
completed all parts of the procedure. With the exception of the Prisoners' Dilemma 
task the order of tasks was standardised across all participants. For the Prisoners' 
Dilemma task, the order of facial expression presentation was partially randomised. 
All participants sawall three neutral expressions first; however the order of the 
individual facial displays was randomised. Following this, participants saw six 
different facial displays (2 displays from 3 individuals) in a random order. 
Procedure. 
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It was imperative to the validity of this experimental procedure that pm1icipants 
accepted as true the presence of their simulated interaction partners. Participants were 
told that they were taking part in the experiment simultaneously with three others, 
with whom they would be interacting in various ways. Although the other participants 
were never actually present, it was crucial that participants believed they were 
interacting with other individuals. If participants did not accept this cover story, they 
may not have behaved as they would when actually interacting with others. To this 
end, the purpose of the initial tasks in the procedure was to help establish credibility 
of the cover story, as well as to collect baseline information regarding participants' 
propensity for cooperation and competition in social dilemma situations. 
Participants were recruited to take part in a study entitled "Social Psychology and 
Cyberspace: Communicating across the Internet". Upon arrival to the laboratory they 
were greeted and provided with an information sheet (see Appendix Q) and given a 
verbal description of the research. Specifically, participants were told that they would 
be taking part in research that was investigating various aspects of interpersonal 
interaction when using new technologies such as the internet, web-cameras, and 
video-conferencing. It was explained that an initial motivation for the research was to 
understand how communication between individuals has been shaped by the advent of 
new technologies and an example was given of how it is now possible to hold a face-
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to-face interaction with another person who is not in the same physical location, by 
using web cameras. Finally, it was explained that the research involved several tasks 
that examined communication and interaction in different settings, some which 
involved a computer interaction and others that did not, and therefore, three other 
participants would be completing the experiment as well. All participants were then 
asked to sign a consent form (see Appendix R) ifthey agreed to take part. 
Once consent was obtained, it was explained that the experiment consisted of three 
interaction tasks and a number of short questionnaires, and the interaction tasks would 
take place with the other participants who were located in separate testing rooms in 
the Department of Psychology. Participants were also informed that they would be 
paid between $5 and $25 for taking part in the experiment, but that the amount they 
would receive depended on their performance in the interaction tasks. Specifically, 
they were told that in each interaction task there was a chance to earn 'points' and that 
at the completion of the experiment their points would be converted into money. 
Furthermore, they were also told that their performance in each interaction task 
depended partly on their own responses and partly on the responses of their partners. 
Initially, participants were required to complete a mood scale (see Appendix B) and 
were then provided with an information sheet and response form regarding the social 
value orientation scale (see Appendix N), ostensibly the first interaction task. It was 
explained that this task involved interaction with one of the other three participants, 
although they would not know who the other participant was. Their interaction partner 
was, in relation to the decomposed game, the 'other' person who they were assigning 
points to. It was also explained that the 'points' for each participant in this task would 
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be calculated by taking an average of the points they assigned to themselves and the 
points their partner assigned to them, which would then be converted into a monetary 
amount that they would be paid at the end of the experiment. 
Participants were next required to complete a second mood scale (see Appendix B) 
and then provided with written instructions regarding the resource dilemma task (see 
Appendix 0). The resource dilemma task was introduced as the second interaction 
task, whereby they would again be interacting with one other participant, but they 
would not know whom it was. Participants were told that this task was similar to the 
previous one in that the more resources they accumulated the more money they 
received and that their performance also depended partly on their own responses and 
partly on the responses of their partners. The instructions outlined that the participant 
was to take the role of the captain of a fishing boat that was licensed to catch fish 
from a small lake. They were told that only their boat and one other (that of their 
interaction partner) were allowed to fish from this lake which began with a stock of 
100 fish, but only on the condition that the number of fish in the lake never fell below 
70 (if this occurred they lost all the fish they had previously harvested). Participants 
were also told that each season they caught 15 fish and their task was to decide how 
much of this catch to keep, and how much to return to the lake. They could keep 
between 0 and 15 fish, but the more fish they kept the fewer would be in the lake for 
breeding, and therefore, fewer would be available the subsequent season, while the 
more they returned, the more that would be available in the future. A table was 
supplied that listed the consequences of keeping fish versus returning fish to the lake 
(see Appendix 0). The table followed the equationL = 5n - 30 (Bargh et aI., 2001), 
where L represents the effect on the lake and n represents the number of fish returned 
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in a season (e.g. keeping 10 fish and returning 5 to the lake had a net effect of 
decreasing the lake stock by 5). Participants were told that there was no set number of 
seasons, but if the number offish in the lake ever dropped below 70, then the game 
was over and they would lose all the fish they had kept to that point. They were also 
told there was no means to communicate with the other player, and therefore, no way 
to know how many fish the other participant were keeping, and how many they were 
returning to the lake. Finally, they were told that the total number of fish they 
accumulated would be converted into a monetary amount that they would be paid at 
the end of the experiment. 
Before beginning a practice trial the experimenter made a bogus telephone call to one 
of the other experimenters who was administering the task to the interaction partner. 
This call was allegedly made to check if the other participant was ready to begin the 
resource dilemma procedure, but was actually a set part of the procedure to help 
maintain the cover story. Participants were then shown into a separate testing room 
where the computer and monitor were situated. Phoney cables were run from the 
computer into an adjoining room that participants were told provided a direct 
connection to the other testing rooms. For each fishing season, an initial catch of 15 
fish was displayed in the centre of the computer screen. Participants were then 
required to press designated keys to adjust the total number of fish they wished to 
return to the lake. Also displayed was the effect the participant's decision would have 
on the stock of the lake as well as the total number of fish accumulated over all 
seasons. Each season lasted 30 seconds, during which a tone was played at a random 
time that participants were told indicated that their partner was 'online and fishing'. 
At the completion of each season the message: "there continue to be more than 70 fish 
230 
in the lake" was displayed regardless of how many fish participants chose to return. 
Five fishing seasons were played in total, with the number offish participan~s elected 
to retain each season recorded by the computer software. 
After finishing the resource dilemma task, participants completed a third mood scale 
and were then introduced to the final interaction task, the Prisoners' Dilemma. It was 
explained that in this task, interaction would be taking place with all 3 other 
participants, again using a computer, but this time they would be able to see and be 
seen by the others via a video camera and web link. Written instructions for the 
Prisoners' Dilemma were supplied which included the payoff matrix and a brief 
explanation of the logic behind the dilemma (see Appendix P). These instructions 
were repeated verbally to the participants after which a short practice game of the 
dilemma was played between the participant and the experimenter to ensure the 
payoff structure was fully understood. After this, the experimenter provided some 
further details regarding the procedure by referring to a fake chart on a wall adjacent 
to where the participants were seated. Specifically, participants were told that the 
experiment had several different conditions and manipulations, and that in the current 
condition, they would be interacting with members of the same sex (i.e. female) who 
had been recruited from different departments of the university so it was unlikely they 
would know them. They were also told that the web-camera link was video only (i.e. 
no sound), only one-way at a time (i.e. while they were watching their partner they 
could not be seen and vice-versa), and as a result one participant would always be 
seen first, one would always see their partner first, and the other two would oscillate 
between being seen first or second. PartiCipants were informed that they had been 
allocated to the role whereby they would always see their partner first and then be 
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seen by that person. This information was provided to prevent any suspicion 
regarding interaction order (i.e. the fact the interaction partners were always seen 
first) and to minimise the likelihood that participants would attempt to communicate 
verbally via the video-link as this may have aroused suspicion regarding the actual 
presence of their partners when they did not respond. No mention was made of 
competition, cooperation, or the Prisoners' Dilemma at any stage of the procedure. 
Participants were reminded that this task was similar to the previous two in that the 
more points they accumulated the more money they would be paid at the end of the 
experiment, and that their performance was determined in part by their own responses 
and in part by their partner's responses. 
Participants were then shown back into the testing room, the video camera was 
positioned above the monitor and additional cables were plugged into it. Although the 
camera primarily served to maintain the cover story, it was also used to record the 
participant's facial expressions during the course of the procedure. A mirror was 
positioned behind the participant such that a reflection of the monitor the participants 
were using could be seen on the recording of the participant's facial expressions. This 
provided a record of the order of interactions with each partner. Each trial began with 
a screen of text simulating computer traffic (e.g. establishing network connections, 
selecting interaction partner etc.) for approximately 5 seconds followed by an on-
screen countdown that participants were told signified that a video transmission was 
about to begin. After the countdown was complete, a 1 O-second video-clip of a facial 
display of one of the interaction partners was displayed. Once the video-clip of the 
interaction partner had finished, further simulated computer traffic appeared on 
screen, followed by another count-down and a 10-second test pattern which the 
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participants were told signified that they could be seen by their partner. Finally, a 
further screen of simulated computer traffic was displayed followed by an opportunity 
for the participant to make their response. Each trial was completed once the 
participant had made their response, which was recorded by the computer software. 
In an initial practice trial, instead of a video clip of a participant, a I O-second video 
was played showing an empty testing room identical to that the participant was in. At 
this point the experimenter apologised and claimed that this must mean that the other 
participant was not ready. The experimenter then made another bogus telephone call, 
apologised again and assured the participant that their partner was now ready to begin. 
The procedure began with a series of 3 trials whereby the participant interacted once 
with each partner displaying a neutral expression. The participant was told that these 
trials, although part of the procedure and therefore worth points, were calibration 
trials to ensure the equipment was working properly and that the cameras were 
correctly positioned and focussed. As such, for these trials they were told that during 
transmission it was important that they sit still and look directly into the camera. This 
information was intended to reinforce the cover story and reduce suspicion regarding 
the rather solemn appearance of the interaction partners exhibiting neutral 
expressions. It was also important to show the neutral expressions first as 
interspersing these expressions with the smiles may have led participants to make 
attributions regarding this change in expression of their partners and therefore 
influence their responses, or worse, potentially arouse suspicion about the procedure. 
After these trials were completed the experimenter reported that all the equipment 
appeared to be working correctly and asked the participant whether they could see 
their partners clearly, whether they had interacted with three different people and if 
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they knew any of them personally. No participants knew any ofthe interaction 
partners. The experimenter then informed the participant that there would be six 
further interactions (in effect the six critical smile trials), two with each partner, and 
that because everything was working correctly, they could now relax and act more 
naturally during the interactions. This provided a credible reason as to why the 
interaction partners were smiling in the following interactions. 
After the Prisoners' Dilemma task had been completed, participants were required to 
fill out a fourth mood scale, and a debriefing questionnaire (see Appendix S) designed 
to discover whether the participants believed the cover story and deceptions involved 
in this procedure. No participants questioned the actual presence of the interaction 
partners, or reported any suspicion regarding the cover story for the experiment, or the 
experimental procedure per se. Participants were then debriefed as to the actual 
purpose of the experiment (see Appendix T). Finally, participants completed a fifth 
mood scale and a second consent form (see Appendix U) after which they were paid 
(all participants received $15 regardless of performance) and thanked for their time 
and assistance. Participants were asked to not discuss the experiment with others for 
at least one month to prevent the cover story being exposed. The entire procedure 
lasted approximately 1 hour. 
Results 
The main dependent measure of interest in this experiment was the nature of the 
choices (i.e. cooperative or competitive) made by participants in the Prisoners' 
Dilemma task, expressed as a rate of cooperation (i.e. number of cooperative choices / 
total number of interactions). The overall cooperation rate for all interactions was 0.57 
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(SD = 0.23). This rate is consistent with that expected for the payoff matrix used in 
this task (K = 0.5, therefore 50% cooperation was expected, all else being equal), in 
light of the previous findings that social contact (e.g. eye contact) between interaction 
partners facilitates cooperation in dilemma tasks (Sally, 1995). The remainder of this 
results section will provide an examination of the factors influencing cooperation rate 
in Experiment 3. The primary focus of this study was to investigate the influence of 
smile veracity on cooperation rates. However, to do so, account must be taken of 
impact of the factors relevant to the present study that have previously been shown to 
influence cooperative behaviour in social dilemma situations, in order to be able to 
examine whether smile veracity has an effect in addition to these variables. Therefore, 
initially the relationship between each of the variables measured and cooperative 
behaviour will be explored in a univariate manner. Subsequently, those factors shown 
to be relevant to cooperation in the initial analyses will be combined into a 
multivariate analysis in order to further assess any relationship between cooperation 
and partner facial expression while controlling for the influence of all other relevant 
factors. In this way, any influence of interaction partner facial expression on 
cooperation in addition to that of the other factors shown to be related to cooperative 
behaviour can be examined. 
Facial expression o./partner. 
Cooperation rates as a function of facial expression are displayed in Figure 4. The 
influence of the interaction partner's facial expression on cooperation was initially 
examined using a one-way repeated measures analysis of variance comparing the 
cooperation rates for interactions with partners expressing neutral expressions (Mnelltral 
= 0.62), posed smiles (Mposed= 0.50), and genuine smiles (Mgenlline= 0.66). This 
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revealed a significant effect, F(2,56) = 3.11,p = 0.05. A planned comparison revealed 
that participants cooperated when their interaction partner was exhibiting a genuine 
smile significantly more frequently than when they were exhibiting a posed smile, 
F(I,2S) = 4.42,p < 0.05. Similarly, more cooperation was observed when the partner 
exhibited a neutral expression than when they expressed a posed smile, F(1,2S) = 
4.0S, p = 0.05, but there was no difference in cooperation rate when neutral 
expression and genuine smile interactions were compared, F(1,2S) = 0.31, n.s. 
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Figure 4: Bar graph showing the cooperation rate as a function of interaction partner's 
facial expression, Experiment 3. 
Cooperation as a function of facial expression was also examined for each interaction 
partner individually. Table S displays cooperative and competitive choices as a 
function of interaction partner and facial expression. Because each participant only 
interacted with each facial expression of each partner once, there was a restricted 
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range in terms of cooperate rates at the required level of analysis, and therefore a lack 
of normality in regard to the distribution of this variable. Hence, for these analyses, 
the data were left in their raw form (i.e. compete or cooperate) and analysed 
categorically. Chi-squared tests for independence were performed to compare the 
number of cooperative and competitive choices as a function of posed and genuine 
smiles for each interaction partner separately. Neutral expressions were not included 
Table 8: Summary of participant responses (cooperated or competed) by interaction 
partner and facial expression for Experiment 3. 
Participant response 
Facial expression Cooperated Competed Coop. % 
Partner 1 
Neutral expression 16 13 55.2% 
Posed smile (open mouth) 16 13 55.2% 
Genuine smile (open mouth) 19 10 65.5% 
Partner 2 
Neutral expression 19 10 65.5% 
Posed smile (closed mouth) 13 16 44.8% 
Genuine smile (closed mouth) 19 10 65.5% 
Partner 3 
Neutral expression 19 10 65.5% 
Posed smile (closed mouth) 15 14 48.3% 
Posed smile (open mouth) 15 14 51.7% 
in the present analysis as the focus of this study is on the differences in cooperative 
behaviour as a function of posed and genuine smiles. Partner 1 (open mouth posed 
and genuine smiles) was cooperated with on 55% of interactions when she was 
exhibiting a posed smile, and on 66% of interactions when she was exhibiting a 
genuine smile, X2 = (1,29) = 0.65,p = 0.42. Partner 2 (closed mouth posed and 
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genuine smiles) was cooperated with on 45% of interactions when she was exhibiting 
a posed smile, and on 66% of interactions when she was exhibiting a genuin~ smile, 
x2 = (1,29) = 2.51, P = 0.11. Partner 3 (closed and open mouth posed smiles) was 
cooperated with on 48% of interactions when she was exhibiting a closed mouth 
posed smile, and on 52% of interactions when she was exhibiting a open mouth posed 
smile, X2 = (1,29) = 0.07,p = 0.79. Although these analyses did not reveal significant 
effects, a clear trend exists consistent with the previous findings in that cooperation 
was more frequent when interacting with a partner exhibiting a genuine smile 
compared with a posed smile. Furthermore, although no definitive conclusions can be 
drawn here, there is some indication of a slight trend toward cooperation being more 
likely when interacting with an individual exhibiting an open mouth posed smile 
compared to a closed mouth posed smile. This result is consistent with the effects 
reported for Experiments la and 1 b whereby smiles with the teeth exposed (i.e. open 
mouth smiles) were more likely to be categorised as an expression of happiness than 
were smiles without the teeth exposed regardless of veracity. 
Social value orientation. 
In total, in regard to social value orientation 16 participants were classified as 
cooperative, 7 participants were classified as individualists, 1 was classified as a 
competitor, and 5 could not be classified (i.e. did not make 6 consistent choices out of 
the 9 decomposed games). Hence, in order to retain sufficient statistical power to 
perform the required analyses, participants' social value orientation was reclassified 
to a binary category ofprosocial90 or non-prosocia1.91 This classification is reasonable 
when considered in the context of the operational definitions of the categories of 
90 Cooperators will be referred to as prosocials in these analyses to aid clarity. 
91 Thus, the non-prosocial category included all participants classified as individualists and competitors 
as well as those participants who could not be classified. 
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social value orientation, that is, the present reclassification can be interpreted to 
represent a distinction between participants who attempt to maximise gain for their 
interaction partner (i.e. prosocial) a,:ld those who do not adopt this strategy. Overall, 
there were 16 prosocial participants and 13 non-pro social in the present sample. 
An independent means t-test was conducted to compare overall cooperation rates 
between the prosocial and non-prosocial groups. A comparison of mean cooperation 
rates revealed that the prosocial participants (Mprosocia/ = 0.70) exhibited a 
significantly higher rate of cooperation than did the non-prosocial participants (Mnon-
prosocia/= 0.44), t(26) = 3.31,p < 0.01, a result which is consistent with previous 
research (e.g. Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Sally, 
2000; Van Lange et aI., 1992). 
Resource dilemma. 
The relationship between the amount of resources harvested during the resource 
dilemma task and cooperation rates during the Prisoners' Dilemma task was examined 
using a series of Pearson product-moment correlations. Specifically, the number of 
fish harvested in each season, as well as the total number of fish harvested were 
correlated with the cooperation rates for interactions with partners exhibiting neutral 
expressions, posed smiles and genuine smiles respectively, as well as with the overall 
rate of cooperation. No significant correlations were revealed. There appeared to be 
no relationship between the amount of resource harvested in the resource dilemma 
task and cooperation during the Prisoners' Dilemma task. 
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Participant mood. 
The relationship between participants' self-reported mood and their cooperative 
behaviour in the Prisoners' Dilemma task was also examined using a series of Pearson 
product-moment correlations. Specifically, mood scores from all five mood measures 
were correlated with the cooperation rates for interactions with partners exhibiting 
neutral expressions, posed smiles, and genuine smiles respectively, as well as with the 
overall rate of cooperation. Only one significant correlation was revealed between the 
initial mood score (i.e. the mood rating made prior to the first interaction task) and the 
cooperation rate for interactions with a partner exhibiting a neutral expression, r (29) 
= 0.42,p < 0.05. The more positive a participant rated their mood, the more likely 
they were to cooperate on their first set of interactions, that is, when interacting with a 
partner exhibiting a neutral expression. 
Participant facial expression. 
Throughout the Prisoners' Dilemma procedure, the facial expressions of each 
participant were recorded to digital video. Each clip was examined for the presence of 
smiling, and any smiles subsequently coded as posed or genuine (see Chapter 3 for 
coding details). Coding of smiles was not possible at all for one participant as her 
hairstyle and glasses obscured the area of her face where orbicularis oculi contraction 
can been observed (i.e. the temples and outer corners of the eyes). In total, 
participants exhibited 207 posed smiles and 91 genuine smiles. The relationship 
between the total number of posed and genuine smiles exhibited by each participant 
and cooperative behaviour was assessed using a series of Pearson product-moment 
correlations. Specifically, the respective number of posed and genuine smiles 
expressed by participants during the Prisoners' Dilemma task were correlated with the 
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cooperation rates for interactions with partners exhibiting neutral expressions, posed 
smiles, and genuine smiles respectively, as well as with the overall rate of 
cooperation. A significant positive relationship was revealed between the total 
number of genuine smiles the participant expressed and the cooperation rate for 
interactions with a genuinely smiling partner, r(28) = 0.38,p < 0.05. When their 
interaction partner was exhibiting a genuine smile, cooperation was positively related 
to the total number of genuine smiles exhibited by each participant. No other 
significant relationships were revealed. 
Order of interaction. 
To investigate the possibility that cooperative behaviour systematically varied over 
the course of the Prisoners' Dilemma procedure, responses to the first and second 
smile interactions with each partner were compared. Neutral expressions were not 
included in the present analysis as there was a break in the procedure between the 
neutral expression trials and the smile trials, hence it is not clear whether responses 
are directly comparable between these trials in regard to the order of interactions. 
Table 9 displays cooperative and competitive choices as a function of interaction 
partner and interaction order. 
Chi-squared tests for independence were performed to compare the number of 
cooperative and competitive choices as a function of interaction order for each 
interaction partner separately. These results revealed a consistent trend across all 
interaction partners whereby cooperation was more frequent for the first smile 
interaction than the second. Specifically, when interacting with Partner 1 (open mouth 
posed and genuine smiles), 69% of participants cooperated on the first interaction, 
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Table 9: Summary of participant responses (competed or cooperated) by interaction 
partner and interaction order for 'smile' interactions for Experiment 3. 
Participant response 
Interaction order Cooperated Competed Coop. % 
Partner 1 
Interaction 1 20 9 69.0% 
Interaction 2 19 10 51.7% 
Partner 2 
Interaction 1 18 11 62.1% 
Interaction 2 14 15 48.3% 
Partner 3 
Interaction 1 15 14 58.6% 
Interaction 2 15 14 41.4% 
while 52% cooperated on the second interaction (X2 = (1,29) = 1.8,p = 0.18). For 
interactions with Partner 2 (closed mouth posed and genuine smiles), 62% of 
participants cooperated on the first interaction, while 47% cooperated on the second 
interaction (X2 = (1,29) = 1.12,p = 0.29). Finally, when interacting with Partner 3 
(closed and open mouth posed smiles), 59% of participants cooperated on the first 
interaction, while 41 % cooperated on the second interaction. Although this effect did 
not reach statistical significance for any of the interaction partners, there appears to be 
a clear trend across all interaction partners whereby cooperation was more likely on 
the initial interaction with each partner when they were smiling. 
To this point a number of influences on cooperative behaviour in the Prisoners' 
Dilemma task of the present study have been identified. Specifically, the facial 
expressions of the respective interaction partners, as well as the social value 
orientation of the participant have been shown to influence cooperation. Furthermore, 
the self-reported mood of the participant, the facial expressions of the participant, and 
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the order of interactions have also been shown to be related to cooperative behaviour, 
although the statistical evidence here is less compelling. However, the effects of these 
factors have, so far, only been considered in a univariate manner. To further 
understand the influence of these factors on cooperative behaviour in the present 
study, it is necessary to take a multivariate approach to the present analysis by 
considering the factors identified as influencing cooperation rates above in 
combination. This will allow a determination of the relative impact of each of these 
factors on cooperation rates in the present experiment. To this end a logistic 
regression analysis was used to model the present data. Specifically, the relevant 
factors from the above analysis were used to predict the likelihood of cooperation for 
each interaction. This allows for the contribution of each factor to be considered in a 
multivariate manner whereby the influence of one factor can be assessed while 
simultaneously controlling for all other factors. Importantly, this provides the ability 
to assess the influence of the facial expression displayed in each interaction on the 
likelihood to cooperate, while keeping the influence of all other relevant factors 
constant (i.e. to assess the impact of facial expressions on cooperation over and above 
that of the other factors measured). This approach also provides the advantage of 
being able to use participant responses in their raw binary form (i.e. compete or 
cooperate) as the dependent variable, and thereby avoids the need to collate or 
collapse across interaction partners or across responses. Furthermore, this allows for 
each interaction with each partner to be modelled separately thereby preserving the 
structure of the procedure within the structure of the analysis. In other words, the 
effects of those factors shown to influence cooperation can be investigated in regard 
to each individual interaction. 
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A summary of the relevant factors included in this analysis is displayed in Table 10. 
To maximise the available statistical power for the present analysis, all variables were 
coded into binary categories. As such, the facial expressions of interaction Partners 1 
and 2 were coded to reflect whether or not the partner was exhibiting a genuine smile 
(i.e. GENSMILE). The facial expression of interaction Partner 3 (who only exhibited 
posed smiles) was coded to reflect whether or not she was exhibiting an open mouth 
posed smile (i.e. OPENPOSED). Participants' social value orientation as assessed 
using the decomposed games task (see above) was coded to reflect whether or not 
they were classified as prosocial (i.e. PROSOCIAL). Participants' facial expressions 
were coded to reflect whether or not they exhibited a genuine smile during the 
interaction being modelled (i.e. PPTGENSM). 
Table 10: Independent Variables for Logistic Regression Analysis, Experiment 3. 
Variable 
GENSMILE* 
OPENPOSED** 
PROSOCIAL 
PPTGENSM 
COOPNEUT 
COOPINTI 
Description 
facial expression of interaction partner was genuine smile 
(reference condition = posed). 
Facial expression of interaction partner was open mouth posed 
smile (reference condition = closed mouth posed smile). 
participant had a 'prosocial' Social Value Orientation 
(reference condition = pro-self). 
participant genuinely smiled during interaction 
(reference condition = no genuine smile). 
participant cooperated during the neutral interaction with this 
partner (reference condition = competed neutral interaction). 
participant cooperated during the first interaction with this partner 
(reference condition = competed first interaction). 
Note: All variables were coded to predict the likelihood of making a cooperative 
choice for the interaction being modelled. 
* = Interaction Partners 1 and 2 only. ** = Interaction Partner 3 only. 
244 
Interaction order was also considered in the present analysis by modelling each 
interaction separately, however this sti11leaves open the possibility that parti~ipants 
simply cooperated with one partner more than the others. To take account of the 
history with any given interaction partner, responses to the neutral expression 
interaction with the same participant as for the interaction being modelled were coded 
to reflect whether the participant cooperated or not (i.e. COOPNEUT), as were 
responses to the first interaction with that participant (i.e. COOPINTl). The mood of 
participants was not included in the present analysis as it was shown to only have 
relevance for cooperation with an interaction partner exhibiting a neutral expression, 
while the focus here is on cooperative behaviour as a function of posed and genuine 
smiles. The dependent variable (whether the participant cooperated or competed on 
the interaction being modelled) was coded such that the independent variables were 
predicting the likelihood that the participant's response was cooperative. 
It is acknowledged that the sample size of the present study is a limiting factor with 
regard to the statistical significance of any effects revealed. However, it is suggested 
that even in these circumstances, a multivariate approach to the present data provides 
value in that the general trends in any relationship revealed between smile veracity 
and cooperation can be examined while controlling for other relevant factors. Hence, 
the logistic regression analysis was performed by fitting the data to a binary logit 
model using the PROC LOGISTIC procedure in the SAS statistical software package. 
Each smiling interaction with each partner was modelled separately. Initially, each 
factor was entered into the model in a univariate manner, before all factors were 
entered simultaneously into a multivariate model. As the present analysis is primarily 
intended to assess the influence of smile veracity on cooperative behaviour in the 
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Prisoners' Dilemma task while controlling for other relevant factors, particular 
emphasis is given to the odds ratios reported. In regard to the present analysis, the 
reported odds ratios (OR) can be interpreted to reflect the likelihood of cooperation, 
given the factor of interest. For example, ifthe variable GENS MILE has an OR of 
2.00, this suggests that cooperation is twice as likely when the interaction partner was 
genuinely smiling compared to when they were exhibiting a posed smile. The results 
are presented below for each interaction partner separately. Consistent with the aims 
of this study, the emphasis within the interpretation of these results is on the influence 
of the facial expression of the interaction partners on the likelihood of participants to 
cooperate. To this end, an approximate guideline for assessing such effects in the 
present research is to consider odds ratios greater than 2 (a doubling in the likelihood 
of cooperation) to be indicative of a general trend. However, consideration here 
should also be given to the associated probability levels (p-values) as estimates of the 
general statistical significance of any variables shown to influence cooperation 
according to the general conventions (i.e. p < 0.05 is considered statistically 
significant) . 
Partner 1. 
Table 11 displays the frequency of cooperative and competitive choices for 
interactions with Partner 1 (open mouth posed and genuine smiles) for each of the 
independent variables included in the logistic regression analysis. With regard to the 
variable PPTGENSM (i.e. whether the participant exhibited a genuine smile during 
the course of the interaction), the expressions of two participants were not able to be 
coded for either interaction (one because her glasses and hair obscured her face and 
the other because she moved out of the camera shot during the procedure), and an 
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additional participant's expressions could not be coded for the second interaction 
(because her hair obscured her face for this interaction only). A visual inspection of 
the percentage of cooperative choices associated with each variable provides an initial 
confirmation of the trend observed in the analysis presented above in that the 
partner's facial expression appears to be influencing cooperation, especially during 
Table 11: Summary of participant responses (competed or cooperated) for interactions 
with Partner 1 (open mouth posed and genuine smiles) during the Prisoners' Dilemma 
task for each predictor variable in the logistic regression analysis, Experiment 3. 
Participant response 
Variable Cooperated Competed Coop % 
Interaction 1 
GENSMILE Genuine smile 11 3 78.6% 
Posed smile 9 6 60.0% 
PROSOCIAL Prosocial 11 4 73.3% 
Pro-self 9 5 65.3% 
PPTGENSM Genuine smile 11 5 59.3% 
No genuine smile 7 4 40.7% 
COOPNEUT Coop(neutral int.) 11 5 68.8% 
Comp(neutral int.) 9 4 69.2% 
Interaction 2 
GENSMILE Genuine smile 8 7 53.3% 
Posed smile 7 7 50.0% 
PROSOCIAL Prosocial 12 3 80.0% 
Pro-self 3 11 21.4% 
PPTGENSM Genuine smile 6 6 50.0% 
No genuine smile 8 6 57.1% 
COOPNEUT Coop(neutral int.) 10 6 62.5% 
Comp(neutral int.) 5 8 38.5% 
COOPINTI Coop( 1 st int.) 11 9 55.0% 
Comp(lst int.) 4 5 44.4% 
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the first interaction with this participant. Social value orientation also appears to have 
a strong effect on cooperation, particularly for the second interaction. 
All variables were initially entered individually into a logistic regression to estimate 
the extent of the relationship between that variable and cooperation. Subsequently all 
variables were entered into the same model simultaneously. The results from both the 
univariate and multivariate models are displayed in Table 12. Although no variables 
predicted cooperation to a statistically significant degree, it can be seen that during 
their first interaction, participants were approximately 2.5 times more likely to 
cooperate with Partner 1 if she was expressing a genuine smile compared to a posed 
smile. This result obtained when smile type was considered as a single predictor 
variable, as well as when the influence of the other predictors were controlled for. 
However, for the second interaction with Partner 1, smile veracity appeared to be 
umelated to cooperation. For this interaction, the social value orientation of 
participants predicted cooperation to a statistically significant extent (p < 0.01). 
Prosocial participants were, all else being equal, approximately 18 times more likely 
to cooperate on their second interaction with Partner 1 than were non-pro social 
participants. There was also an indication of a trend toward those participants who 
cooperated with Partner 1 when she was exhibiting a neutral expression, also 
cooperating with her during their second smile interaction. 
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Table 12: Summary oflogistic regression analysis for variables predicting cooperation 
for interactions with Partner 1 (open mouth posed and genuine smiles) by interaction 
order, Experiment 3. 
Variable Std Est.(error) X2 p OR (95% CI) 
Interaction 1 
Univariate models 
GENSMILE 0.89 (0.84) 1.13 0.29 2.44 (0.47-12.63) 
PROSOCIAL 0.42 (0.81) 0.28 0.60 1.53 (0.31-7.44) 
PPTGENSM 0.23 (0.83) 0.08 0.78 1.26 (0.25-6.38) 
COOPNEUT -0.02 (0.81) 0.01 0.98 0.98 (0.20-4.76) 
Multivariate model 
GENS MILE 0.96 (0.91) 1.09 0.30 2.60 (0.43-15.61) 
PROSOCIAL 0.64 (0.93) 0.48 0.49 1.90 (0.31-11.84) 
PPTGENSM 0.14 (0.97) 0.02 0.88 1.15 (0.17-7.75) 
COOPNEUT -0.08 (0.86) 0.01 0.93 0.92 (0.17-5.03) 
Interaction 2 
Univariate models 
GENSMILE 0.13 (0.74) 0.03 0.86 1.14 (0.27-4.91) 
PROSOCIAL 2.69 (0.92) 8.58 <0.01 14.66 (2.43-88.49) 
PPTGENSM -0.29 (0.79) 0.13 0.72 0.75 (0.16-3.53) 
COOPNEUT 0.98 (0.77) 1.63 0.20 2.67 (0.59-12.04) 
COOPINT1 0.42 (0.81) 0.28 0.60 1.53 (0.31-7.44) 
Multivariate model 
GENSMILE -0.24(1.06) 0.05 0.82 0.79 (0.10-6.33) 
PROSOCIAL 2.92 (1.08) 7.30 <0.01 18.61 (2.32-155.1) 
PPTGENSM 0.28 (1.06) 0.07 0.79 1.33 (0.17-10.69) 
COOPNEUT 0.93 (1.06) 0.77 0.38 2.52 (0.32-20.05) 
COOPINT1 0.80 (1.15) 1.15 0.49 2.22 (0.24-21.03) 
Partner 2. 
The frequencies of competitive and cooperative choices for interactions with Partner 2 
(closed mouth posed and genuine smiles) are displayed in Table 13. As for Partner 1, 
no data regarding participants' facial expressions were included for two participants 
for the first interaction, and for three participants for the second interaction with 
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Partner 2 (see above for details). An inspection of the percentage of cooperative 
choice displayed in Table 13 indicates that smile veracity influenced cooperation for 
both interactions, but more so for interaction 2. 
Table 13: Summary of participant responses (competed or cooperated) for interactions 
with Partner 2 (closed mouth posed and genuine smiles) during the Prisoners' 
Dilemma task for each predictor variable in the logistic regression analysis, 
Experiment 3. 
Participant response 
Variable Cooperated Competed Coop rate 
Interaction 1 
GENS MILE Genuine smile 12 6 66.7% 
Posed smile 6 5 54.6% 
PROSOCIAL Prosocial 12 3 80.0% 
Pro-self 6 8 42.9% 
PPTGENSM Genuine smile 12 5 70.6% 
No genuine smile 5 5 50.0% 
COOPNEUT Coop(neutral int.) 15 4 79.0% 
Comp(neutral int.) 3 7 30.0% 
Interaction 2 
GENSMILE Genuine smile 7 4 63.6% 
Posed smile 7 11 38.9% 
PROSOCIAL Prosocial 9 6 60.0% 
Pro-self 5 9 35.7% 
PPTGENSM Genuine smile 4 6 40.0% 
No genuine smile 8 8 50.0% 
COOPNEUT Coop(neutral int.) 7 12 36.8% 
Comp(neutral int.) 7 3 70.0% 
COOPINTI Coop( 1 st int.) 9 9 50.0% 
Comp(lst int.) 5 6 45.5% 
Furthermore, the social value orientation of participants appears to have influenced 
cooperation for both interactions, while both the facial expression of the participant, 
and their choice to compete or cooperate during the neutral interaction with this 
partner seemed to' influence cooperation, although in different directions for each 
interaction. 
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All variables were initially entered individually into a logistic regression to estimate 
the extent of the relationship between that variable and cooperation. Subsequently all 
variables were entered into the same model simultaneously. The results from both the 
univariate and multivariate models are displayed in Table 14. For the first interaction 
with Partner 2, smile veracity did not appear to influence cooperation (although the 
direction of the effect was consistent with that hypothesised). However, for this 
interaction, both social value orientation and the participant's response when 
interacting with Partner 2 exhibiting a neutral expression were related to cooperation. 
Specifically, when all other variables were controlled, prosocial participants were 
approximately 7.7 times more likely to cooperate on their first interaction with Partner 
2 than were non-pro social participants. Furthermore, those participants who 
cooperated with Partner 2 on the neutral expression interaction were approximately 18 
times more likely to cooperate on their first interaction with Partner 2 than those who 
competed during the neutral interaction trial. This effect was statistically significant (p 
< 0.05). 
For the second interaction with Partner 2 however, smile veracity did appear to 
influence cooperation. After controlling for all other factors, for their second 
interaction with Partner 2, participants were shown to be approximately 3.6 times 
more likely to cooperate if she was expressing a genuine smile compared to a posed 
smile. Also relevant to this interaction was the participant's response to their 
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interaction with Partner 2 when she was exhibiting a neutral expression. However, 
contrary to the previous interaction, participants who had cooperated with Pa~tner 2 
when she displayed a neutral expression were approximately 6 times less likely to 
cooperate than those who had competed during the neutral interaction trial. 
Table 14: Summary oflogistic regression analysis for variables predicting cooperation 
for interactions with Partner 2 (closed mouth posed and genuine smiles) by interaction 
order. 
Variable Std Est.(error) X2 p OR (95% CI) 
Interaction 1 
Univariate models 
GENSMILE 0.51 (0.79) 0.42 0.51 1.67 (0.36-7.77) 
PROSOCIAL 1.67 (0.84) 3.96 0.05 5.33 (1.03-27.76) 
PPTGENSM 0.88 (0.83) 1.12 0.29 2.40 (0.48-12.13) 
COOPNEUT 2.17 (0.89) 5.93 0.01 8.75 (1.53-50.11) 
Multivariate model 
GENSMILE OAI (1.04) 0.16 0.70 1.50 (0.20-11.44) 
PROSOCIAL 2.04 (1.24) 2.70 0.10 7.71 (0.68-87.90) 
PPTGENSM -0.02 (1.09) 0.01 0.99 0.98 (0.12-8.40) 
COOPNEUT 2.90 (1.26) 2.70 0.02 18.11 (1.54-213.3) 
Interaction 2 
Univariate models 
GENSMILE 1.01 (0.79) 1.63 0.20 2.75 (0.58-12.98) 
PROSOCIAL 0.99 (0.77) 1.68 0.20 2.70 (0.60-12.15) 
PPTGENSM -0.41 (0.82) 0.25 0.62 0.67 (0.14-3.30) 
COOPNEUT -1.39 (0.84) 2.74 0.10 0.25 (0.48-1.29) 
COOPINT1 0.18 (0.76) 0.06 0.81 1.20 (0.27-5.40) 
Multivariate model 
GENSMILE 1.23 (1.03) 1.58 0.21 3.64 (0.48-27.34) 
PROSOCIAL 0.66 (1.01) 0.43 0.51 1.93 (0.27-14.00) 
PPTGENSM -0.83 (1.0J) 0.68 0.41 0.44 (0.20-3.16) 
COOPNEUT -1.95 (1.28) 2.33 0.13 0.14 (0.01-1.74) 
COOPINT1 0.99 (1.32) 0.56 0.45 2.71 (0.20-36.23) 
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Partner 3. 
Table 15 displays the frequencies of competitive and cooperative responses to 
interactions with Partner 3 (closed and open mouth posed smiles). No data regarding 
participants' facial expressions were included for two participants across both the first 
and second interactions with Partner 3 (see above for details). A visual inspection of 
Table 15: Summary of participant responses (competed or cooperated) for interactions 
with Partner 3 (closed mouth posed smile and open mouth posed smile) during the 
Prisoners' Dilemma task for each predictor variable in the logistic regression analysis, 
Experiment 3. 
Participant response 
Variable Cooperated Competed Coop rate 
Interaction 1 
OPENPOSED Open mouth posed 10 5 66.7% 
Closed mouth posed 7 7 50.0% 
PROSOCIAL Prosocial 10 5 66.7% 
Pro-self 7 7 50.0% 
PPTGENSM Genuine smile 7 7 50.0% 
No genuine smile 8 5 61.5% 
COOPNEUT Coop(neutral int.) 14 5 73.7% 
Comp(neutral int.) 3 7 30.0% 
Interaction 2 
OPENPOSED Open mouth posed 5 9 35.7% 
Closed mouth posed 7 8 46.7% 
PROSOCIAL Prosocial 8 7 53.3% 
Pro-self 4 10 28.6% 
PPTGENSM Genuine smile 5 6 45.5% 
No genuine smile 6 10 37.5% 
COOPNEUT Coop(neutral int.) 9 10 47.4% 
Comp(neutral int.) 3 7 30.0% 
COOPINTI Coop( 1 st int.) 9 8 52.9% 
Comp(1st int.) 3 9 25.0% 
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the percentage of cooperative choices displayed in Table 15 indicates that cooperation 
was more frequent when Partner 3 was exhibiting an open mouth posed smile for 
Interaction 1, but less frequent for Interaction 2. There is also an indication that a 
prosocial value orientation led to more cooperation, as did cooperating with Partner 3 
during the neutral interaction trial, or during Interaction 1. 
All variables were initially entered individually into a logistic regression to estimate 
the extent ofthe relationship between that variable and cooperation. Subsequently, all 
variables were entered into the same model simultaneously. The results from both the 
univariate and multivariate models are displayed in Table 16. For the first interaction, 
participants were approximately 3.3 times more likely to cooperate if Partner 3 was 
displaying an open mouth posed smile compared to a closed mouth posed smile, once 
all other factors were controlled for. Furthermore, those who cooperated with Partner 
3 when she displayed a neutral expression were approximately 5.9 times more likely 
to cooperate on their first interaction with her than those who competed on the neutral 
interaction trial. With all other factors controlled for, this effect approached statistical 
significance (p = 0.07). There also appears to be a trend toward a negative association 
between participants' genuine smiles and cooperation. Participants who exhibited one 
or more genuine smiles during their first interaction with Partner 3 were 
approximately 3 times less likely to cooperate on this interaction than those who did 
not display any genuine smiles. 
In regard to the second interaction with Partner 3, the type of smile displayed by 
Partner 3 appeared to influence cooperation, although only when all other factors 
were controlled for. When smile type was considered as a single predictor of 
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cooperation, there was a very weak trend toward closed mouth posed smiles being 
cooperated with more frequently than open mouth posed smiles. 
Table 16: Summary of logistic regression analysis for variables predicting cooperation 
with Partner 3 (closed mouth posed smile and open mouth posed smile) by interaction 
order, Experiment 3. 
Variable Std Est.(error) X2 p OR (95% CI) 
Interaction 1 
Univariate models 
OPENPOSE 0.69 (0.76) 0.82 0.37 2.00 (0.45-8.96) 
PROSOCIAL 0.69 (0.76) 0.82 0.37 2.00 (0.45-8.96) 
PPTGENSM -0.47 (0.78) 0.36 0.55 0.63 (0.14-2.89) 
COOPNEUT 1.88 (0.86) 4.71 0.03 6.53 (1.20-35.73) 
Multivariate model 
OPENPOSE 1.19 (1.18) 1.01 0.31 3.28 (0.32-33.20) 
PROSOCIAL -0.29 (1.08) 0.07 0.79 0.75 (0.09-6.14) 
PPTGENSM -1.18 (1.09) 1.16 0.28 0.31 (0.04-2.63) 
COOPNEUT 1.78 (0.99) 3.25 0.07 5.93 (0.86-41.16) 
Interaction 2 
Univariate models 
OPENPOSE -0.45 (0.76) 0.36 0.55 0.64 (0.14-2.82) 
PROSOCIAL 1.05 (0.79) 1.78 0.18 2.86 (0.61-13.34) 
PPTGENSM 0.33 (0.80) 0.17 0.68 1.39 (0.29-6.61) 
COOPNEUT 0.74 (0.83) 0.80 0.37 2.10 (0.41-10.66) 
COOPINT1 1.22 (0.83) 2.17 0.14 3.38 (0.67-17.00) 
Multivariate model 
OPENPOSE 0.92 (1.07) 0.74 0.39 2.51 (0.31-20.43) 
PROSOCIAL 2.51 (1.35) 3.46 0.06 12.34 (0.87-174.5) 
PPTGENSM 1.39 (1.23) 1.28 0.26 4.03 (0.36-45.07) 
COOPNEUT 0.09 (1.09) 0.01 0.94 1.09 (0.13-9.31) 
COOPINT1 1.02 (1.01) 1.02 0.31 2.77 (0.39-19.94) 
However, in the multivariate model, the direction of this effect was reversed. When 
all other predictors were controlled for, participants were approximately 2.5 times 
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more likely to cooperate when Partner 3 was exhibiting an open mouth posed smile 
than when she was exhibiting a closed mouth posed smile, although this effect 
remained weak. The social value orientation of participants was also relevant to 
cooperation for this interaction in that prosocial participants were approximately 12.3 
times more likely to cooperate than pro-self participants. This effect approached 
statistical significance (p = 0.06). Furthermore, participants who exhibited one or 
more genuine smiles during their second interaction with Partner 3 were 
approximately 4 times more likely to cooperate during this interaction than those who 
displayed no genuine smiles. Finally, those who cooperated with Partner 3 during 
their previous interaction were approximately 2.8 times more likely cooperate on 
Interaction 2 than those who had previously competed. 
Discussion 
Overall, the results from Experiment 3 clearly indicate that, as predicted, cooperative 
behaviour in the context of the Prisoners' Dilemma game was influenced by the facial 
expression of the interaction partner. Specifically, participants showed a greater 
proclivity to cooperate with a partner exhibiting a genuine smile than with a partner 
exhibiting a posed smile. Furthermore, posed smiles with features that have been 
previously shown to be associated with these expressions being misperceived as 
genuine smiles (i.e. open mouth posed smiles that expose the teeth, see Experiments 
I a and I b) appeared to attract more cooperative behaviour than posed smiles without 
this feature. In addition, the relationship revealed between genuine smiles exhibited 
by the participants and cooperation with genuinely smiling partners is also consistent 
with the prediction that genuine smiles specify a willingness to cooperate. Together, 
these findings provide support for the hypothesised relationship between smile 
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veracity and cooperation. Consistent with Owren and Bachorowski' s (2001) account 
of the function of smiling in social interactions, it appears as -though genuine smiles 
facilitate cooperation when they are perceived and expressed. 
An interesting finding to emerge from this experiment is that cooperation rates did not 
appear to differ between interactions with a partner exhibiting a neutral expression or 
in interactions with a partner exhibiting a genuine smile. Initially, this may be taken as 
evidence contrary to the hypothesised function of genuine smiles in social interaction. 
To this end, it may be that an inhibitory effect of posed smiles rather than a facilitory 
effect of genuine smiles on cooperative behaviour, accounts for the current findings. It 
can be speculated that posed smiles specify information that encourages competitive 
behaviour rather than genuine smiles specifying opportunities to cooperate. Given that 
posed smiles are believed to specify motives or intentions rather than opportunities 
related to emotional experience, it could be that in the context of a social dilemma the 
affordances specified by any given posed smile lack direct relevance, when compared 
with genuine smiles, to the situation at hand. In this case, participants may be more 
inclined to compete with partners exhibiting posed smiles in that this may well be the 
more rational behaviour given the lack of relevant, emotion specific information 
regarding the partner's likely behaviour in a dilemma situation. Alternatively, the lack 
of significant differences in the cooperation rates for interactions with neutral and 
genuinely smiling partners may be the result of the design of the current experiment. 
Consistent with the present data, previous literature regarding the effects on 
cooperative behaviour of multiple trials of social dilemma type interactions has 
reported that typically, cooperation rates are highest during the initial interaction and 
decline on subsequent interactions (Komorita & Parks, 1995; Parks, Sanna, & Berel, 
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2001; Van Lange et aI., 1992). The design for Experiment 3 required that all 
participants interact with all partners exhibiting a neutral expression before any 
interactions with a smiling partner took place. Thus, it is not possible to confirm from 
the present research whether the cooperation rate for interactions with partners 
exhibiting a neutral expression was elevated as a function of these interactions always 
taking place before any of the smiling interactions, or alternatively, that posed smiles 
led to an increase in competitive behaviour rather than genuine smiles facilitating 
cooperation. Although this issue awaits further research, the previous literature 
relevant to these effects indicates that the former explanation regarding the order of 
interactions is probably more likely if it is assumed that behaviour of participants in 
the present dilemma situation is generally consistent with that reported for other 
similar studies. 
The results from the multivariate models, although somewhat limited by the sample 
size of the present study, also lend support to the prediction that genuine smiles 
specify an opportunity to cooperate. During both the first interaction with Partner 1 
and the second interaction with Partner 2, participants made more cooperative choices 
when their partner was exhibiting a genuine smile as compared to a posed smile. 
Importantly, for both interaction partners, this trend remained when all other relevant 
factors were controlled for. Furthermore, the results from interactions with Partner 3 
also suggest that participants were more likely to cooperate when their partner was 
exhibiting a posed smile with the teeth exposed than a posed smile without exposing 
the teeth. Although this may be taken as evidence against the current hypothesis that 
only genuine smiles specify cooperability, it should be noted that overall, cooperation 
rates for interactions with this partner were lower than for either of the other two 
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partners (i.e. PI = 60.3%, P2 = 55.2%, P3 = 50%). Therefore, a more likely 
explanation is that the perceptual bias associated with smiles that expose the .teeth 
resulted in the posed smiles of Partner 3 with this feature being misperceived by some 
participants as genuine smiles and, therefore, attracted more cooperative behaviour, 
consistent with the findings reported for Experiments la and 1b (see Chapter 4). 
A somewhat puzzling aspect of these results concerns the different effects of 
interaction order between interaction partners. Although there is no evidence to 
directly indicate why the effect of smile veracity was only influential for the first 
interaction with Partner 1, but was not observed until the second interaction with 
Partner 2, it is suggested that this may have resulted in part as an artefact of the 
procedure employed, and in part as a function of the differences between the two sets 
of smiles. The characteristics of Partner l' s smiles (i.e. open mouth with teeth 
exposed) have been found to result in readily identifiable genuine smiles, but also 
posed smiles that are commonly misperceived as genuine smiles (see Experiments la 
and 1 b), leading to the expectation that cooperation rates for interactions with this 
partner would be higher than for the other interaction partners. The present data do 
indeed reflect this; for their first interaction with Partner 1, participants cooperated on 
79% of trials when she was genuinely smiling and 60% of trials when she was posing 
a smile, with both of these rates exceeding those found when all interactions with all 
partners were considered (i.e. 66% cooperation for genuine smiles, and 50% 
cooperation for posed smiles). However, when it came to the second interaction with 
Partner 1, the overall cooperation rates were substantially lower (53% for genuine 
smile interactions, 50% for posed smile interactions). 
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It is hypothesised that those participants who, in their initial interaction with Partner 1 
cooperated when she was exhibiting a posed smile, did so as a result of misperceiving 
this expression as a genuine smile. If this is the case, then perhaps upon viewing 
Partner l' s genuine smile during interaction 2, the previous misperception leads some 
participants to, in effect, be viewing a second genuine smile. In fact, the cooperation 
rates for these participants (i.e. those who viewed Partner l's posed smile in their first 
interaction and therefore viewed her genuine smile in their second interaction) were 
very similar between interactions (i.e. 60% cooperation for interaction 1 and 53% 
cooperation for interaction 2, in terms of the raw data 9 of 15 participants cooperated 
on interaction 1, and 8 of 15 participants cooperated on interaction 2). On the other 
hand, those participants who initially interacted with Partner 1 when she was 
exhibiting a genuine smile were already familiar with this expression when they 
encountered her posed smile. It is suggested that such familiarity provided these 
participants with a standard for comparison with regard to the veracity of Partner l's 
posed smile, and were therefore better informed regarding the physiognomy of 
Partner l' s smiles when it came to this interaction. Indeed, those participants who 
initially interacted with Partner 1 when she was exhibiting a genuine smile showed 
substantially different rates of cooperation between their first (79%) and second 
interactions (50%) with this partner. Thus, it is suggested that the characteristics of 
Partner l' s smiles, in combination with the order of interactions (i.e. posed or genuine 
first) resulted in differences in the accuracy of the detection of smile veracity and, in 
tum, produced different influences of this variable on cooperation depending on the 
interaction in question. 
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In contrast, for Partner 2, smile veracity was influential with regard to predicting 
cooperation during the second interaction, but not the first. However, a similar 
explanation can also be proposed to account for this finding. Again, those participants 
whose first interaction with Partner 2 was when she was exhibiting a genuine smile 
were able to subsequently judge the veracity of her second smile with some form of 
standard for comparison (i.e. her genuine smile). These participants cooperated for 
67% of their first trials with Partner 2 (i.e. when she was exhibiting a genuine smile), 
but only 39% of their second trials with her (i.e. when she was exhibiting a posed 
smile). This strong tendency to compete with Partner 2 when she was expressing a 
posed smile was not observed for those participants whose posed smile interaction 
was their first with Partner 2 (i.e. these participants cooperated on 55% of their posed 
smile trials with Partner 2). Again, therefore, it is suggested that prior exposure to a 
genuine smile facilitated accuracy in detecting a posed smile. Furthermore, the 
characteristics of Partner 2's smiles (i.e. closed mouth smiles with no teeth exposed) 
meant that, unlike interactions with Partner 1, participants were less likely to 
misperceive a posed smile as a genuine smile when interacting with Partner 2. As a 
result, those participants who viewed Partner 2' s posed smile first, were less likely to 
misperceive this expression as a genuine smile and therefore more likely to 
subsequently perceive Partner 2's genuine smile as an expression distinct from the 
previous one. Hence, again the characteristics of the interaction partner's smiles, in 
combination with interaction order, differentially influenced cooperation as a function 
of smile veracity and interaction number (i.e. first or second). 
The present findings are also consistent with the relevant previous literature reviewed. 
As mentioned above, the overall rate of cooperation (57%) for the Prisoners' 
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Dilemma task was consistent with that expected for the payoff matrix employed (see 
Figure 4 and Appendix M) and the fact that participants were interacting in a face-to-
face manner with their partners (Sally, 1995). Furthermore, factors previously shown 
to influence cooperation in Prisoners' Dilemma settings, in particular the social value 
orientation of participants, were also shown here to have a systematic influence on 
cooperative behaviour. Importantly, the present results are also, in part, consistent 
with the earlier research reported by Scharlemann et al. (2001), as well as those 
reported by Brown and Moore (2002) concerning smiling and cooperation. One 
difference in the pattern of results revealed in the present study compared to those 
reported by Scharlemann et al. is the fact that in this research not all smiles facilitated 
cooperation.92 As described above, it is possible that the fact that all participants 
interacted with their partners exhibiting neutral expressions first, influenced 
cooperation rates for these interactions. Alternatively, it could be argued that in the 
present study posed smiles inhibited cooperative behaviour. Regardless of these 
considerations, the present research provides an extension to the findings of 
Scharlemann et al. in that the nature of the smile employed as a representation of the 
interaction partner was shown to influence cooperation in the Prisoners' Dilemma 
situation. The present results are also consistent with those reported by Brown and 
Moore, in that greater cooperation was observed for interactions with a partner 
represented as exhibiting a genuine smile compared to interactions with a partner 
posing a smile. Thus, the present study provides advancement on both of these earlier 
studies, particularly with respect to the use of ecologically valid facial displays and 
the realistic simulation of actual face-to-face interactions. 
92 Although this issue is confounded somewhat by the fact that Scharlemann et al. did not report the 
veracity of the smiles they employed. 
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Thus, there is evidence from both the initial analyses when the overall cooperation 
rates across all interactions were considered, and the separate multivariate modelling 
of each interaction with each partner, to indicate that smile veracity influenced 
cooperation in a Prisoners' Dilemma situation. However, before these results can be 
evaluated with regard to the theoretical accounts of the function of posed and genuine 
smiles in social interaction surveyed above, a number of potential limitations of the 
present experiment need to be examined. Although there was sufficient statistical 
power to reveal significant differences in cooperation rates between interactions with 
posed and genuine smiling partners when all interactions were considered together, 
the sample size of the present study was a limiting factor for the multivariate analysis. 
While clear trends in relation to smile type and veracity were shown in this analysis, 
when these effects were evident they did not reach statistical significance. This should 
not necessarily be taken as an indication that the results of the logistic regression 
analyses lacked validity, as factors previously shown to have a strong relationship to 
cooperation (i.e. Social Value Orientation) did indeed predict cooperative choices at 
statistically significant levels. Instead, it is likely that within the complexity of the 
face-to-face Prisoners' Dilemma interaction, the size of the effects of smile veracity 
on cooperation were not as large as those produced by other factors. Hence, it is 
argued here that the trends revealed in the multivariate analysis relevant to the 
relationship between smile veracity and cooperation do indeed accurately reflect this 
relationship within the present data. 
Furthermore, some authors have questioned the external validity of experimental 
games such as the Prisoners' Dilemma. For instance, Nemeth (1972) objected to the 
lack of mundane realism in laboratory-based social dilemma situations on the basis 
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that these procedures are often only minimally social and do not reflect the richness of 
real-world social interaction. In addition, Kollock (1998), in a substantial review of 
the social dilemma literature, criticised the conduct of many such experimental games 
in research settings on the basis that participants were not motivated by incentives 
equivalent to those which may be available in social dilemmas outside the laboratory. 
For instance, in this regard Kollock commented that "it is entirely possible that many 
of the inconclusive or contradictory results that are reported in the literature are due in 
part to subjects being faced with outcomes that are trivial" (p. 207). ' 
Both of these criticisms are rejected in relation to the present study. Firstly, many of 
the aspects of an actual interaction were present in the procedure employed. In 
particular, the apparently face-to-face interaction between the participant and her 
interaction partner represents a level of ecological validity only rarely found in social 
dilemma research. With the exception of research that directly examined the effects of 
communication in social dilemma settings (e.g. see Sally, 1995; 2000), the majority of 
research in this area required participants to interact with direct social contact. 
Admittedly, the interactions in the present research were not actual social interactions, 
but it can be inferred from the fact that no participant reported any suspicion that their 
interaction partner was not actually present that the situation was perceived as real. 
Indeed, a number of participants even attempted to communicate with their partners 
by waving or saying hello, and many blushed during the phases of the procedure 
when they thought the partner could see them. Secondly, before the beginning of each 
task participants were reminded verbally and in written instructions that the more 
points or resources that they accumulated during the interaction tasks, the more they 
would be paid at the end of the experiment. Thus, all participants were under the 
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illusion that they could earn up to $25 for their participation, but if they perfonned 
poorly, they would only earn $5. Although these amounts are by no means large, it is 
suggested that the difference between the maximum and minimum potential earnings 
was sufficient to motivate participants, who were all university students, to behave in 
ways that secured themselves the largest possible amount, or at least as they would in 
a similar situation outside of the laboratory, where payoffs are also non-trivial. Hence, 
the level of mundane realism in the present study was sufficient to generalise, with 
some confidence, from the experimental setting to an actual interaction. The use of 
ecologically valid facial displays, sufficient incentive to motivate participants to take 
the task seriously, and an elaborate procedure to ensure participants believed they 
were actually interacting with other participants, together provide grounds for the 
generalisation of these results to situations outside the laboratory setting. 
In a more general sense, the results of the present research can be taken as preliminary 
support for Owren and Bachorowski' s (200 1 ) recent evolutionary theory regarding the 
function of smiling during social exchange. In particular, the significant difference in 
cooperation rates between posed and genuine smile interactions offers direct support 
for the proposition that the detection of a genuine smile provides the individual with 
infonnation specifying an opportunity for cooperative behaviour, inasmuch as a 
positive emotional state relates to a commitment to cooperate. In addition, the 
observed trend whereby posed smiles with features that have previously been 
associated with these expressions are misperceived as genuine smiles (i.e. open mouth 
with teeth exposed), also attracted higher rates of cooperation than posed smiles 
without this feature, is also consistent with the claim that genuine smiling facilitates 
cooperation. However, the evidence is less clear when it comes to the role of the 
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facial expressions of the participants in predicting cooperative behaviour. Although 
there was a relationship between the number of genuine smiles displayed by . 
participants and cooperation with genuinely smiling partners, the results of the 
multivariate modelling did not reflect this trend. It may be the case, however, that the 
somewhat disjointed nature of the interactions, in particular the fact that participants 
did not believe their partner could see them when they could see their partner, and the 
delay between transmissions to and from the participant, may have interrupted the 
spontaneous feed-back loop between the detection of a genuine smile and the 
elicitation of positive emotion and further genuine smiling as proposed by Owren and 
Bachorowski. There is no scope within the present methodology to test this notion 
further; hence additional research is required to understand more precisely the 
relationship between the exhibition of a genuine smile and the propensity to 
cooperate. However, the overall relationship between participant genuine smiles and 
cooperation revealed in the present research is still consistent with the claim that 
genuine smiles foster positive emotion and reciprocal cooperation between interaction 
partners. Indeed, the fact that participants' genuine smiles did not relate to 
cooperation when interacting with partners exhibiting either neutral expressions or 
posed smiles is further support for the hypothesised relationship between genuine 
smiles and cooperation. Together, these findings suggest that there is a basis to 
conclude that there is preliminary evidence in support of Owren and Bachorowski' s 
theory. That is, there is evidence to indicate that the detection of a genuine smile 
elicits positive emotion and genuine smiling, and hence, the potential for the 
formation of a reciprocally cooperative relationship between individuals. 
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Returning to the theoretical underpinnings of the present research, it is clear that the 
detection of information specifying a positive emotional state in an interaction partner 
plays some form of functional role in the coordination of social interaction, and 
potentially in the establishment and maintenance of reciprocal, mutual cooperation. 
Individuals exhibiting genuine smiles, as expressions specifying the dispositional 
properties of a person experiencing a positive emotional state, were interacted with 
differently, compared to when they were exhibiting physiognomically and 
ontologically distinct posed smiles. Following McArthur and Baron (1983), it has 
been suggested that information specifying emotional states can be equated to 
information specifying social affordances (see Chapter 2). It has been proposed that 
genuine smiles specify the affordance of cooperability, while posed smiles, as 
expressions unrelated to emotional state, do not. In this sense, the present data show, 
as theorised, that the distinct physiognomies of posed and genuine smiles lead 
individuals to engage with interaction partners exhibiting these expressions in 
systematically different ways. Specifically, in a situation where interaction was 
constrained to either competing or cooperating, genuinely smiling individuals were 
cooperated with more frequently than when they were posing a smile. Thus, it is 
suggested that there is some basis to conclude that genuine, but not posed smiles, 
specify the affordance of cooperability. The information specified by the facial 
expression of an individual experiencing a positive emotional state also specifies an 
opportunity to cooperate in the context of social exchange. Furthermore, the accurate 
detection of this affordance property has been shown to elicit positive emotion and 
genuine smiling in the perceiver (Surakka & Hietanen, 1998), which in turn facilitates 
further positive emotion, and hence the opportunity for mutual cooperation. 
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In this sense therefore, it is asserted that positive emotional state does indeed specify 
affordance-relevant information to the effect that the acquisition of information 
specifying a positive emotional state in others, together with equivalent information 
about the self (i.e. an experience of positive emotion) indicates an opportunity for 
reciprocal cooperative behaviour. The positive relationship between participant 
genuine smiling and cooperation with genuinely smiling individuals supports this 
idea. That is, positive emotion, as referenced by genuine smiling, serves here as 
information about the affordances of the interaction partner, including information for 
the perceiver about their effectivities. Emotional state serves as a 'common currency', 
both for detecting opportunities to cooperate with others, and also for indicating such 
opportunities to others, which together form the reciprocal feed-back loop proposed 
by Owren and Bachorowski to foster cooperative behaviour. Importantly, the fact that 
posed smiles did not attract the same levels of cooperation as genuine smiles, and that 
there was no relationship between participant genuine smiles and cooperation with 
partners exhibiting a posed smile, indicate that there is some form of safe-guard 
against cheating within this proposed mechanism for ensuring effective cooperation. 
Posed smiles, as simulations of a positive emotional state, were not perceived to 
specify the same potential for cooperation as genuine smiles. 
The influence of the order of interactions may also have an interesting ecological 
interpretation. Overall, it appeared that participants were more accurate93 in detecting 
the affordances specified by smiles during the second interaction with the interaction 
partners exhibiting genuine smiles (i.e. Partners 1 and 2) compared to their first 
interaction (see above for a description of these results). Perhaps prior exposure to the 
93 When accuracy is considered to be cooperating when interaction partners were genuinely smiling and 
competing when they were posing a smile. 
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physiognomy of a particular individual's smile provides some basis for comparison 
and therefore leads to enhanced attunement to information specified by that 
individual's facial expressions on subsequent interactions. Given that the manifest 
appearance of the contraction of facial muscles is likely to vary somewhat between 
individuals (due to differences in anatomical structure, adipose facial tissue, skin 
quality, and wrinkling etc.), it may be the case that while social perceivers are 
generally sensitive to the information specifying disposition by means of facial 
expressions, sensitivity to particular individuals expressions may require some degree 
of learning or experience interacting with that individual. In this sense, the 
participants in Experiment 3 may have in fact, by means of some form of short-term 
perceptual learning (E. J. Gibson, 1969, 1992), become more attuned to the 
affordance-relevant information specified by the facial expressions of their interaction 
partners over time. In other words, participants were better able to take advantage of 
the information available relevant to each interaction partner individually once they 
viewed that partner's expression. Presumably, with further experience (i.e. more 
interactions) there would be more opportunity for perceptual learning and therefore 
even greater levels of attunement would be expected. This proposal awaits further 
research. 
To summarise, the results of Experiment 3 provide an important contribution to the 
present research program. On the basis that posed and genuine smiles are 
ontologically distinct and that perceivers can differentiate between these expressions 
based on differences in physiognomy, it was proposed that in a functional sense, 
genuine smiles specify an opportunity to cooperate and posed smiles do not. This 
hypothesis was tested by requiring participants to engage in a series of one-shot 
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Prisoners' Dilemma trials with partners exhibiting either neutral facial expressions, 
posed smiles, or genuine smiles. The results confirmed that participants did indeed 
perceive more opportunity to cooperate with partners exhibiting genuine smiles than 
those exhibiting posed smiles as evidenced by their behaviour in these dilemma 
games. These findings led to the conclusion that posed and genuine smiles do indeed 
specify distinct sets of social affordances, which are, in tum, used by perceivers to 
inform behaviour during social exchange situations. Together the results of 
Experiment 3 represent an original contribution to the social dilemma literature, but 
more importantly, a novel application of Gibsonian ecological psychology to the 
study of social interaction and, in particular, the preliminary identification of 
information specifying the social affordance of cooperability. The final chapter of this 
thesis will discuss in more detail the implications of the present research with regard 
to the ecological approach to psychology and social psychology in particular. 
270 
CHAPTER 7 
Conclusions 
Drawing from the contemporary literature regarding the functional aspects of 
emotion, an argument has been presented suggesting that the accurate detection of the 
emotional state of conspecifics provides direct adaptive benefit to the social perceiver. 
Emotional experiences help the individual regulate their interaction with the 
environment by promoting modes of action readiness relevant to the various events 
and contingencies with which they are confronted. The likely behaviours and 
intentions of a highly aroused and angry individual contrast greatly with those 
expected of someone grieving or otherwise saddened, which are again very different 
from those of a happy person. On this basis, it was argued that the social perceiver is 
well served by knowing the emotional status of interaction partners in order to better 
predict how they may behave, and concomitantly, how they should be interacted with. 
Approaching the angry person while offering comfort and support is less appropriate 
(and potentially more injurious) than behaving in the same manner toward the sad 
individual. However, critical to the effectiveness of such a perception-action cycle is 
the acquisition of information specifying the emotional state of interaction partners. 
Although the emotional state of conspecifics is usually readily identifiable, often by 
means of facial expressions of emotion, it is not always advantageous for individuals 
to reveal such dispositional information. The goals of the angry person (e.g. inflicting 
injury to another) may be hindered if they indicate their intentions, perhaps by 
frowning and baring their teeth in a display of anger, thereby providing an opportunity 
for the intended target to escape or defend themselves. In this situation, the angry 
person may well be advantaged by attempting to mask any indicators of anger or even 
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simulating information specifying other emotional states, for example, by smiling. 
However, for the perceiver to retain the adaptive function accurate social perception 
offers, they must be sensitive to any differences between information that specifies 
emotional state, and intentional attempts to simulate or imitate such information 
without the corresponding emotional experience being present. That is, the social 
perceiver must be sensitive to the differences between genuine and dissembled 
expressions of emotion or else risk misperceiving the emotional state of interaction 
partners, and therefore misperceiving the relevant opportunities for interaction. To 
address these issues, the present research has focussed on investigating (i) whether 
social perceivers can differentiate between spontaneous veridical expressions of 
positive emotion, that is, genuine smiles, and simulations of this expression unrelated 
to emotional state, that is, posed smiles, and (ii) whether sensitivity to the information 
that distinguishes these expressions is useful for guiding social interaction. 
The current investigation was conducted within the theoretical framework of 
Gibsonian ecological psychology (see Chapter 2). An important epistemic claim of 
the ecological approach is that the dispositional properties inherent to an individual's 
environment, including the objects, people, places and events of that environment, can 
be directly perceived without recourse to any form of mediation by mental structures 
(the mental representations and schema of the mind etc.) proposed within the more 
traditional information processing accounts of psychology. For ecological 
psychologists, this is a tenable claim in that information is conceived as the arrays of 
energy that are lawfully structured by, and therefore specify, an environment to an 
individual. The isometric relationship between, for instance, the surfaces of a piece of 
fruit, and the structure of the light reflected off those surfaces, precisely specifies the 
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properties (size, shape, ripeness, edibility etc.) of that piece of fruit to a suitably 
sensitive perceiver (i.e. a perceiver who is sensitive to such structure in the optic 
array). Thus, meaningful information about the environment is available in the 
environment, and therefore, once acquired, needs no further elaboration in order for 
the perceiver to apprehend meaning. In an ontological sense, it is the particular 
dispositional properties of an object, place, or event that lawfully structure the 
ambient array and therefore give rise to the information that specifies that object, 
place, or event to a perceiver. This claim applies equally to the animate (e.g. other 
people) and the inanimate (e.g. a rock) as both have surfaces that structure the 
ambient array in a manner whereby information is isomorphically related to 
disposition. 
Hence, a critical initial step in the present research was to ensure that when perceivers 
were viewing examples of posed and genuine smiles, the information available for 
detection precisely specified the ontological distinction between these expressions. 
There is no scope within the present approach to require perceivers to infer, reason, or 
interpret any information with which they are presented; the information must specify 
exactly what it means94. Thus, any examples of posed and genuine smiles must 
specify the meaningful distinction between these expressions. That is, genuine smiles 
must specify a positive emotional state, while posed smiles must not specify such a 
dispositional property. To this end, an original set of facial expressions was generated 
specifically for use in the present research that met prescribed criteria for ecologically 
valid facial displays (see Chapter 3 for a full description of the facial display 
94 This does not imply that perceivers cannot 'go beyond' any information that is detected, but that in 
the context of the present research, any facial displays employed as experimental materials must 
replicate the relevant information available during the course of an actual real world social interaction, 
thereby obviating any necessity for inference as an artefact of the experimental materials employed. 
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generation procedure and the criteria for ecologically valid facial displays that were 
employed). Essentially, to be considered suitable for use in the present research, any 
facial expression was required to conform to the established physiognomic markers of 
posed and genuine smiles (in brief, genuine smiles were required to show evidence of 
bilateral contraction of the zygomatic major and orbicularis oculi muscles, while 
posed smiles were required to only show evidence of zygomatic major contraction, 
see Chapters 1 and 3 for further details), as well as be expressed in the context of the 
relevant emotional state (i.e. genuine smiles were required to be exhibited in concert 
with self-reported positive mood, while posed smiles were required to be exhibited in 
the absence of strong positive affect).95 To meet these criteria, participants' facial 
expressions were video taped while they were asked to pose a series of smiles, as well 
as when they were listening to, and viewing (positively) affectively laden sounds and 
photographs. Participants were also required to report their mood at various stages 
during the procedure. Only smiles expressed while viewing or listening to the 
affective pictures and sounds, and were accompanied by an increase in self-reported 
mood, and met the criteria for contraction of zygomatic major and orbicularis oculi 
were deemed suitable examples of genuine smiles. Alternatively, to be judged a posed 
smile, an expression was required to be exhibited while intentionally smiling (i.e. 
when given instructions to smile) and evidence of zygomatic major contraction had to 
be present. 
By placing these restrictions on the requirements of the facial displays used in the 
present research, an adequate level of ecological validity was ensured. In short, 
95 A number of other criteria were also prescribed that related more to ensuring the resultant facial 
displays were suitable for the purposes of research materials (e.g. ensuring that factors such as gaze-
direction and the presence of facial hair or spectacles did not unduly bias perceptions of the facial 
expressions) rather than specifically to the ecological validity of the displays per se (see Chapter 3 for 
details). 
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consistent with an ecological approach to psychology, the dispositional status of the 
individual provided the ontological basis for the resultant facial expression, and 
therefore structure in the ambient array of a perceiver (i.e. information) that specified 
such a disposition precisely. Those expressions considered to be genuine smiles were 
spontaneously exhibited in a context whereby positive emotion may be expected (i.e. 
while pictures and listening to sounds that have previously been shown to reliably 
elicit positive affective responses), were accompanied by a self-reported increase in 
the positive mood, and conformed to reliable physiognomic markers of a positive 
emotional experience. In contrast, posed smiles were deliberately expressed in a 
context when a positive affective experience is less likely (e.g. posing for a drivers 
license photograph, albeit an imaginary one) and did not contain physiognomic 
information specific to genuine smiles. Thus, by systematically varying the 
dispositional properties of the individuals exhibiting the target expressions, and 
verifying the resultant facial expressions according to established physiognomic 
criteria (e.g. FACS ratings), it is reasonable to assume that the facial expressions 
generated for use in the present research adequately replicated the information 
available to perceivers during naturalistic, real world, social interactions. In other 
words, the facial displays employed in the present research were of an adequate level 
of ecological validity to enable generalisation from the laboratory to actual social 
interaction. 
The subsequent step in the present research was to provide an initial investigation into 
whether perceivers were sensitive to the meaningful differences between posed and 
genuine smiles, or alternatively, simply deemed these expressions equivalent. 
Although scant, the previous research that has considered this issue has generally 
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indicated that perceivers do in fact differentiate between posed and genuine smiles. 
However, much of this research has suffered from methodological shortcomings that, 
while not critical to the research as a whole, have tended to undermine the 
generalis ability of the results reported (see Chapters 4 and 5 for reviews). To 
overcome these problems, Experiments la, lb, and 2 of the present research were 
intended to replicate and extend the previous literature. Experiments la and lb 
eniployed a modified form of a signal detection task to investigate whether perceivers 
could accurately categorise neutral expression, posed smiles, and genuine smiles as 
reflecting happiness (or not). The results here revealed that although judgments were 
typically accompanied by a degree of bias (see Chapter 4), perceivers could, overall, 
accurately determine which expressions were specific to the experience of happiness, 
regardless of whether the judgments were made from photographs (i.e. static 
expressions) or videos (i.e. dynamic expressions). On this basis, Experiment 2 was 
conducted in order to establish whether such sensitivity was manifest when 
participants were not provided with any explicit instruction or direction to attend to 
facial expressions or emotional states. This study employed a priming procedure 
whereby participants were required to classify a target word as positive or negative. 
Each target word was preceded by a facial expression prime. The results again 
revealed that perceivers were sensitive to the meaningful differences between posed 
and genuine smiles. The identification of positive target words was facilitated by prior 
exposure to a genuine smile, but not a posed smile. Taken together and in concert 
with the previous research, it was suggested that the findings revealed in Experiments 
la, lb and 2 provide evidence to conclude that perceivers can differentiate between 
posed and genuine smiles on the basis of experienced positive emotional state, and in 
fact, remain sensitive to this distinction even without an explicit goal to evaluate 
emotional state. 
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An important finding to emerge from these initial experiments (specifically Ela and 
E 1 b) concerned the role ofthe exposure of the teeth in the context of a smile. While 
perceivers were very accurate when distinguishing posed from genuine closed mouth 
smiles (i.e. smiles that do not expose the teeth), a consistent bias towards 
misidentifying posed smiles as genuine smiles was found for judgments of open 
mouth smiles. It appears that the exposure of the teeth during a smile, although 
irrelevant to the detection of smile veracity (i.e. the teeth can be exposed during a 
genuine smile, but are not specific to genuinely smiling), can lead to the 
misperception of a posed smile as a genuine smile. This finding has some parallel to 
that reported by Frank, Ekman and Friesen (1993), who suggested that factors 
associated with increasing the physiognomic prominence of orbicularis oculi 
contraction (e.g. low intensity zygomatic major contraction) resulted in greater 
accuracy when distinguishing posed from genuine smiles. The exposure of the teeth 
during the course of a smile may simply result from individual differences in facial 
morphology in that for some people moderately intense zygomatic major contraction 
can raise the upper lip and thereby expose the teeth. Often when zygomatic major is 
contracted at a moderate (or greater) intensity the cheeks are pushed upwards toward 
the eyes causing the bagging of skin below the eye orbits (Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 
2002), and a change in physiognomic appearance similar to that when orbicularis 
oculi is contracted (Frank et al.). Thus, participants who incorrectly identified posed 
smiles with the teeth exposed as genuine smiles may have in fact been attuned to 
properties of the facial displays non-specific to smile veracity due to their 
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morphological similarity to information specific to smile veracity. Such attunement to 
task-irrelevant information was therefore misinformative with respect to judging 
smile veracity and consequently resulted in dysfunctional perceptions regarding the 
presence or absence of positive emotional state. 
It is important to note that this is not to infer that the detection of smile veracity 
occurred in some form of probabilistic manner. The information that specifies 
orbicularis oculi contraction can be distinguished from that resulting from moderate 
to high intensity zygomatic major contraction (Ekman et aI., 2002) although 
differences between these facial features may be very subtle. Indeed, the bias 
associated with the display of teeth in Experiments la and Ib was by no means 
unanimous across either participants or target expressions. Hence, individual 
differences in attunement, perhaps akin to differing degrees of social perception 
expertise among participants, as well as the varying physiognomies of the target facial 
displays are likely to have contributed to the variance in bias observed. To return to 
Kahneman's (1973) notion of perceptual readiness (see Chapter 4), it is suggested that 
for those participants who were (assumed to be) less sensitive to the information 
specifying positive emotional state, smiles with the teeth exposed (and therefore 
contained wrinkling below the eyes as a function of zygomatic major contraction) 
were essentially ambiguous in terms of information specifying emotional state (i.e. 
these participants were unable to differentiate the subtle distinctions between 
moderate intensity zygomatic major contraction and orbicularis oculi contraction). 
This situation is similar to the example of the Ames distorted room aforementioned, 
although here there is information specific to emotional state, but it is suggested that 
some perceivers are not sufficiently sensitive to detect it. For some participants posed 
278 
~smiles with the teeth exposed were essentially seen as genuine smiles, because, 
without sufficient information available to determine veracity, any expression with 
the characteristic upturned mouth of a smile and wrinkling around the eyes is seen as 
consistent with the information that specifies a genuine smile and, indeed, positive 
emotional state. 
On the basis that perceivers can determine the ontological status of posed and genuine 
smiles, a third experiment was conducted to investigate whether such sensitivity has a 
functional role in guiding effective social interaction. In Experiment 3, participants 
were required to play several rounds of the Prisoners' Dilemma game with partners 
(actually video recordings) exhibiting neutral expressions, posed smiles, and genuine 
smiles. This experimental set-up was employed in part as an initial assessment of a 
recent evolutionary theory regarding the functional aspects of posed and genuine in 
social interaction (Owren & Bachorowski, 2001). In short, Owren and Bachorowski 
proposed that genuine smiles function to elicit reciprocal cooperation from interaction 
partners. In fact, mutual or reciprocal cooperation has posed a conceptual problem to 
social scientists for some time to the effect that any indication of a willingness to 
cooperate may simultaneously serve as an indicator of an opportunity for exploitation 
by interaction partners. Owren and Bachorowski argued that by means of accurately 
detecting information specific to a positive emotional state (i.e. a genuine smile), the 
social perceiver in fact initiates a feedback loop whereby they too experience positive 
emotion. As a result they also exhibit a genuine smile, which in tum provides 
information specific to this dispositional state back to the original smiling individual. 
Thus, the shared positive emotional state between interaction partners and, in 
particular, the acquisition of information specific to this relationship, provides a 
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means for each party involved in the interaction to engage in cooperative behaviour 
with a similarly committed other. 
The results of Experiment 3 supported the proposition ofOwren and Bachorowski's 
(2001). Participants were significantly more likely to cooperate with an interaction 
partner who was exhibiting a genuine smile, than an interaction partner who was 
exhibiting a posed smile. Furthermore, the perceptual bias manifest in terms of a 
tendency to misidentify posed smiles with the teeth exposed as genuine smiles, which 
was reported for Experiments 1 a and 1 b, was also influential in Experiment 3. 
Participants were more likely to cooperate with partners exhibiting open mouth posed 
smiles compared to closed mouth posed smiles. These are important findings within 
the context of the present research as it represents the first empirical demonstration of 
the functional role of sensitivity to smile veracity within social interaction. 
Furthermore, this effect was demonstrated by using an experimental procedure with a 
level of ecological validity that was adequate, it is argued, to enable generalisation 
beyond the laboratory setting to naturalistic social interactions. Both in the facial 
displays employed (see above and Chapter 3) as well as the constraints on and realism 
inherent to the interaction situation (see Chapter 6) approximated well to the reference 
situation of an actual social interaction. Hence, there is reason to suggest that the 
behavioural outcomes associated with the veracity of smiles exhibited by interaction 
partners within a social dilemma situation (i.e. specifically, a general tendency to 
cooperate when a genuine smile was exhibited and compete when a posed smile was 
exhibited) should also be observable during regular real-world social interactions. In 
this sense, it is suggested that facial expressions provide a means to identify 
conspecifics with whom cooperation does not risk exploitation. Genuine smiles, as 
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expressions that specify the dispositional properties of an individual experiencing a 
positive emotional state, are used to identify those interaction partners who are likely 
to be motivated and committed to cooperate, thereby initiating the establishment of a 
reciprocally cooperative interaction. Alternatively, posed smiles, as expressions 
unrelated to positive emotion state, do not call forth cooperative behaviour, and may 
in fact, facilitate competitive modes of interaction. 
The results of Experiment 3 are also very pertinent to a functional ecological 
conceptualisation of social perception and interaction. Beyond the claim of 
information as lawfully structured energy arrays specific to the objects, places, and 
events of the environment, Gibson (1979) introduced the concept of affordances, that 
is, the opportunities for acting and interacting specified by the available information 
relative to the individual (see Chapter 2). Related to the present research, McArthur 
and Baron (1983) have suggested that information specifying emotional states can be 
equated to information specifying social affordances. Specifically, it has been argued 
here that positive emotional states, exhibited in this case by a facial expression (i.e. a 
genuine smile), specify an opportunity to cooperate with a conspecific, while posed 
smiles, as expressions unrelated to emotional state, specify a distinctly different set of 
affordances. Consistent with Runeson and Frykholm's (1983; 1986) KSD principle 
(see Chapter 2), the dispositional properties underlying posed and genuine smiles (i.e. 
positive emotion versus intention) constrain the kinematic patterns and, therefore, the 
morphological appearance of these facial expressions. This is an important 
ontological claim in that by linking disposition directly to physiognomy there is a 
robust theoretical basis to contend that an isomorphic relationship exists between the 
emotional state (or alternatively, intentions and motivations) of an individual and their 
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facial expression. In turn, these expressions modulate the ambient (optical) array and 
specify, to an attuned social perceiver, this dispositional information and, therefore, 
disposition-relevant opportunities for interaction relative to the smiling individual. 
The results of Experiment 3 provide evidence that perceivers are able to use the 
different dispositional information specified by posed and genuine smiles 
respectively, to guide interaction. More specifically, when information specifying 
positive emotional state was available, cooperation in the Prisoners' Dilemma 
scenario was facilitated. By contrast, when no such information was available (i.e. the 
interaction partner was exhibiting a posed smile) competitive interactions were more 
likely. Drawing from Owren and Bachorowski's (2001) 'selfish-gene' theory 
regarding the evolutionary functions of posed and genuine smiles (see Chapters 1,2, 
and 6), and consistent with the Gibsonian monistic unit of analysis for psychology 
(i.e. the animal-environment interaction), it has been argued that the role of 
information specifying an opportunity to cooperate (i.e. information specifying a 
positive emotional state) extends beyond a specification of a simple environmental 
property. Here, positive emotional state is simultaneously a guide to identifying 
suitable partners for reciprocally cooperative interactions, as well as information that 
guides the individual to interact cooperatively. In this sense, information specifying 
positive emotional state and, therefore, cooperability, is expropriospecific (Lee, 1978, 
1980). It specifies the relationship between the individual and their environment (in 
this case another individual within the environment) relevant to available 
opportunities to interact (i.e. competition or cooperation). The presence of positive 
emotion, as information for the affordance of cooperability, points both ways, 
implicating both the perceiver and the referent of perception in a perception-action 
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cycle, and setting the occasion for mutual cooperation. A shared positive emotional 
state provides information by which fellow cooperators can be identified, as well as 
information relevant to an intention to cooperate. Acquisition of this information is 
likely to lead to cooperative interaction by suitably motivated individuals, as 
demonstrated by the results of Experiment 3. 
To conclude, the present program of research provided novel empirical evidence to 
illustrate that social perceivers can detect the meaningful ontological distinctions 
between posed and genuine smiles. Furthermore, it was also shown that such 
sensitivity is manifest in terms of functionally adaptive behaviour relevant to the 
opportunities to interact with smiling individuals. These results are believed to be the 
first rigorous empirical demonstration of the behavioural outcomes associated with 
the accurate perception of the emotional state specified by posed and genuine smiles 
respectively. Finally, the application of an ecological framework, specifically that of 
Gibsonian ecological psychology, to the study of social perception provides both 
theoretical and methodological innovation. It is suggested that the Gibsonian 
ecological view can lead to a more conceptually coherent account of psychological 
activity than currently offered by the information processing accounts of the dominant 
cognitivist approach evident within contemporary psychological research and 
theorising. 
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Appendix A: Facial Action Coding System (Ekman et aI., 2002) criteria for assessing 
contraction of Action Unit 12 (zygomatic major contraction) and Action Unit 6 
(orbicularis oculi contraction). 
Action Unit 12 - Lip Corner Puller 
The muscle underlying A U 12 emerges high up in the lower face by the cheek bones 
and attaches at the corner of the lips. In AU 12, the direction of the action is to pull 
the lip corners up towards the cheek bone in an oblique direction. 
Appearance Changes due to AU12 
1. Pulls the corners of the lips back and upward ( obliquely) creating a shape to the 
mouth. 
2. Deepens the nasolabial furrow, pulling it laterally and up. The skin adjacent to the 
nasolabial furrow is raised up and laterally. 
3. In a weak to moderate 12, there is some raising of the infraorbital triangle and there 
may be some deepening of the infraorbital furrow. 
4. In a strong action, one or more of the following: 
a. The infraorbital triangle push upwards is more evident. 
b. The infraorbital furrow deepening is more evident. 
c. Bags the skin below the lower eyelid. 
d. Narrows the eye aperture by pushing up the cheek and skin below the lower 
lid. 
e. Produces crow's feet at eye corners. 
f. May raise and widen the nostrils. 
g. May flatten and stretch the skin on the chin boss. 
5. Almost all of the appearance changes listed under 4 above (with the exception of 
changes f. and g.) can also be produced by AU 6 in the upper face. When you see a 
strong action of 12, often it is difficult to be certain whether the changes listed under 
change 4 above are due to 12 alone or to the combination of 6 plus 12 because a 
strong 12 hides many of the effects of 6. When the action of 12 is weak to moderate 
the appearance changes under 4 above do not occur, unless AU 6 has been added. 
With such weak to moderate actions of 12 you score 12 or 6+ 12 based upon 
whether the evidence of AU 6 is apparent. In either case, it is important to determine 
whether the appearances should be scored as 12 or 6+ 12. 
Intensity Scoring for AU 12 
AU12A 
The appearance changes for AU 12 are sufficiently present to indicate AU 12, but are 
insufficient to score 12B (e.g., a trace of raising of skin in the lower/middle nasolabial 
furrow area and a trace of lip corners elongated and angled up). You should 
emphasize detecting the oblique upward movement of the lip corners in low intensity 
12s that changes the angle of the lip corners. Note that neither AU 6 or 11 changes the 
angle of the lips, as does 12. 
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AU12B 
1. Skin in the area of the lower-middle portion ofthe nasolabial furrow or the furrow 
itself has been raised up and laterally slightly. If the nasolabial furrow is 
permanently etched, it usually deepens with a 12B, but the crucial change is that the 
skin in this area shifts obliquely. If the nasolabial furrow is not permanently etched, 
it may not appear with 12B. 
and 
2. Slight evidence that infraorbital triangle has been raised; most likely showing in 
lifting and puffing out of lateral top corner of infraorbital triangle. 
and 
3. Slight evidence that lip corners elongated and angled up. Ifupward angle is 
permanent, it must increase slightly. Note that when 6 is added to 12B there often is 
more evidence of the nasolabial furrow deepening than in 12B without 6, and the 
excursion of the lip corners is small in comparison to the extent of crow's feet 
wrinkles. Note that appearance changes 1 and 2, as expressed in words, could be 
due to AU 6, rather than AU 12. However, the appearance of 6 is noticeably 
different from 12. Furthermore, the appearance of 6 and 6+ 12 also differ. If there 
are other signs of AU 6, inspect carefully for change 3 to score AU 12. 
AU12C 
All three criteria for 12B above are present and all are at least marked, but the 
evidence is less than the criteria for 12D. 
AU12D 
Appearance changes 1 (lip corners raised obliquely to make U shape), 2 (deepened 
nasolabial furrow and oblique movement of skin in that area), and 4 in 12secA are all 
at least severe, but the evidence is less than the criteria for 12E. 
AU12E 
Appearance changes 1 (lip corners raised obliquely to make U shape), 2 (deepened 
nasolabial furrow and oblique movement of skin in that area), and 4 (infraorbital 
triangle raise, infraorbital furrow deepening, in 12secA must be extreme to maximum. 
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Action Unit 6 - Cheek Raiser and Lid Compressor 
The muscle undeflying A U 6 circles the eye orbit, with a circumference that extends 
into the eyebrow and below the lower eye furrow. Action Unit 6 pulls skin towards the 
eye. 
A. Appearance Changes due to AU 6 
1. Draws skin towards the eye from the temple and cheeks as the outer band of 
muscle around the eye constricts. 
2. Raises the infraorbital triangle, lifting the cheek upwards. 
3. Pushes the skin surrounding the eye towards the eye socket, which can narrow the 
eye aperture, bag or wrinkle the skin below the eye, and push the eye cover fold 
down and/or change its shape. 
4. May cause crow's feet lines or wrinkles to appear, extending radially from the outer 
comers of the eye aperture. 
5. Deepens the lower eyelid furrow. 
6. May lower lateral portion of the eyebrows to a small extent. 
7. A strong AU 6 may: 
a. Make evident or deepen the nasolabial furrow. 
b. Raise the outer portions of the upper lip to a small extent. 
c. Make evident or deepen the infraorbital furrow, so that this wrinkle 
lUns across the top of the infraorbital triangle in a straight or crescent-
like shape. 
8. Ifthere is evidence of 6 on one side of the face and 7 on the other side, score it as a 
bilateral 6, unless you are scoring the asymmetry of 6 and 7. 
Intensity Scoring for AU 6 
AU6A 
The appearance changes for AU 6 are sufficiently present to indicate AU 6, but are 
insufficient to score 6B (e.g., slight crow's feet or slight cheek raise). 
AU6B 
Marked change on either criterion 1 or 2 below or slight on both 1 and 2 is sufficient 
to score 6B. 
1. Crow's feet wrinkles; if present in neutral, they must increase. 
or 
2. Infraorbital triangle raise: cheeks up, infraorbital furrow deepened, and bags or 
wrinkles under eyes; if present in neutral, the furrow and either bags or wrinkles 
under the eyes must increase. 
AU6C 
The crow's feet wrinkling and infraorbital triangle raising criteria for 6B are both 
present and both are at least marked, but the evidence is less than the criteria for 6D. 
AU6D 
The crow's feet wrinkling and infraorbital triangle raising criteria for 6B are both 
present and both are at least severe, but the evidence is less than the criteria for 6E. 
AU6E 
Crow's feet wrinkling and infraorbital triangle raising are both present, with the 
infraorbital triangle and cheek raising in the maximum range. 
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L6+R7 or R6+L7: If6 can be scored on one side of the face and 7 on the other side, 
score as bilateral 6, unless you are scoring asymmetry. 
Appendix B: Analogue mood scale 
Participant #: 
Sex: 
Date: 
Please indicate with a line(--J your current mo~ the vertical bar below: 
Very Positive V 
Neutral 
Very Negative 
(t! \:J 
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Appendix C: Overview of procedure and materials for generation of facial displays 
Phase Part Description 
Intro Welcome & instructions 
Mood scale 1 
1 Neutral a neutral expression 
Mood scale 2 
2 Posed smile a smile 
b passport photo 
c family portrait 
d photo with PM 
e photo for CV 
f photo for drivers licence 
Mood scale 3 
Instructions 
3 Mood indctn. a Classical music: Allegro movements (4:05 minutes) 
Mozali Divertimento #136 
Vivaldi Concerto ... g major 
Mozart Eine Kleine Nacht Musik 
Mood scale 4 
Instructions 
Males Females 
4 Genuine smile 1 a cardinal (116) choir (812) 
(lADS #) b rock and roll (815) rock and roll (815) 
c erotic female (201) baseball (353) 
d sport crowd (352) boy laugh (220) 
e boy laugh (220) erotic couple (215) 
f funk music (820) funk music (820) 
g baby laugh (110) male laugh (221) 
h applause (351) applause (351) 
erotic female (202) baby laugh (110) 
J baseball (353) erotic female (201) 
k erotic couple (215) applause (401) 
Mood scale 5 
Instructions 
5 Genuine smile 2a kitten (1460) garden (5760) 
(lAPS #) b erotic couple (4607) dolphin soccer (1920) 
c snow skiing (8190) seal (1440) 
d erotic female (4180) baby (2050) 
e baby (2050) kitten (1460) 
f rabbits (1750) puppies (1710) 
g baby (2040) baby (2057) 
h dolphin soccer (1920) rabbit (1610) 
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baby (2070) rabbits (1750) 
J erotic female (4220) baby (2040) 
k babies (2080) ladies (2395) 
1 erotic female (4250) erotic couple (4607) 
m puppies (1710) sunset (5830) 
n erotic female (4210) baby (2058) 
0 erotic female (4232) baby (2070) 
p seal (1440) babies (2080) 
q erotic couple (4664) children (2091) 
r erotic couple (4652) snow skiing (8190) 
s car (8510) man and baby (2165) 
t baby (2260) grandfather and kids (2340) 
Moodscale 6 
END. 
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Appendix D: Overview of coding of smiles using F ACS action units 12 and 6 for each 
participant for the facial display generation procedure. 
Table Dl· Female participant 1 (Fl) facial display generation procedure results 
PHASE AUl2? AU6? Other AUs? 
la n 
2a y n 
2b y n 
2c y n 
2d y n 
2e y n 
2f y n 
4a n n 
4b y Y 
4c n 
4d n 
4e y n 
4f n 
4g n 
4h n 
4i y 
4i n 
4k n 
5a n 
5b n 
5c n 
5d n 
5e n 
5f n 
5g y n 
5h n 
5i n 
5j n 
5k n 
51 n 
5m 
5n 
50 
5p 
5q 
5r 
5s 
5t 
Total Posed: 9 Total Genuine: 1 
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Table D2: Female participant 2 (F2) facial display generation procedure results 
PHASE AU12? AU6? Other AUs? 
la n 
2a y n y 
2b Y n Y 
2c y n 
2d y n 
2e y n 
2f y n 
4a n 
4b y ? 
4c n 
4d y n 
4e n 
4f n 
4g y n 
4h n 
4i y n 
4i y n 
4k n 
5a n 
5b y n 
5c y n 
5d n 
5e n 
5f n 
5g y n 
5h y n 
5i y n 
5j y n 
5k y n 
51 y 
5m y n 
5n n 
50 
5p 
5q 
5r 
5s 
5t 
Total Posed: 20 
Total Genuine: 0 
Notes: 
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Table D3: Female participant 3 (F3) facial display generation procedure results 
PHASE AU12? AU6? Other AUs? 
la n 
2a y n 
2b y n 
2c y n 
2d y n 
2e 'i_ n 
2f y n 
4a n 
4b n 
4c n 
4d y 
4e y 
4f Y 
4g n 
4h n 
4i y 
4j Y 
4k Y 
Sa 
Sb y 
Sc 
Sd 
Se 
Sf 
Sg 
Sh 
Si 
Sj 
Sk 
Sl 
Sm 
Sn 
So 
Sp 
Sq 
Sr 
Ss 
St 
Total Posed: 13 
Total Genuine: 
Notes: Hair occluded AU6 area, could not code Phases 4 and S. 
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Table D4: Female participant 4 (F4) facial display generation procedure results 
PHASE AUl2? AU6? Other AUs? 
1a n 
2a y n 
2b y Y 
2c y n 
2d y n 
2e y n 
2f y n 
4a n 
4b n 
4c n 
4d y n 
4e n 
4f n 
4g n 
4h n 
4i y n 
4j n 
4k n 
5a n 
5b y n 
5c n 
5d n 
5e y n y 
5f Y n 
5g n 
5h n 
5i n 
5j n 
5k n 
51 y n 
5m n 
5n n 
50 y Y Y 
5p Y n 
5q y n 
5r n 
5s n 
5t n 
Total Posed: 13 
Total Genuine: 2 
Notes: 
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Table D5:Fernale participant 5 (F5) facial display generation procedure results 
PHASE AU12? AU6? Other AUs? 
la n 
2a y n 
2b y n 
2c y n 
2d y n 
2e y n 
2f n 
4a n 
4b y Y 
4c y n 
4d y y 
4e y y 
4f Y Y 
4g Y n 
4h y n 
4i y Y 
4j y y 
4k n 
5a n 
5b y n 
5c n 
5d n 
5e n 
5f y n 
5g y n 
5h n 
5i n 
5j n 
5k n 
51 y n 
5m n 
5n n 
50 n 
5p n 
5q n 
5r n 
5s n 
5t y 
Total Posed: 13 
Total Genuine: 6 
Notes: 
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Table D6: Female participant 6 (F6) facial display generation procedure results 
PHASE AUl2? AU6? Other AUs? 
1a n 
2a y ? 
2b Y n 
2c y y 
2d Y n 
2e y y 
2f Y n 
4a n 
4b y y 
4c n 
4d y ? 
4e y y 
4f Y ? Y 
4g y n 
4h y Y 
4i n 
4j n 
4k y n 
5a y n 
5b y Y 
5c y y 
5d Y Y 
5e y y 
5f Y Y 
5g Y Y 
5h Y Y 
5i y n 
5j y n 
5k y n 
51 n 
5m y n 
5n y y 
50 Y Y 
5p Y Y Y 
5q Y n 
5r n 
5s y y 
5t Y n 
Total Posed: 14 
Total Genuine: 16 
Notes: 
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Table D7: Female participant 7 (F7) facial display generation procedure results 
PHASE AUl2? AU6? Other AUs? 
la n 
2a y n 
2b y n 
2c y n 
2d y n 
2e y n 
2f y n 
4a y n 
4b y Y Y 
4c y n 
4d y n 
4e y n 
4f n 
4g y n 
4h n 
4i y n 
4j n 
4k y Y 
5a n 
5b y n 
5c y n 
5d y n 
5e n 
5f y n 
5g y n 
5h n 
5i y n 
5j n 
5k n 
51 y n 
5m n 
5n y n 
50 n 
5p y n 
5q y n 
5r y n 
5s n 
5t y n 
Total Posed: 24 
Total Genuine: 2 
Notes: 
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Table D8: Female participant 8 (F8) facial display generation procedure results 
PHASE AUl2? AU6? Other ADs? 
la n 
2a y y y 
2b Y n 
2c y y 
2d Y n 
2e y ? 
2f Y n 
4a n 
4b n 
4c n 
4d n 
4e y y 
4f n 
4g n 
4h n 
4i n 
4j y n 
4k n 
5a n 
5b n 
5c n 
5d n 
5e n 
5f n 
5g n 
5h n 
5i n 
5j n 
5k n 
51 n 
5m y n 
5n n 
50 n 
5p n 
5q n 
5r n 
5s n 
5t n 
Total Posed: 6 
Total Genuine: 3 
Notes: 
319 
Table D9: Male participant 1 (Ml) facial display generation procedure results 
PHASE AUI2? AU6? . Other AUs? 
Ia n 
2a y n 
2b y n 
2c y n 
2d y n 
2e y n 
2f n 
4a n 
4b y n 
4c n 
4d n 
4e y ? 
4f n 
4g n 
4h n 
4i n 
4j n 
4k y n 
5a y ? 
5b Y n 
5c n 
5d n 
5e n 
5f n 
5g n 
5h n 
5i n 
5j n 
5k n 
51 n 
5m n 
5n n 
50 n 
5p n 
5q y n 
5r n 
5s n 
5t n 
Total Posed: 11 
Total Genuine: 0 
Notes: 
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Table DIO: Male participant 2 (M2) facial display generation procedure results 
PHASE AU12? AU6? Other AUs? 
1a n 
2a y n 
2b y n 
2c n 
2d n 
2e n y 
2f n 
4a n 
4b n 
4c n 
4d n 
4e y n 
4f y n 
4g y n 
4h n 
4i y Y 
4j Y n 
4k y n 
5a n 
5b y n y 
5c n 
5d n y 
5e n 
5f n 
5g n 
5h y 
5i Y 
5j n 
5k n 
51 n 
5m y n 
5n n 
50 n 
5p n 
5q n 
5r n 
5s n 
5t n 
Total Posed: 11 
Total Genuine: 
Notes: 
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Table D 11: Male participant 3 (M3) facial display generation procedure results 
PHASE AU12? AU6? Other AUs? 
la n 
2a y n 
2b y n 
2c y ? 
2d Y n 
2e y n 
2f y n 
4a n 
4b y y 
4c y ? 
4d n 
4e y 
4f Y n 
4g y n 
4h n 
4i n 
4i n 
4k y 
5a n 
5b y 
5c n 
5d n 
5e n 
5f n 
5g y n 
5h y ? 
5i n 
5j n 
5k n 
51 y n 
5m n 
5n y n 
50 n 
5p n 
5q y n 
5r y y 
5s n 
5t n 
Total Posed: 18 
Total Genuine: 2 
Notes: 
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Table Dl2: Male participant 4 (M4) facial display generation procedure results 
PHASE AU12? AU6? Other AUs? 
la n 
2a X n 
2b y n 
2c y n 
2d y n 
2e n 
2f y 
4a n 
4b y n 
4c n 
4d n 
4e n 
4f n 
4g n 
4h n 
4i y Y ? 
4j n 
4k y Y Y 
5a n 
5b y Y Y 
5c n 
5d y n 
5e y y y 
5f n 
5g n 
5h n 
5i n 
5j n 
5k n 
51 n 
5m n 
5n y y y 
50 n 
5p n 
5q n 
5f n 
5s n 
5t n 
Total Posed: 7 
Total Genuine: 5 
Notes: 
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Table D13: Male participant 5 (M5) facial display generation procedure results 
PHASE AUl2? AU6? Other AUs? 
la n 
2a n 
2b y n 
2c n 
2d y n 
2e n 
2f n 
4a n 
4b y n 
4c y y y 
4d n 
4e n 
4f y n 
4g n 
4h n 
4i n 
4j n 
4k y y y? 
5a n 
5b y Y Y 
5c n 
5d y Y Y 
5e n 
5f n 
5g n 
5h n 
5i n 
5j n 
5k n 
51 n 
5m n 
5n y ? 
50 n 
5p n 
5q n 
5r y n 
5s n 
5t n 
Total Posed: 6 
Total Genuine: 4 
Notes: 
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Table D 14: Summary of facial display generation procedure results for all participants 
Participant Posed smiles Genuine smiles Total smiles 
Fl 9 1 10 
F2 20 0 20 
F3 ab 13 - 13 
F4b 13 2 15 
F5 13 6 19 
F6 14 16 30 
F7 24 2 26 
F8 6 3 9 
Ml 11 0 11 
M2 11 1 12 
M3 18 2 20 
M4 7 5 12 
M5 6 4 10 
Total 165 42 207 
a No genuine smiles could be coded for this participant as her hair occluded the AU6 (orbicularis 
oculi) region during phases 4 and 5 of the facial display generation procedure. 
b These participants did not meet the criteria for an increase in self-reported mood during the genuine 
smile phases of the procedure. Hence no genuine smiles from these participants were considered for 
use in the present research. 
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Appendix E: Graphs of self-reported mood for each participant in the facial display 
generation procedure. 
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Appendix F: Infonnation sheet for Experiments la and lb. 
Department of Psychology University of Canterbury 
Forming Impressions From Faces: Information Sheet 
You are invited to participate in the above-named research project. The 
aim of this project is to examine whether different types of facial 
expressions lead people to form different types of impressions. In 
particular, we are interested in the idea that our expression and experience 
of emotion do not have to be the same. Sometimes we can be 
experiencing an emotion but not express it, and other times we can 
express an emotion without having to experience it. For instance if you 
encounter a person who you do not particularly like, often you will hide 
your displeasure and perhaps smile politely. 
Your participation will involve completion of a computer administered 
face judgment task. In total, participation will take less than lO minutes. 
You are free to withdraw from the project at any time, including 
withdrawal of any information you have provided. 
The results of this project may be published, but you can be assured of 
the complete confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation. To 
ensure anonymity and confidentiality, you are not asked to provide any 
identifying information at any stage of the project. 
By completing the study, however, it will be understood that you have 
consented to participate in the proj ect, and that you consent to the 
publication of the results of the project with the understanding that 
anonymity will be preserved. 
The project is being carried out by Lynden Miles, under the supervision 
of Dr Lucy Johnston. Lynden can be contacted on 364 2987, x7704 or 
lkm2l @student.canterbUly.ac.nz, to discuss any questions you may have 
regrading participation in this project. 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of 
Canterbury Human Ethics Committee. 
Appendix G: Consent fonn for Experiments la and 1 b 
Department of Psychology University of Canterbury 
Forming Impressions From Faces: Consent Form 
I, the undersigned, have read and understood the infonnation sheet for the study 
'Forming Impressions from Faces'. I consent to participate and understand that the 
results of this study may be published, but my anonymity will be preserved. 
Signed: Date: / / 
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Appendix H: Formulae for calculation of non-parametric indices of sensitivity (A ') 
and response bias (B "). 
Sensitivity (A '): 
• ForH~FA: A'=0.5+[(H-FA)(1+H-FA)]/[4H(1-FA)] 
• For FA> H: A' = 0.5 - [(FA -H)(1 + FA -H)] / [4FA(1-H)] 
Response bias (B "): 
• ForH~FA: B"=[H(1-H)-FA(1-FA)]/[(H(1-H) +FA(1-FA)] 
• ForFA>H: B"=[FA(l-FA)-H(1-H)]/[(FA(l-FA)+H(1-H)] 
Where H = hit rate, and FA = false alarm rate. 
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Appendix I: List of target words used for Experiment 2 
Positive words Mean valence rating (s.d.) 
Approachable 7.54 (1.56) 
Authentic 7.85 (1.34) 
Decent 7.90 (1.64) 
Friendly 8.43 (1.08) 
Fun 8.37 (l.11) 
Genuine 7.99 (l.23) 
Honest 7.70 (1.43) 
Joy 8.60 (0.71) 
Kiss 8.26 (1.54) 
Love 8.72 (0.70) 
Respectable 7.64 (1.29) 
Sincere 7.94 (1.45) 
Trustworthy 7.68 (2.61) 
Truthful 7.80 (l.29) 
Valid 7.76 (1.45) 
Negative words Mean valence rating (s.d.) 
Bogus 2.45 (1.56) 
Corrupt 2.32 (1.23) 
Deceitful 2.50 (1.63) 
Depressed 1.83 (1.42) 
Devious 2.21 (1.99) 
Dishonest 1.93 (1.61) 
Failure 1.70 (1.07) 
False 2.27 (1.40) 
Fraud 2.47 (1.66) 
Hate 2.12 (1.72) 
Liar 2.31 (1.78) 
Repulsive 2.01 (1.32) 
Sad 1.61 (0.95) 
Terrible 1.93 (1.44) 
Umeliable 2.34 (1.67) 
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Appendix J: Information sheet for Experiment 2 
Department of Psychology University of Canterbury 
Mood and Word Recognition: Information Sheet 
You are invited to participate in the above-named research project. The 
aim of this project is to examine the effects of mood on a word judgement 
task. 
Your participation will involve completion of a very short questionnaire, 
followed by a computer administered word recognition task. In total, 
participation will take less than 20 minutes. In return you will be given a 
'scratch and win' lottery ticket. You are free to withdraw from the 
project at any time, including withdrawal of any information you have 
provided. 
The results of this project may be published, but you can be assured of 
the complete confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation. To 
ensure anonymity and confidentiality, you are not asked to provide any 
identifying information at any stage of the project. 
By completing the study, however, it will be understood that you have 
consented to participate in the project, and that you consent to the 
publication of the results of the project with the understanding that 
anonymity will be preserved. 
The project is being carried out by Lynden Miles, under the supervision 
of Dr Lucy Johnston. Lynden can be contacted on 364 2987, x7704 or 
llan21@student.canterbury.ac.nz, to discuss any questions you may have 
regrading participation in this project. 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of 
Canterbury Human Ethics Committee. 
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Appendix K: Consent form for Experiment 2. 
Department of Psychology University of Canterbury 
Mood and Word Recognition: Consent Form 
I, the undersigned, have read and understood the information sheet for the study 
'Mood and word Recognition'. I consent to participate and understand that the results 
of this study may be published, but my anonymity will be preserved. 
Signed: Date: / / 
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Appendix L: Summary of data cleaning by participant for Experiment 2. 
Table Ll: Data removed (errors and outliers) by participant 
Partide.ant Trials # correct 0/0 errors # outliers % outliers # remain % remain 
1 300 276 8.0 7 2.5 269 89.7 
2 300 290 3.3 4 1.4 286 95.3 
3 300 295 1.7 5 1.7 290 96.7 
4 300 289 3.7 4 1.4 285 95.0 
5 300 270 10.0 7 2.6 263 87.7 
6 300 281 6.3 5 1.8 276 92.0 
7 300 247 17.7 4 1.6 243 81.0 
8 300 281 6.3 3 1.1 278 92.7 
9 300 285 5.0 4 1.4 281 93.7 
10 300 294 2.0 4 1.4 290 96.7 
11 300 293 2.3 5 1.7 288 96.0 
12 300 274 8.7 4 1.5 270 90.0 
l3 300 294 2.0 3 1.0 291 97.0 
14 300 286 4.7 3 1.0 283 94.3 
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Appendix M: General fonn and conditions for the Prisoners' Dilemma (adapted from 
Kuhlman and Marshello, 1975) 
PersonB 
PersonA Cooperation Defection 
Cooperation R/R SIT 
Defection TIS PIP 
The first value in each cell is person A's payoff, while the second value is person B's 
payoff. Following Rapaport and Chammah (1965), R indicates reward for mutual 
cooperation, S indicates sucker's payoff, T is temptation to defect, and Pis 
punishment for mutual defection. 
A prisoners' dilemma game obtains when the following inequalities are satisfied: 
1. T>R>P>S 
2. 2R > T + S > 2P 
In the present research P = 4, R = 6, S = 3, and T = 7, which confonn to the general 
fonn and conditions of the Prisoners' Dilemma: 
1. 7>6>4>3 
2. 12> 10> 8 
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Appendix N: Social Value Orientation task, Experiment3. 
Department of Psychology . University of Canterbury 
Social Psychology and Cyberspace: 
Communicating Across the Internet 
INTERACTION TASK 1: OVERVIEW 
In this task you will be randomly paired with another participant, whom 
we will simply refer to as the "Other". For this task, the identity of the 
other participant will remain anonymous - you won't find out who they 
are, and they won't find out who you are. Both you and the other 
participant will be making choices by circling one of the letters: A, B or 
C. Your choices will produce points for both you and the other 
participant. Likewise, the other person's choice will produce points for 
them and for you. Every point has value: the more points you receive 
(from both yourself and the other participant) the more you will be paid 
for completing this part if the study, and likewise the more points the 
other participant receives the more they will be paid. 
Here is an example of how this task works: 
You get 
Other gets 
A 
500 
100 
B 
500 
500 
C 
550 
300 
In this example if you chose A you would receive 500 points and the 
other person would receive 100 points; if you chose B you would receive 
500 points and the other person would receive 500 points; if you chose C 
you would receive 550 points and the other person would receive 300 
points. So, you see that your choice influences both the number of points 
you receive and the number of points the other person receives. 
Before you begin making choices, please keep in mind that there are no 
right or wrong answers - choose the option that you, for whatever reason, 
prefer the most. Also, remember that the points have value: the more you 
accumulate the more you will be paid for completing this part of the 
study. Likewise, from the other's point of view, the more points they 
accumulate the more they will be paid. 
Ask the experimenter now if you have any questions. 
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For each of the nine choice situations below, circle A, B or C 
depending on the option you prefer the most. 
A B C 
(1) You get 4.80 5.40 4.80 
Other gets .80 2.80 4.80 
A B C 
(2) You get 5.60 5.00 5.00 
Other gets 3.00 5.00 1.00 
A B C 
(3) You get 5.20 5.20 5.80 
Other gets 5.20 1.20 3.20 
A B C 
(4) You get 5.00 5.60 4.90 
Other gets 1.00 3.00 4.90 
A B C 
(5) You get 5.60 5.00 4.90 
Other gets 3.00 5.00 .90 
A B C 
(6) You get 5.00 5.00 5.70 
Other gets 5.00 1.00 3.00 
A B C 
(7) You get 5.10 5.60 5.10 
Other gets 5.10 3.00 1.10 
A B C 
(8) You get 5.50 5.00 5.00 
Other gets 3.00 1.00 5.00 
A B C 
(9) You get 4.80 4.90 5.40 
Other gets 1.00 4.90 3.00 
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Appendix 0: Resource Dilemma task, Experiment 3 
Department of Psychology University of CC!nterbury 
Social Psychology and Cyberspace: 
Communicating Across the Internet 
INTERACTION TASK 2: OVERVIEW 
In this task, you will be interacting with another participant located in a 
separate testing room in the Psychology Department. Interaction will 
occur via a network linle using the university's intranet. To ensure this 
technology runs smoothly it is important that you follow all instructions 
for this task carefully. 
F or this task, you take on the role of the captain of a fishing boat licensed 
to catch fish from a small lake. The total number of fish you are able to 
harvest will determine your success as a fishing boat captain and 
ultimately how much payment you receive for this task. The lake starts 
out with a total stock of 100 fish and only you and one other boat are 
permitted to take fish from this lake. Every season you are each able to 
catch 15 fish, but the total number offish in the lake must never fall 
below 70 or you will have your fishing boat and all profits confiscated. 
Therefore, at the end of each season you have the opportunity to return 
some, or all, of your catch to the lake. The captain of the other boat also 
has this opportunity although you have no means of communication with 
this boat therefore can never know how many fish they caught/returned. 
Whether you return any fish to the lake or not influences the number of 
fish available in the subsequent season according to the accompanying 
table. For example, if you return 2 fish to the lake, in the next season 
there will be 20 fewer fish available; while if you return 13 fish to the 
lake, in the next season there will be 35 more fish available. Remember 
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that these numbers only apply to the fish you catch -. not the fish caught 
by the other fishing boat. 
You will play several seasons of this 'fishing task'. For each season, you 
are simply required to indicate how many fish, out of your catch of 15, 
you wish to return to the lake. If the number of fish in the lake at the start 
of any season ever drops below 70 the game is over. Keep in mind there 
are no right or wrong answers, but remember that the more fish you can 
harvest, the more successful you will be as a fishing boat captain and the 
more money you will be paid for completing this task. 
Number of fish returned 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Effect on number of fish in lake 
-30 
.. 25 
-20 
-15 
-10 
-5 
o 
+5 
+10 
+15 
+20 
+25 
+30 
+35 
+40 
+45 
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Appendix P; Prisoners' Dilemma task, Experiment 3. 
Department of Psychology University of Canterbury 
Social Psychology and Cyberspace: 
Communicating Across the Internet 
INTERACTION TASK 3: OVERVIEW 
In this task you will be interacting with other participants located in 
separate testing rooms in the Psychology Department. Interaction will 
occur via video links using the university computer network. To ensure 
this technology runs smoothly it is important that you follow all 
instructions for this task carefully. 
Each interaction will last for approximately 1 minute. During this time, 
you will have an opportunity to see your partner, and they will have an 
opportunity to see you. You will then both be faced with a simple 
decision; choose one of two options: 'A' or 'B'. Your choice, in 
conjunction with the choice of your partner, will determine how many 
points you receive for that trial. The more points you accumulate, the 
more money you will be paid for completing this task. Points will be 
allocated according to the table below: 
You 
A 
B 
A 
6 (6) 
7 (3) 
Partner 
B 
3 (7) 
4 (4) 
The first number represents how many points you will receive and the 
number in brackets represents how many points your partner will receive. 
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To many people the optimal strategy for this task seems obvious, and 
their reasoning may appear flawless. Either your partner is going to 
choose 'A' or to 'B'. Logically those are the only two possibilities. But 
either way, you would do better, that is get more points, choosing 'B' 
rather than choosing' A'. Hence, it may seem that if you are 'rational', 
you will choose 'B'. However, the same reasoning would seem to apply 
to your partner with equal validity. That is, if they are 'rational', they will 
also choose 'B'. In short, if you are both 'rational', you will both choose 
'B' and receive 4 points - substantially less than the maximum on offer. 
Remember that the more points you accumulate, the more you will be 
paid for completing this task. 
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Appendix Q: Information sheet, Experiment 3. 
Department of Psychology University of Canterbury 
Social Psychology and Cyberspace: 
Communicating Across the Internet 
Participant Information 
You are invited to participate in the above-named research project. The 
aim of this project is to examine aspects of the ways people communicate 
when using the internet. 
Your participation will involve completing two short questionnaires, 
followed by two interaction tasks using computers, and a short 
recognition task. This procedure will take no longer than one hour and, 
depending on your performance during these tasks, you will receive a 
voucher worth between $5 and $25 in return. You are free to withdraw 
from the proj ect at any time, including withdrawal of any information you 
have provided. 
The results of this project may be published, but you can be assured of 
the complete confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation. To 
ensure anonymity and confidentiality, you are not asked to provide any 
identifying information at any stage of the project. 
By completing the study, however, it will be understood that you have 
consented to participate in the project, and that you consent to the 
publication of the results of the project with the understanding that 
anonymity will be preserved. 
The project is being carried out by Lynden Miles, under the supervision 
of Dr Lucy Johnston. Lynden can be contacted on 364 2987, x7704 or 
Ikm21 @student.canterbury.ac.nz, to discuss any questions you may have 
regarding participation in this project. 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of 
Canterbury Human Ethics Committee. 
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Appendix R: Consent form 1, Experiment 3 
Department of Psychology University of Canterbury 
Social Psychology and Cyberspace: Consent Form I 
I, the undersigned, have read and understood the information sheet for the study 
'Social Psychology and Cyberspace: Communication and the Internet'. I consent to 
participate and understand that the results of this study may be published, but my 
anonymity will be preserved. 
I understand also that I may at any time withdraw from the project, induding 
withdrawal of any information I have provided. 
Name: 
Signed: Date: / / 
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Appendix S: Debriefing questionnaire, Experiment 3 
Department of Psychology University of Canterbury 
Social Psychology and Cyberspace: 
Communicating Across the Internet 
Please answer the following questions after you have completed all interaction tasks: 
1. What strategies did you use to decide how to interact with each partner 
2. What do you think the purpose of the study was? 
3. Did any part of the study seem strange or suspicious to you? If so please 
describe. 
- Thankyou for your participation -
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Appendix T: Debriefing sheet, Experiment 3 
Department of Psychology University of Canterbury 
Social Psychology in Cyberspace: Debriefing Sheet 
Thank you for participating in this project. In the information given to you prior to 
your participation, you were told that part of this study would involve interacting with 
other people using web cameras across the internet. In fact, this was not the case. The 
other 'participants' you saw were in fact videos we had prepared for the purposes of 
this study. Furthermore, the payment you receive for participating in this study was 
not determined by your success in the interaction task - all participants received a $10 
voucher for completing this stage of the study. The actual purpose of the study was to 
gauge whether the facial expressions exhibited by the people in the videos influenced 
the way you behaved during the interaction task. Specifically, some of the facial 
expressions were genuine smiles and some were posed smiles. It is important to be 
sensitive to the difference between these expressions as a genuine smile is an honest 
signal of happiness, while, by comparison, a posed smile is an attempt to simulate a 
genuine expression without experiencing the underlying emotional state. In this sense, 
a posed smile can be considered a form interpersonal deception. We predicted that 
you would cooperate with the individuals exhibiting genuine smiles to a greater 
degree than with those exhibiting posed smiles. 
It was necessary to deceive you in this manner for two reasons. Firstly, a genuine 
smile is a spontaneous expression of enjoyment that cannot be generated on demand. 
In other words, posing a genuine smile is not possible. Therefore we used videos of 
people exhibiting this expression in order to have control over what facial expressions 
you perceived during each interaction. Secondly, it was important to keep you blind to 
the specific hypothesis of the study, so as not to influence your responses. 
The results from this study will be available in approximately two months time. If you 
are interested in these results when they become available, or have any questions 
regarding this study, please inform the experimenter. 
Thank you. 
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Appendix U: Consent form 2, Experiment 3. 
Department of Psychology University of Canterbury 
Social Psychology and Cyberspace: Consent Form II 
I, the undersigned, have read and understood the debriefing sheet for the study' Social 
Psychology and Cyberspace: Communication and the Internet'. I give permission for 
the data that I have provided to be retained for the purposes of the research and 
understand that the results of this study may be published, but my anonymity will be 
preserved. 
I understand also that I may at any time withdraw from the project, including 
withdrawal of any information I have provided. 
Name: 
Signed: Date: / / 
Payment received: 
